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ABSTRACT 
 
The first essay studies the effects of exogenous and endogenous shocks on output 
sustainability in Central Eastern Europe and Russia during the 2000s. It expands traditional vector 
autoregressive model to a multi-country model that relates bank real lending, the cyclical component 
of output and spreads and accounts for cross-sectional dependence across the countries. Impulse 
response functions show that exogenous positive shock lead to a drop in output sustainability for 
nine over twelve Central Eastern European countries, when the endogenous shock is mild and 
ambiguous. Moreover the effect of the exogenous shock is more significant in the aftermath the 
crises. 
The second essay investigates variation in entrepreneurship across cities of Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) during 1995-2008, utilizing a unique dataset and employing the System 
Generalised Method of Moments technique. Institutional theory is used to unveil the effects of 
various institutional domains on heterogeneity of entrepreneurship across CIS cities. The findings 
suggest that banking reform facilitates entrepreneurship, whereas the size of the state discourages it. 
We also find that cities with higher number of universities are likely to have higher entrepreneurial 
entry, with the effect reinforced further through university-industry collaboration which highlights 
the importance of the knowledge spillover channel. 
The third essay aims to assess the returns to patenting and knowledge expenditure in the form 
of innovative training and education for a matched Community Innovation Survey database (CIS) 
with the Business Survey Database (BSD) of 4049 UK firms. It also quantifies the incentives that 
patent protection provides for training expenditure. Controlling for additional firm-specific and 
industrial characteristics, patent and training premia were estimated viz. the additional new product 
revenues generated by obtaining a patent and by increase in spending on innovative training. Both 
patent and training premia are positive, however, there is no inducement for additional knowledge 
expenditure for a patent holder as expected from the literature. Returns to training vary across firms 
of different age and during the economically-constrained times: higher returns on training during the 
crisis and lower returns before the crisis. The study fills a gap in calculation of returns to knowledge, 
patent propensity for the UK innovators, and the impact of patent protection on further investment in 
knowledge.  
3 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
First, I would like to thank my supervisor Professors Giorgio Barba-Navaretti  and Professors Franco 
Donzelli, Michele Santoni and Alessandro Missale from the University of Milan who made my PhD 
study in Italy possible; for their support, guidance, inspiration, understanding and encouragement 
over the years that it has taken to complete my thesis.  
My friends and paper co-authors Dr. Jana Peliova from the University of Economics in Bratislava, 
Dr. Julia Korosteleva and Prof. Tomasz Mickiewicz from School of Slavonic and Eastern European 
Studies, University College London and Dr. Yulia Rodionova from Leicester Business School who 
have been tireless in their reading of drafts and guiding me through my analysis, for which I am very 
grateful.  
 
4 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
Some of the material contained in this thesis has been presented in the following publications: 
 
Chapter 1. 
 
Journal Papers: 
1. Belitski, M., Péliová, J., 2011. Output Sustainability to Exogenous and Endogenous Shocks: 
Evidence from Emerging Economies. International Journal of Sustainable Economy 3(3), 255-280 
2. Belitski, M., Péliová, J., 2009. Analysis of ad-hoc monetary shocks in Central and Eastern 
Europe  (Analýza ad-hoc monetárnych šokov v strednej a východnej Európe), Nová ekonomika: 
vedecký časopis Národohospodárskej fakulty Ekonomickej univerzity v Bratislave = Faculty of 
National Economy, University of Economics in Bratislava scientific journal = The New economy. - 
Bratislava: EKONÓM, 2009. - ISSN 1336-1732. - Roč. 2, č. 3, s. 86-99. (published) 
 
Chapter 2. 
 
Journal Papers: 
Belitski, M. and Korosteleva, J. (2011) Entrepreneurship and cities: Evidence from post-communist 
world, WIFO Working Papers, 2011. Available at 
http://www.icsb2011.org/download/18.62efe22412f41132d41800011708/74.pdf 
 
Books: 
Belitski, M. 2010. Foreign direct investment in innovation: policy coordination in regional unions. In 
Rudenkov, V. (Ed.). International business vectors (pp.308-318). Minsk: Institute of Economics. 
Publisher Law & Economics. (published) 
 
Chapter 3. 
 
Report: 
Arora, A, Athreye, S., and M. Belitski. 2011. Returns to patenting. Report on IPO UK project ‗Patent 
incentives‘ No 11004, IPO UK September 2011. 
 
5 
 
 
List of contents 
 
Abstract 
Dedication 
Acknowledgements 
Declaration 
List of Tables 
List of Figures 
 
Chapter 1 
 1.1. Introduction 
1.2.  Theoretical framework and hypothesis tested  
1.3.  VAR Estimation and Analysis 
1.4.  Variance Decompositions 
1.5.  Impulse response analyses 
1.6.  The Aftermath of Crisis: Variance Decomposition 
1.7.  Conclusion 
 
Chapter 2 
2.1.      Introduction 
2.1. Theoretical concepts, hypothesis and controls  
2.2.1.  Entrepreneurship in the context of transition 
2.2.2.  Institutional theory 
2.2.3.  The four-pillar institutional framework 
2.2.4.  Understanding the role of higher education institutions: integrated approach 
2.2.5.  Other controls 
2.4. Data and methodology 
2.4.1. Sample Description 
2.4.2. Variable Definition 
2.4.3. Methodology 
2.4.4. Empirical results and discussion  and discussion 
2.4.5. Conclusions 
 
Chapter 3 
3.1.  Introduction 
3.2.  Theoretical Framework and Literature review 
3.2.1.  Previous research  
3.2.1.1 Returns to patenting 
3.2.1.2. Returns to training, drivers of training and innovative outcomes 
3.2.2.  Theoretical Model. 
3.3.  Data and Methodology  
3.3.1.  Identification Strategy and Research Hypotheses 
3.3.2.  Data and variable description 
3.4.  Results 
3.4.1. New product revenue and returns to patenting  
3.4.2. New product revenue and returns to training  
3.4.3. The implied elasticity of training to patent protection 
3.4.4.  New product revenue, training expenditure and their drivers  
3.4.5. Discussion 
 
Appendices 
Bibliography 
6 
 
 
                              
List of Figures  page 
Figure 1.1 Real lending rates: Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and Germany (A); Slovakia, 
Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary (B); Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (C); Russia, Slovenia 
and Ukraine (D), Jan. 2000- Oct. 2009 
 
Figure 1.2 Moody‘s yields on corporate bonds – all industries, AAA and BAA, Jan. 2000- 
Oct. 2009 
 
Figure A.1 Generalised Impulse Responses, Output response to historical shock to BAA-
AAA and LR 
 
 
Figure B1: Number of Small Businesses Registered in a City in 1995 
 
Figure B2: Number of Small Businesses Registered in a City in 2006 
 
Figure B3: Growth in the number of Small Businesses Registered in a City, 1995-2006 
 
8-9 
 
 
 
9 
 
 
59-60 
 
 
 
61 
 
62 
 
63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
List of Tables  page 
Table 1.1: Pesaran CD test of cross-sectional dependence  
 
Table 1.2: Correlation matrix of model variables (Feb. 2007- Sept. 2009) 
  
Table 1.3: Correlation matrix of model variables in crises (Feb. 2007- Sept. 2009)  
 
Table 1.4: Variance decompositions of ―Cyclical component of output‖ (Model A and 
Model B) over the period 2001:M1-2009:M9  
 
Table 1.5:  Generalised variance decompositions of ―Cyclical component of output‖  in 
the aftermath of crises  
 
Table 3.1: Existing estimates of the impact of training on firm performance  
 
Table 3.2: Top 5 sectors included in the CIS4-6 panel dataset (CIS split)  
 
Table 3.3: Firm size composition by CIS  
 
Table 3.4: Variables used in the study  
 
Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics   
 
Table 3.6: Correlation matrix  
 
Table A1: Panel Unit root tests (Summary)  
 
Table B1: Descriptive statistics and definitions of the variables  
 
Table B2: Correlation matrix for CIS urban audit variables  
 
Table B3: Estimation Results 
 
Table C1: Training premium equation: cross-section estimation by CIS round 
 
Table C2: equation:  panel data estimation  
 
Table C3: Training -premium equation: firm age split 
 
Table C4: The patent (revenue) premium at different levels of patent propensity 
14 
 
14 
 
15 
 
 
16-17 
 
19 
 
 
45 
 
51 
 
51 
 
52-53 
 
54 
 
55 
 
61 
 
67 
 
68 
 
69-70 
 
71-72 
 
72-73 
 
74 
 
74 
 
8 
 
 
Chapter 1. Output Sustainability to Exogenous and Endogenous Shocks: Evidence from 
Emerging Economies
1
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Sustainable economic development programmes of the former Soviet bloc countries were 
suddenly brought down by a severe economic downturn starting from the beginning of 2008. One by 
one the economies were affected with downturn of output, lack of internal and external funds for 
government and business. Output, private credit to GDP, jobs, stock prices fell dramatically with 
large capital outflows from the Central Eastern Europe and Russia. The purpose of this paper is to 
build a multi-country model for thirteen Central and Eastern European countries (Croatia, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Russia, Slovenia 
and Ukraine) structured as a panel data model and to estimate the impact of external (exogenous
2
) 
and domestic (endogenous) shocks on output sustainability in these countries over a period of 2001-
2009. A particular focus is on establishing the differences in the output response to shock within 
2001-2009 and in the aftermath of financial crises (2007-2009).  
The cointegration relationships between the variables of interest was not modelled here, as 
for the newly established countries like Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine and other, or 
substantially transformed Russia, the long-run relationships have time to develop (Charamza et al. 
2009). Regarding the reduction of the dimensionality problem, cross-country augmentations, 
discussed by Chudik and Pesaran (2007, 2009) and Charamza et al. (2009) were originally 
implemented in the Infinite vector autoregressive model (IVAR). This model has shown the 
consistency of the cross-country augmentations in case where the number of countries is large and 
there is no dominant country in the panel Chudik and Pesaran (2009).  
We model endogenously generated shocks, as a temporary increase in the risk premium faced 
by domestic borrowers —that is, an increase in a real lending rate. The dynamic of the real lending 
rate fluctuations is shown in Figure 1.1. The dotted vertical line corresponds to the beginning of the 
world financial crisis (Sept. 2007). Real lending rates in Germany are given for a benchmark.  
Approach to modelling external shock is motivated in large part by the increase in US 
corporate bond yield spread i.e. change of Moody's BAA Corporate Bond Yield relative Moody's 
AAA Corporate Bond Yield
3
, see Figures 1.2. The indicator is sometimes called Moody‘s BAA-
AAA default spread. A vertical line corresponds to the beginning of the world financial crisis (Sept. 
2007).  
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1
 This essay is the result of collaboration with Professor Jana Péliová from the Economic University in Bratislava 
(Slovakia) during my stay in Bratislava and Professor Alessandro Missale during 2010-2011 in Milan. 
2
 Exogenous shock is used interchangeably with external shock; endogenous shock is used interchangeably with 
domestic shock. 
3
 Moody's BAA Corporate Bond Yield and Moody's AAA Corporate Bond Yield series are seasonally adjusted. 
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Figure 1.1 Real lending rates: Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and Germany (A); Slovakia, Czech 
Republic, Poland, Hungary (B); Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia (C); Russia, Slovenia and 
Ukraine (D), Jan. 2000- Oct. 2009 
 
Sources: Datastream; IMF International Financial Statistics; National Bank of Ukraine for Ukraine wired 
http://www.bank.gov.ua/Statist/sfs.htm and Deutsche Bundesbank for Germany wired 
http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_zeitreihen.en.php; Croatian Central Bureau of Statistics for Croatia wired 
http://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm 
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Figure 1.2 Moody’s yields on corporate bonds – all industries, AAA and BAA, Jan. 2000- Oct. 
2009 
Source: www.moodys.com 
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Like yields on Treasury securities, US corporate bond yields spread embody a reward to 
investors for forgoing consumption today and saving. But corporate yields are almost always higher 
than yields on Treasuries of comparable maturities because of the implicit default risk and a host of 
other factors. The US corporate bond yield spread is also used as a measure of credit stress. It 
signifies the degree of risk-aversion of a lender. Widening the gap between BAA and AAA corporate 
bond yields signifies that lenders have become extremely risk-averse.  
Evidence on the predictive ability of the external shocks on economic performance proxied 
by output gap of the country, would be useful to businesses and policymakers. These countries 
present new business opportunities for European companies. For example, European businesses and 
policy-makers would benefit from better forecasts of foreign real economic activity because 
projections for European counties exports depend on forecasts of foreign economic growth. 
We find that variance decompositions and impulse responses corrected for cross-country 
interdependence demonstrated that output gap associated both with external and internal shocks is 
growing faster in short horizons, which signifies an immediate impact of a shock to business activity 
in the economies analysed. The impact of external shock as an indicator of external investor‘s risk-
aversion in the aftermath of crises was clearly higher in 2007-2009 compared to 2001-2009 for the 
majority of the countries with few exceptions.  
The external shocks associated with a decrease of a risk appetite of international investors 
were a threat to economic sustainability brining down economic performance in a short run, in 
particular for Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia and Slovenia; in a long run for 
Estonia, Poland and Slovakia. Romania and Bulgaria seem to behave even which could be explained 
by existence of investment mechanisms for these countries and large foreign direct investments.  
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 1.2 presents the theoretical framework and 
establishes research hypothesis. Section 1.3 presents Infinite VAR model (for the period January 
2001 – October 2009). Variance decompositions are discussed in section 1.4. Section 1.5 uses 
impulse response functions to analyse the effects of external shocks, defined as an increase in the US 
corporate bond yields spread; and of domestic shock defined as an increase in the real lending rate. 
Section 1.6 assesses the movements in output in the aftermath of financial crises 2007–2009. Section 
1.7 concludes.  
 
1.2. Theoretical framework and hypothesis tested 
 
The theoretical framework is based on the works of Gilchrist et. al. (2009) and works of 
Federal Reserve bank of St. Louis emphasizing the fact that US corporate bond yields spread contain 
substantial predictive power for economic activity and outperform—especially at longer horizons—
standard default-risk indicators. Much of the predictive power of bond spreads for economic activity 
is embedded in securities issued by intermediate-risk rather than high-risk firms. According to 
impulse responses from a structural factor-augmented vector autoregression model proposed in their 
paper, unexpected increases in corporate bond spreads cause large and persistent contractions in 
economic activity.  
Famous studies in this field, but not for transition economies include Genberg (2003) on of 
output fluctuations and risk premiums. Using variance decompositions, he finds that external shocks 
are important determinants of movements in the level of prices and GDP. Furthermore, Genberg and 
Sulstarova (2008) incorporated the assessment of sovereign debt sustainability and showed how the 
volatility of the macroeconomic variables as well as potential interactions between them influence 
country risk. Gilchrist et. al. (2009) analysed the impulse responses from a structural factor-
augmented vector autoregression, where unexpected increases in corporate bond spreads cause large 
and persistent contractions in economic activity. They have proved that shocks emanating from the 
corporate bond market account for more than 30 percent of the forecast error variance in economic 
activity in the US at the two- to four-year horizon. Overall, their results imply that credit market 
shocks contributed significantly to US economic fluctuations during 1990–2008.  
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The determinants of output sustainability theories for developed and developing world were 
discussed extensively by Agénor and Aizenman (1998), Barajas, Steiner and Salazar (1999), 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Afanasieff, Priscilla and Nakane (2002), McMillan (2002), 
Mody and Taylor (2003, 2004), Botric and Slijepcevic (2008), Papadamou S. (2009), Gilchrist et. al 
(2009). At the same time scarce research has been done so far on the impact of exogenous shocks 
(proxied by yields on a BAA corporate bond and AAA corporate bond of comparable time to 
maturity) on economic activity in transition economies of CEE. This paper aims to bridge this gap 
along with estimating the effect of external shocks on economic activity over the period of 2001-
2009 and in aftermath of financial crises 2007-2009. Taking into account that the spreads are mainly 
driven by global financial conditions (e.g. Ag nor, Aizenman and Hoffmaister, 2008; Özatay, 
Özmen and Şahinbeyoğlu, 2009), transition economies of CEE in spite of the declared sustainable 
economic growth are sensitive to exogenous shocks in international credit and equity markets. 
Understanding the way external shocks affect outputs is relevant for monetary and fiscal policy 
implications in these countries, which could enable policy makers to use the most sophisticated 
financial and monetary instruments. The aspect that is in the focus relates to the direct impact of 
shocks on business that finance their capital needs via domestic / international banking system. 
Therefore, the research hypotheses to be tested are following: 
 
Definition 1: A higher external cost of credit,  due to increase in the risk premium nationally or 
internationally, raises the price of money (domestic real lending rate), therefore lowers the demand 
for inputs and business activity, and reduces expected aggregate output in the economy. 
Definition 2: A higher BAA-AAA corporate bond yields spread will signify that lenders are becoming 
extremely risk-averse and dislike risk. Therefore lenders are expected to stay away from adding 
high-risk stocks or investments to their portfolio linked to the economies with the increased default 
risks. Negative response of output gap to a shock to BAA-AAA corporate bond yields spread explains 
that the lenders are cautious about their investment or stocks market operations in the country in 
focus. The contrary is true for positive response of output gap to BAA-AAA corporate bond yields 
spread shock.   
 
Results in Definition 1 and 2 are consistent with those obtained with more developed, 
general-equilibrium models, such as those of Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Gilchrist et al. (2009). 
There are crucial differences between the model developed by Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and our 
studies. Their framework is nonmonetary in nature, so that capital needs to depend on real interest 
rates. In our model, where firms and government borrow from home and international markets, 
domestic lenders are assumed to receive back the full value of their loans (plus interest) making 
borrowing risk free. The banking system and credit market are explicitly considered here. However, 
this is done in a deterministic setting with no account of credit market imperfections.  
 
1.3. VAR Estimation and Analysis 
 
Panel data sets are likely to exhibit substantial cross-sectional dependence, which may arise 
due to the presence of common shocks and unobserved components that become part of the error 
term. See, for example, Robertson and Symons (2000), Pesaran (2004) and Baltagi (2008). One 
reason for this development for transition countries may be that during the last decade transition 
countries experienced an ever-increasing economic and financial integration reuniting into EU, 
which implies strong interdependencies between countries.  
Assuming that cross-sectional dependence is caused by the presence of common factors, 
which are unobserved they are uncorrelated with the included regressors, the standard fixed effects 
(FE) and random effects (RE) estimators are consistent, although not efficient, and the estimated 
standard errors are biased. One may chose to rely on standard FE/RE methods and correct the 
standard errors by following the approach proposed by Driskoll and Kraay (1998). Alternatively, one 
may attempt to obtain an efficient estimator by using the methods put forward by Robertson and 
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Symons (2000) and Coakley and Fuertes (2002) dealing with asymmetric dynamics in UK real 
interest rates. On the other hand, if the unobserved components that create interdependencies across 
countries are correlated with the included regressors, these approaches will not work and the FE and 
RE estimators will be biased and inconsistent.  
One may follow the approach proposed by Pesaran et. al. (2004), Chudik and Pesaran (2007, 
2009, 2010) to deal with cross-sectional dependence in both cross-section and time series. They have 
introduced the so-called ―stacked vector autoregressive model (VAR)‖ which is different from a 
simple VAR. Simple VAR is a model for two or more time series where each variable is modelled as 
a linear function of past values of all variables, plus disturbances that have zero means given all past 
values of the observed variables. VAR models will have at least one lag of each variable. All 
variables in VAR model are normally assumed to be endogenous, however it does not mean there 
could not be an exogenous variable in the VAR. In practice there would often be more than two 
endogenous variables, but not necessarily an exogenous variable. In case with N endogenous 
variables and l lags, we can write VAR model in a matrix notation such as: 
             (1.1) 
 
where   vector of intercept term,   it‘s a lagged value,  are N x 1 vectors, ,….  are N x N 
matrices of constants to be estimated. 
Although the approach has drawbacks, such as a lack of economic restrictions on the 
dynamics of the system (Cooley and Dwyer, 1998) and sensitivity to identifying restrictions (Pagan 
and Robertson, 1998; Faust and Leeper, 1997), it has the advantage of being able to capture general 
dynamic relationships and identifying economic interactions without the imposition of too much 
structure. However, one of the weak points of this approach in practice is that the need for a limited 
number of endogenous and exogenous variables which could lead to omitted bias. As the number of 
parameters, to be estimated grows at a quadratic rate, the number of variables is limited by the size of 
typical country datasets. For macroeconomic and international economics empirical applications this 
is not enough. As the number of cross-sectional units‘ increases we face the so-called ―curse of 
dimensionality‖, and certain restrictions must be imposed for the analysis. 
Two different approaches have been suggested in the literature: (i) shrinkage of the parameter 
space and (ii) shrinkage of the data. They consider a parameter space can be shrunk by imposing a 
set of restrictions, which could be for instance obtained from a theoretical structural model, directly 
on the parameters. The second approach to deal with ―curse of dimensionality‖ is to shrink the data, 
along the lines of index models. Chudik and Pesaran (2007, 2009 and 2010) techniques model 
proposes to deal with the curse of dimensionality by shrinking the data as the number of endogenous 
variables (N) increases to a large number. Under this set up their Infinite VAR (IVAR) could be 
approximated by a set of finite-dimensional small-scale models that can be consistently estimated 
separately in the spirit of Global VAR (GVAR) models initially proposed in Chudik and Pesaran 
(2007). 
Later on, Chudik and Pesaran (2010) extend the analysis of infinite dimensional vector 
autoregressive models (IVAR) proposed to the case where one of the variables or the cross section 
units in the IVAR model is dominant or pervasive. This extension is not straightforward and involves 
several technical difficulties. The dominant unit influences the rest of the variables in the IVAR 
model both directly and indirectly, and its effects do not vanish even as the dimension of the model 
(N) tends to infinity. The dominant unit acts as a dynamic factor in the regressions of the non-
dominant units and yields an infinite order distributed lag relationship between the two types of 
units. Despite this it is shown that the effects of the dominant unit as well as those of the 
neighbourhood units can be consistently estimated by running augmented least squares regressions 
that include distributed lag functions of the dominant unit.  
A successful attempt to extend Chudik and Pesaran‘s logic on modelling the transition 
economies of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia was made by Charemza et. al. (2009). Technically their 
the modelling idea has been grounded within the concept of the infinite dimensional vector 
autoregressive models by Chudik and Pesaran (2007). The main developments are such that the 
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model is 1) interdependent rather than vector autoregressive, 2) estimated by the generalised method 
of moments and 3) forward-looking. The primary linkage of the country models is provided through 
the real effective exchange rates of particular countries, while the secondary linkages are through the 
Chudik and Pesaran cross-sectional augmentations.  Cross section augmentations (CSA) i.e. cross 
section averages of each endogenous variable calculated for the rest the countries. CSA itself is an 
exogenous variable which captures the effect of cross-sectional dependence across the countries 
caused by the presence of common factors, which are unobserved. An Infinite VAR along with a 
simple VAR method enable to measure the impact of external and domestic shocks on output of one 
country taking into account an unobserved impact of the rest of the countries pooled together in one 
vector autoregressive model. Both VAR and IVAR models may have the number of lags starting 
from one and more. In case with N endogenous variables and l lags, the Infinite VAR model can be 
represented as follows:  
Let  denote the realisation of a random endogenous variable belonging to cross section unit i in 
period t, and assume that  is generated according to the following reduced 
VAR (l) model: 
 
   (1.2) 
 
 where,   vector of intercept terms,  is N x N dimensional matrix of unknown coefficients 
of the endogenous variables,  is N x N dimensional matrix of unknown coefficients of cross- 
section augmentations (CSA), significant in a group cross- section augmented regressions, 
 are white noise innovation terms, that is E(  )=0, and ,  and ,  
are independent for , h= 0. The matrix  is non-diagonal.  
Country specific cross section averages accounting for cross-sectional effects, are constructed as 
 
          (1.3) 
 
CSAs (1.8) are included in a VARs model as exogenous should the value of  be more than zero 
for .
4
  
IVAR now includes the following variables: US corporate bond yield spread, BAA-AAA, 
domestic interest rate spread on national currency-denominated assets and liabilities, DS, real 
lending rate, LR, and measure of output gap, GAP, i.e. economic performance of the country: 
deviations of current output from its trend level, ( . The trend component is 
obtained by applying the moving average
5
 instead of Hodrick–Prescott filter frequently used in 
economic literature
6
. In order to justify the inclusion of CSA in IVAR (p) model cross-sectional 
dependence test (CD test) by Pesaran (2004) was implemented and those CSAs to be included in a 
model were identified (see Table 1.1 below). US corporate bond yield spread was not tested for CD 
dependence as this variable is exogenous and does not vary across the countries being analysed. No 
CSA were calculated for US corporate bond yield spread. Pesaran CD test strongly rejects the null 
hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence at least at the 1% level of significance. Although it is 
                                                          
4 On the previous version of the paper distances between the capitals of country j and country i used for to implement unobserved 
effects correction. We reconsidered this approach and we agree with the anonymous referee that such an approach is not suitable for 
financial market analysis as the markets are becoming or are already global. Therefore distances as weights were removed from cross 
sectional augmentations. 
5 Simple moving average (one sided) was used in its unweighted mean of the previous 7 data points. For example, a 7-months simple 
moving average of output is the mean of the previous 7 months' output.  
6 The filter has misleading predictive outcome when used dynamically since the algorithm changes (during iteration for minimisation) 
the past state (unlike a moving average) of the time series to adjust for the current state regardless of the size of lambda used. 
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not the case here, a possible drawback of the CD test is that by adding up positive and negative 
correlations it might undermine the cross-sectional dependence present in the data. 
The average absolute correlations are calculated between the cross-sectional units. In this case the 
average absolute correlations are 0.680, 0.095 and 0.135 respectively. The value of GAP is very 
high. Hence there is enough evidence suggesting the presence of cross-sectional dependence in 
model (1.2) under a fixed effects assumption. 
To justify the choice of four variables in a model two correlation matrices were introduced (see 
Table 1.2 and Table 1.3).  Table 1.2 and 1.3 provide the evidence of existing correlation between the 
model variables. Particular attention is given to proxies for shocks and a dependent variable output 
gap. As one could expect the correlation is statistically significant and the value of the pair-wise 
correlation coefficient is lower for US corporate bond spread. The pair-wise correlation coefficient 
between US corporate bond spread and output gap increases three times during the time of crises 
which helps us to explain better fluctuations in output gap of those economies of international 
lender‘s interest. Both coefficients are statistically significant at 1% significance level; however 
correlation does not mean causation.  
 
Table 1.1: Pesaran CD test of cross-sectional dependence
*
 
Model: Fixed effects 
(within) regression 
Pesaran's test of 
cross sectional 
independence 
Pr. 
Average absolute value 
of the off-diagonal 
elements 
GAP as dependent 
variable 
57.880 0.000 0.680 
LR as dependent variable 4.445 0.000 0.095 
DS as dependent variable 5.329 0.000 0.135 
 
*Note:  According to the results, once we account for State fixed effects LR and DS have no effect upon country output fluctuations. 
An assumption implicit in estimating equation (1.2) is that the cross-sectional units are independent. Ho: Cross-sectional 
Independence. To test this hypothesis Pesaran's (2004) CD test was employed. 
Source: Author‘s calculations.  
 
The pair-wise correlation coefficient of real lending rate and output gap has also increased 
significantly during the time of crises and became negative. This signifies a higher impact of lending 
rates hit by endogenous shocks and its effect on output of the countries being analysed.  
 
Table 1.2: Correlation matrix of model variables (Feb. 2007- Sept. 2009) 
 Interest rate 
spread 
BAA-AAA Output gap Real lending 
rate 
Interest rate 
spread 
1.0000 - - - 
BAA-AAA -0.1108* 
(0.001) 
1.0000 - - 
Output gap 0.0234  
(0.361) 
-0.0603** 
(0.018) 
1.0000 - 
Real lending rate 0.0834* 
(0.001) 
-0.0165 
(0.520) 
0.1217* 
 (0.000) 
1.0000 
 
(*), (**), (***)-significant at 1, 5 and 10% level accordingly, p-values are in parenthesis. Number of observations 105. 
Source: Author‘s calculations. 
 
We refer in what follows to the model without CSA as Model A, and the one with CSA as Model B.  
Both models are estimated with monthly data from January 2001 through September 2009. External 
shocks being exogenous to both domestic factors (such as changes in output and domestic credit 
conditions) and external factors (such as changes in market sentiment) are therefore placed last in the 
Cholesky ordering of the IVAR model. This allows to ―clear‖ it of its possible domestic component. 
In doing so, we are capturing primarily the exogenous shock. Changes in a real lending rate could 
happen mostly due to endogenous shocks, such as changes in government bond rates, monetary 
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policy and other domestic credit conditions. Therefore that variable is placed first in the ordering of 
the IVAR model as it will include the domestic component. 
 
Table 1.3: Correlation matrix of model variables in crises  (Feb. 2007- Sept. 2009) 
 Interest rate 
spread 
BAA-AAA Output gap Real lending 
rate 
Interest rate 
spread 
1.0000 - - - 
BAA-AAA -0.0664 
(0.146) 
1.0000 - - 
Output gap 0.1614* 
(0.004) 
-0.1978* 
(0.000) 
1.0000 - 
Real lending rate -0.6345* 
(0.000) 
0.1723* 
(0.001) 
-0.2921* 
(0.000) 
1.0000 
Note: (*), (**), (***)-significant at 1, 5 and 10% level accordingly, p-values are in parenthesis. Number of observations 33. 
Source: Author‘s calculations. 
 
1.4. Variance Decompositions 
 
      The variance is used as a measure of how far a set of numbers are spread out from each other. It 
is one of several descriptors of a probability distribution, describing how far the numbers lie from the 
mean (expected value). In particular, the variance is one of the moments of a distribution.  
      Variance Decomposition or Forecast error variance decomposition indicates the amount of 
information each variable contributes to the other variables in VAR models. To analyse variance 
decomposition is important because it determines how much of the forecast error variance of output 
gap can be explained by exogenous shocks to the other variables and the output gap itself. 
 Table 1.4 presents for Model A and Model B the variance decompositions for GAP. Following the 
discussion of the results below, the table shows the share of the variance associated with shocks to 
GAP, and the sum of the shares of the variance associated with shocks to the other variables in the 
models
7
.  
The share of the variances in Model A and Model B are different. At face value these results suggest 
that on average between January 2001 and October 2009, movements in GAP for the countries being 
analysed were associated with shocks originating from both outside and inside the country. This was 
not true for Lithuania, Croatia, Czech Republic and Estonia.  
The bulk of the variance of GAP is associated with external shocks proxied by BAA-AAA spread for 
Latvia, Slovenia, Romania and Russia. This signifies that the external lenders and international credit 
markets, US in particular play an important role for the above countries. This effect is true for both 
short and long horizons, where the external shocks are associated with more than 30 percent of the 
GAP variance for Latvia, 21 percent for Slovenia, more than 40 percent for Romania and about 20 
percent for Russia. Although this share declines somewhat from 6 to 12 months. 
The share of the variance of the cyclical component of output associated with domestic shocks 
proxied by LR is not as substantial as was expected. The variance of GAP for Latvia, Slovenia, 
Hungary and Ukraine is explained by shocks originating within the country such as real lending rate 
shock. Although the specifics depend on the choice of GAP measure, the share of the variance of 
GAP associated with LR increases within 6-20 month horizon for Hungary, Ukraine, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia and Romania; increases within 1-6 months for Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, Croatia. In fact the first group of countries are seemed to be the most effected by Global 
financial crises in 2007-2009.  
 
1.5. Impulse response analyses  
 
                                                          
7 The shocks are assumed to be orthogonal; therefore, the sum of the shares reflects the combined shares of the variance associated 
with shocks from BAA–AAA, DS, (y - ypot / ypot ) and LR. Also, it avoids the thorny issue of identifying the individual shocks of 
these variables that are not of interest to this study. 
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Figure A.1 in Appendix A (left column) shows the impulse responses of GAP to a positive 
shock from BAA-AAA, when (right column) shows the impulse responses of GAP to a positive 
shock from LR. Impulse response functions describe how the GAP reacts over time to exogenous 
impulses, which economists usually call 'shocks'. These impulse responses have been computed by 
placing BAA-AAA last in the ordering and by placing LR first in the ordering in case of calculating 
the effect of a shock from LR. Placing LR first in the ordering does not purge the identified LR 
shock from the impact of other shocks in the model that are more likely to reflect domestic factors. 
As discussed in the introduction, the experiment of placing the variable last in Cholesky ordering can 
be viewed as reflecting a ―pure‖ contagion effect, triggered by events taking place elsewhere. A 
shock from BAA-AAA was identified, but not for a shock from LR.  
The shock from LR cannot be now viewed as reflecting an adverse external financial shock—
related or not to contagion
8
.  The figure displays one-standard-error bands of a  percentage change 
for GAP and one standard deviation for BAA-AAA or LR variable
9
.  
 
 
Table 1.4: Variance decompositions of “Cyclical component of output”  
(Model A and Model B) over the period 2001:M1-2009:M9 
Country 
M
o
n
th
s 
Percentage of variance associated with historical shocks from: 
Model A (VAR) Model B (IVAR) 
GAP LR DS 
BAA-
AAA 
GAP LR DS 
BAA-
AAA 
Poland 
1 
6 
20 
99.94 
85.84 
82.77 
0.00 
8.86 
9.21 
0.04 
1.49 
3.34 
0.00 
3.79 
4.66 
99.75 
79.29 
73.36 
0.03 
5.40 
5.70 
0.20 
3.32 
6.16 
0.00 
11.96 
14.47 
Czech 
Republic 
1 
6 
20 
99.97 
81.81 
78.90 
0.00 
1.31 
3.30 
0.02 
3.59 
4.95 
0.00 
13.27 
12.83 
99.41 
87.94 
78.43 
0.06 
0.49 
1.96 
0.51 
5.11 
11.10 
0.00 
6.45 
8.49 
Slovakia 
1 
6 
20 
99.40 
93.43 
90.23 
0.00 
0.97 
2.44 
0.59 
4.16 
4.04 
0.00 
1.42 
3.27 
99.63 
95.05 
69.00 
0.36 
0.44 
5.44 
0.00 
3.50 
14.40 
0.00 
1.00 
11.14 
Hungary 
1 
6 
20 
97.05 
84.12 
82.00 
2.88 
6.62 
8.26 
0.06 
0.24 
1.00 
0.00 
9.00 
8.72 
98.37 
80.29 
48.18 
1.47 
11.49 
39.45 
0.14 
0.62 
1.48 
0.00 
7.58 
10.87 
Lithuania 
1 
6 
20 
99.95 
65.68 
69.09 
0.04 
17.25 
15.78 
0.00 
8.43 
7.41 
0.00 
8.63 
7.70 
92.53 
75.03 
70.11 
0.95 
1.74 
4.96 
6.50 
18.92 
19.85 
0.00 
4.29 
5.06 
Latvia 
1 
6 
20 
99.97 
74.46 
74.40 
0.01 
0.66 
1.35 
0.00 
2.39 
2.30 
0.00 
22.47 
21.93 
98.13 
55.21 
45.75 
1.74 
12.25 
24.58 
0.11 
1.57 
2.88 
0.00 
30.95 
26.77 
Estonia 
1 
6 
20 
95.28 
70.55 
63.86 
3.56 
3.34 
4.19 
1.15 
3.78 
8.36 
0.00 
22.30 
23.57 
98.21 
90.32 
87.45 
1.42 
3.38 
3.72 
0.36 
0.54 
1.63 
0.00 
5.74 
7.18 
Slovenia 
1 
6 
96.84 
72.82 
0.09 
7.70 
3.06 
5.74 
0.00 
13.72 
94.00 
46.93 
5.53 
28.97 
0.45 
6.95 
0.00 
17.12 
                                                          
8 In the context of transition countries, the shock from LR that is considered may well also represent an increase in devaluation risk. In 
fact, accounting for the transmission process of a change in devaluation expectations would require taking into account the fact that 
major part of the firms could have large foreign-currency-denominated liabilities. But to the extent that adverse balance sheets effects 
translate into downward movements in the cyclical component of output—because, for instance, the risk premium depends on firms‘ 
net worth, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000) —empirical framework would implicitly capture it. 
9
 In all figures the dotted lines for the impulse responses (IRs) show one-standard-error band in each direction and are 
based on 1000 Monte Carlo replications. The upper dotted line shows the upper border of possible response of GAP to a 
shock from BAA-AAA or LR. The bottom dotted line shows the lowest border of possible response of GAP to a shock 
from BAA-AAA or LR. The reaction to shock may vary within the upper and bottom dotted lines which are also called 
95% confidence intervals, i.e. with 95% confidence it‘s possible to say the response of GAP will fit to the estimated 
dotted corridor. Should upper or bottom dotted line cross zero line we conclude on zero response of GAP to an 
exogenous shock. In each replication we sampled the VAR coefficients and the covariance matrix from their posterior 
distribution. From these repetitions we calculated the square root of the mean squared deviation from the impulse 
response in each direction. By construction, these bands contain the impulse-response function but are not necessarily 
symmetric. Number of observations are 117. 
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20 63.77 6.73 10.82 18.66 40.47 25.18 12.97 21.36 
Romania 
1 
6 
20 
99.65 
87.42 
86.53 
0.11 
8.08 
7.02 
0.23 
3.89 
4.35 
0.00 
0.59 
2.08 
97.66 
52.02 
42.30 
1.03 
3.43 
9.95 
1.30 
4.96 
4.15 
0.00 
39.58 
43.57 
Bulgaria 
1 
6 
20 
99.98 
88.49 
87.75 
0.01 
2.65 
2.95 
0.00 
4.56 
3.34 
0.00 
4.28 
5.95 
97.47 
84.60 
73.79 
2.50 
9.39 
10.03 
0.01 
5.40 
6.24 
0.00 
0.58 
9.92 
Croatia 
1 
6 
20 
92.51 
81.68 
83.08 
7.20 
13.63 
10.48 
0.27 
0.59 
0.79 
0.00 
4.08 
5.63 
95.93 
92.39 
90.97 
4.05 
5.36 
5.70 
0.00 
0.60 
1.39 
0.00 
1.63 
1.92 
Russia 
1 
6 
20 
94.88 
86.81 
85.73 
0.00 
4.69 
5.85 
5.11 
4.78 
4.07 
0.00 
3.70 
4.34 
95.59 
80.78 
75.01 
3.71 
2.44 
4.10 
0.69 
0.65 
1.11 
0.00 
16.11 
19.77 
Ukraine 
1 
6 
20 
94.59 
88.98 
86.30 
0.91 
1.42 
3.06 
4.49 
8.52 
7.13 
0.00 
1.06 
3.49 
97.96 
91.70 
72.74 
1.46 
4.34 
13.31 
0.56 
6.39 
5.64 
0.00 
7.55 
8.28 
Notes: These decompositions in the Table 1.4 are based on the unrestricted VAR and Infinite VAR analysis described above following Chudik 
and Pesaran (2007, 2009, 2010). Variance decompositions are assumed to add up to 100 percent and historical shocks are considered to be 
orthogonal, which is different from the decompositions based on the generalized VAR analysis following Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996). 
Variance decompositions are obtained from IVAR models with cross-sectional averages for DS, LR, GAP with cross section dependence in 
Model B. Standard -error in each series are based on 1000 Monte Carlo repetitions. The model is estimated with four lags using monthly data 
from 2001:M1 through 2009:M9; see Appendix A for details.  Source: Author‘s calculations. 
 
First, the impulse responses of GAP to a positive shock from BAA-AAA are discussed and 
later the impulse responses of GAP to a shock from LR. A shock from BAA-AAA corporate bond 
yield spread is modelled which supports the thesis that risk appetite has decreased, and investors do 
not intend to put money to work but rather park it in low risk reservoirs. If this happens, movements 
of GAP for most of the countries become significantly negative supporting the definition 2 of the 
paper. This holds true for Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
Poland and Russia. The fall in the GAP is very significant for the economies dependent on 
international lending such as Hungary, Slovenia Latvia, Poland and Russia. This signifies that 
lenders stay away from adding high-risk stocks or investments to their portfolio linked to the 
economies with increased default risks.  
On the contrary, GAP becomes significantly positive in case of Romania and Bulgaria which 
joined the European Union during its last enlargement in 2007. This positive response could be 
explained by low level of dependence on US investments, rather than EU investments. These two 
countries have recently become centres of outsourcing for European multinationals as well as the 
centres of emigration. Impulse response displays higher degree of persistence for those countries less 
dependent on US credit and financial markets such as Russia, where the fall has happened 4 months 
aftershock. At the same time there was a lower persistence to shock by Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary and Slovenia (3 months). GAP falls instantly after the shock for Poland and Latvia
10
. 
Movements in GAP for Slovakia and Ukraine are ambiguous, because of the large one-standard-error 
bands. The instant aftershock possibly reflects other external shocks or a low share of stocks in the 
investor‘s portfolios from these two countries. 
For seven of the thirteen countries the shock from LR does not result in any significant 
changes in GAP. The 95% confidence intervals include zero, which means there is no significant 
effect of a shock from LR on GAP. Moreover, for four countries such as Hungary, Latvia, Russia 
and Ukraine, GAP become significantly positive which is counterintuitive to the definition 2 made in 
the paper. The possible explanation for this is that firms do not lend in national currency due to high 
inflationary expectation and constant depreciation shocks. These shocks might affect business which 
starts borrowing money in more stable currencies such as Euro or US dollar. In this case there is 
nothing surprising in the positive response of GAP to a shock from LR, should there be an 
international credit channel open. It may also reflect, financial speculation happening behind the 
                                                          
10 Note that there are no perverse blips in the output response at any times.  It is clear why the measurement of cyclical output in this 
case does not make such a blip. It is possible if the HP filter is used in the Model which may create a spurious cycle, as discussed by 
Cogley and Nason (1995). In our Model moving average of seven lags has been used which prevents any unexplained blips and 
spurious cycles.  
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scenes, recalling that LR is calculated as the nominal lending rate on national currency-denominated 
loans at a monthly rate minus current monthly inflation. Nevertheless, definition 2 holds true for 
Croatia, Slovakia and Hungary in the short horizons. This could be explained by borrowing primarily 
in national currency and absence of any form of financial tightening or constraints from the Central 
banks (e.g. a good example of financial market liberalisation is Hungary were no financial 
constraints exist). Movements in GAP for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia, Lithuania, 
Poland, and Romania are ambiguous, possibly because the finding of large one-standard-error bands 
for the instant aftershock that is a reflection of external shocks.  
It‘s possible to conclude on heterogeneity in countries‘ responses to endogenous shocks. 
What is obvious is the size of the economy and monetary policy could explicitly affect the 
movements in GAP in favour of exogenous vs. endogenous shocks. The economies being analysed 
are small open economies except for the economy of Russia which is more subject to endogenous 
rather than exogenous shocks. Ambiguous impulse responses of GAP to a positive shock from LR 
for seven of the thirteen countries enable to conclude on high level of borrowing in foreign currency, 
economic openness, high inflationary expectations and depreciation shocks. The business does not 
seem to borrow in national currency to buy the inputs of production, so that the production cycle is 
not very much dependent on the national currency which often play a secondary role in transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
1.6. The Aftermath of Crisis: Variance Decomposition 
 
A useful application of VAR models estimated above is to assess how much each variable 
contributes to the movements in output gap in VAR models. Variance Decompositions in the 
immediate aftermath of crisis (2007-2009) show how much of the forecast error variance of output 
gap can be explained by exogenous shocks during the crises, rather than during the entire period 
analysed. This can be done by using the historical variance decompositions of these variables for the 
period immediately following the collapse of world financial system, specifically, from September 
2007 to September 2009. Table 1.5 presents these results on a monthly basis.  
First Cogley and Nason (1995) and later Ag nor, Aizenman and Hoffmaister (2008) proposed 
to use similar approach to estimate the effect of shocks for GAP in the aftermath of Peso crises, 
when the historical decompositions obtained by averaging over the monthly decompositions for 
unrestricted vector autoregressive models. The fact that the monthly data is already available in the 
model guarantees the outputs from Table 1.5 are consistent to those in Table 1.4. Above provides a 
clear interpretation of the results accounting for financial crises within the economies analysed.  
Results for IVAR model in Table 1.5 indicate that the share of the variance of GAP 
associated with BAA-AAA shocks in the aftermath of crises (2007-2008) compared to the period of 
2001-2009 has increased for the majority of countries. This is in line with the economic intuition. 
The more is the dependence of small open economies on international fundraising, foreign economic 
policy, foreign direct investment and export-import transactions, the higher is the risk of exogenous 
shocks. For the same period there is a fall in the share of the variance of GAP associated with BAA-
AAA shocks in the aftermath of crises for Slovenia, Romania and Russia.  
The above could be explained by specific economic structures of these countries. Slovenia is 
one of the most developed economies in the New EU member states. Its sustainable growth before 
the crises increased the level of country resistance to various exogenous shocks almost outside the 
EU. Like Romania and other New EU member states the country is being gradually integrated with 
European financial and credit institutions and is more dependent on shocks originating from inside 
the EU than from outside. The situation with Romania is different, however a stream of financial 
resources in a form of direct investments and outsourcing policy of multinationals, sustainable 
production and services growth, common trade zone within the EU made the country less dependent 
on FDI originating from outside the EU and the perception of a country‘s default by foreign 
investors.  
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Russia being a large open economy with its large home market and its special stabilisation 
funds established in 2006 from the monopolistic revenues of gas and oil export in Europe could 
support itself during the recessions and mobilise its reserves to support production and services in the 
aftermath of crises. This could bring down the share of variance of GAP associated with BAA-AAA 
shocks instead of increasing the variance of GAP associated with endogenous shocks. In particular 
there was a significant increase in the share of variance of GAP associated with interest rate spread 
shock as a proxy for banking sector efficiency and competitiveness.  
 
Table 1.5:  Generalised variance decompositions of “Cyclical component of output” 
 in the aftermath of crises 
Country 
M
o
n
th
s 
Model B (VAR) 2007:M9- 2009:M9 
Percentage of variance associated with historical 
shocks from: 
∆
, 
B
A
A
-
A
A
A
*
, 
%
 
∆
, 
L
R
 *
*
, 
%
 
GAP LR DS 
BAA-
AAA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Poland 
1 
6 
20 
74.99 
21.43 
16.33 
5.57 
24.82 
30.00 
19.42 
9.55 
10.40 
0.00 
44.18 
43.25 
0.00 
32.22 
28.78 
5.54 
19.42 
24.30 
Czech 
Republic 
1 
6 
20 
84.75 
53.51 
48.13 
0.73 
2.77 
3.19 
14.40 
20.02 
18.85 
0.00 
23.69 
29.81 
0.00 
17.24 
21.32 
0.67 
2.28 
1.23 
Slovakia 
1 
6 
20 
80.58 
17.44 
11.93 
19.11 
20.05 
14.10 
0.29 
27.75 
26.07 
0.00 
34.75 
47.89 
0.00 
33.75 
36.75 
18.75 
19.61 
8.66 
Hungary 
1 
6 
20 
78.00 
66.82 
54.94 
5.81 
4.86 
5.45 
16.18 
18.10 
12.60 
0.00 
10.20 
27.69 
0.00 
2.62 
16.82 
4.34 
-6.63 
-34.00 
Lithuania 
1 
6 
20 
43.41 
18.46 
11.53 
53.93 
48.90 
79.19 
2.66 
22.26 
7.43 
0.00 
10.36 
1.84 
0.00 
6.07 
-3.22 
52.98 
47.16 
74.23 
Latvia 
1 
6 
20 
80.29 
57.23 
55.15 
0.00 
2.68 
3.14 
19.70 
7.28 
5.58 
0.00 
32.79 
36.11 
0.00 
1.84 
9.34 
-1.74 
-9.57 
-21.44 
Estonia 
1 
6 
20 
59.14 
51.51 
32.78 
0.92 
3.71 
15.53 
39.93 
40.29 
35.14 
0.00 
4.47 
16.53 
0.00 
-1.27 
9.35 
-0.5 
0.33 
11.81 
Slovenia 
1 
6 
20 
34.72 
8.96 
8.77 
12.24 
54.98 
55.00 
53.03 
30.70 
30.64 
0.00 
5.34 
5.57 
0.00 
-11.78 
-15.79 
6.71 
26.01 
29.82 
Romania 
1 
6 
20 
97.11 
74.63 
65.98 
2.72 
10.43 
16.51 
0.15 
12.83 
12.54 
0.00 
2.10 
4.96 
0.00 
-37.48 
-38.61 
1.69 
7.00 
6.56 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Bulgaria 
1 
6 
20 
81.68 
46.99 
36.44 
6.33 
17.46 
25.71 
11.98 
30.92 
32.56 
0.00 
4.61 
5.26 
0.00 
4.03 
-4.66 
3.83 
8.07 
15.68 
Croatia 
1 
6 
20 
32.49 
11.82 
4.35 
32.88 
54.94 
76.72 
34.62 
25.95 
11.39 
0.00 
7.28 
7.52 
0.00 
5.65 
5.60 
28.83 
49.58 
71.02 
Russia 
1 
6 
20 
45.69 
27.11 
26.97 
4.07 
7.66 
8.12 
50.22 
60.69 
60.39 
0.00 
4.52 
4.50 
0.00 
-11.59 
-15.27 
0.36 
5.22 
4.02 
Ukraine 
1 
6 
20 
98.56 
45.84 
42.50 
1.38 
35.88 
39.98 
0.05 
9.56 
8.78 
0.00 
8.70 
8.71 
0.00 
1.15 
0.43 
-0.08 
31.54 
26.67 
Notes: These decompositions are based on the same assumptions as Table 1.4. However, variance decompositions in the Model IVAR 2007-2009 are 
obtained for the period of financial crises from September 2007 to September 2009. Standard -error in each series are based on 1000 Monte Carlo 
repetitions. The models are estimated with two lags instead of 4 lags in Table 1.4 using monthly data from 2001:M1 through 2009:M9 for the period of 
time from 2007:M9 through 2009:M9 respectively. *Column (7) is calculated as the difference in the share of variance of GAP associated to a shock to 
BAA-AAA in the Model B (IVAR) for 2001-2007 (Table 1.4) and column (6) in Table 1.5. **Column (8) is calculated as the difference in the share of 
variance of GAP associated to a shock to LR in the Model B (IVAR) for 2001-2007 (Table 1.4) and column (4) in Table 1.5. Source: Author‘s 
calculations. 
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Now let‘s move to the analysis of endogenous shocks. Interestingly, Table 1.5 shows an 
increase in the share of the variance of GAP associated with LR shocks in the aftermath of crises for 
eleven of the thirteen countries analysed. This is what we could expect from definition 1. In the 
aftermath of crises the external cost of credit,  increases as a result of a liquidity crunch and other 
country shocks generated endogenously. This increased a risk premium that could raise the price of 
money and therefore have a greater affect on the demand for inputs and economic activity than say in 
equilibrium.  
The fall in the share of the variance of GAP associated with LR shocks for Hungary and 
Latvia signifies a secondary role of endogenous shocks compared to shocks originated from 
international financial markets during crises. These countries have suffered most amongst the New 
EU member states during the Global financial crises appealing to IMF and other financial 
institutions. It‘s still disputable whether any financial tightening was applied in these countries as the 
real lending rate during the crises was very low and sometimes negative. At the same time we can 
clearly observe an increased share of variance of GAP associated with BAA-AAA shocks and GAP 
shocks itself for Hungary and Latvia in the aftermath of shock. 
Therefore, the channels of exogenous and endogenous shocks to GAP within the period of 
2007-2009 were different across the countries. This could be explained by heterogeneous structure of 
Eastern and Central European economies being analysed, as well their reliance on internal or 
external financial resources and the activity of multinationals.  
It remains true that during the fourth part of 2007 and first half of 2008 (that is, in the 
immediate aftermath of the financial crisis), exogenous shocks rather than endogenous shocks had 
important impacts on business activity for such countries as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Latvia and Estonia. Transition countries are successfully integrating into the EU and 
reforming its legal institutions. Those countries, where the institutional reforms have been weak 
experienced a higher share of variance of the GAP associated with a shock from LR. The results 
contrast between the models described in Table 1.4 and Table 1.5, particularly in a dramatic decrease 
in the share of variance of GAP associated with its own shocks in the aftermath of crises when the 
business activity seems to be more affected by financial and credit risks.  
 
1.7. Conclusion 
 
Due to a rather new methodology and relatively unresearched area of applications, findings of 
this paper are twofold: methodological and empirical. On the methodological side, it is possible to 
formulate effective algorithms for solving large models with cross-section augmentations, generating 
results which might add more to the knowledge of the modelled systems and markets than the 
traditional vector autoregressive algorithms. The paper shows that, for multi-country modelling, the 
links through the real lending rates, intermediation spread, US corporate bond yield spread and 
output gap are feasible and lead to interesting empirical results.  In this context, the Chudik and 
Pesaran (2007, 2009 and 2010) cross-country augmentations seem to behave well even if the 
principal limit assumptions (large cross-country dimension and lack of dominance) are violated. The 
cointegration relationships was not modelled here, as for the newly established countries like 
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine and other, or substantially transformed Russia, the long-
run relationships have time to develop (Charamza et al. 2009). 
Regarding the empirical findings of the impact of external and domestic shocks on output 
fluctuations in transition economies of Central Eastern Europe and Russia, output sustainability to 
exogenous and endogenous shocks was estimated and the length of the period was identified when a 
country‘s economic activity is more likely affected.  
Variance decompositions and impulse responses corrected for cross-country interdependence 
demonstrated that output gap associated both with BAA-AAA and LR shocks is growing faster in 
short horizons, which signifies an immediate impact of a shock to business activity in the economies 
analysed. Furthermore, the impact of external shock as an indicator of external investor‘s risk-
aversion in the aftermath of crises was clearly higher in 2007-2009 compared to 2001-2009 for the 
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majority of the countries. The exceptions are Slovenia, Romania and Russia. This could be explained 
by the existence of internal financial reserves and large domestic market for borrowing and lending 
for Russia and deeper integration into EU markets with following up foreign direct investment in 
Slovenia and Romania.  
It‘s worth noting that exogenous shocks associated with a decrease of a risk appetite to a 
greater extent than the endogenous shocks were a threat to economic sustainability causing the 
reduction in GAP in a short run for such countries as Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Russia and Slovenia; in a long run for Estonia, Poland and Slovakia. For Romania and Bulgaria, 
countries which recently joined the EU the effect of exogenous shock on GAP was positive flagging 
it‘s higher integration with the European rather than world financial and credit markets.  
There are two trends to be investigated further. At face value the results suggest that on 
average between September 2007 and October 2009, movements in GAP (its cycle component) for 
New EU Members were mostly associated with shocks originating from outside the country. For the 
non-EU countries, where the institutional and market reforms have been weak, and that dependant on 
output fluctuations in the Russian market, movements in GAP were mostly associated with 
endogenous shocks. I joined to the voices questioning the effectiveness of financial constraints in 
countries where financial market and banking sector reforms have been week. These countries 
appear which is more sensitive to endogenous shocks with higher reliance on internal funds.  
Heterogeneity in the effect of domestic shocks on output fluctuations could be also explained 
by the existing differences in credit channels, dependence on international funding, country‘s initial 
conditions, economic structure, degree of market openness, economic competitiveness and resources, 
political regime and others institutional factors that affect capital mobility.  
Finally, the experience of transition economies in the 2000s and in the aftermath of crises 
provides new challenges, requiring policy-makers to reassess the understanding of the transmission 
mechanism and the size of exogenous and endogenous shocks from financial markets to real 
economic activity. Further research might be focused on the policy implications of the results 
obtained as well as bickering over whether further rescue packages for transition economies 
proposed by IMF and the European Central Bank (ECB) in recession make sense.  
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Chapter 2: Entrepreneurship and cities: Evidence from Post-Communist World 
11
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Acknowledging the positive relationship between entrepreneurship and economic development, a 
growing number of empirical studies have focused on explaining variation in entrepreneurial activity 
at various spatial levels with the majority of them taking either a cross-country perspective or 
looking at inter-regional differences. More recent studies on entrepreneurship have shifted their 
focus to examine cross-city variation in entrepreneurship, attributing urban success to more abundant 
supply of entrepreneurship (Acs et al. 2008; Glaeser 2007; Glaeser et. al 2010; Glaeser and Kerr 
2009; Bosma and Schutjens 2007, 2009; Belitski and Korosteleva 2010).  
 Acs et al. 2008 explore differences in entrepreneurial perceptions and entrepreneurial 
behaviour across 34 world cities using Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data. While their paper 
provides a rich comparison of the characteristics of new venture creation across world cities, it falls 
short of providing testable implications for variation in entrepreneurship across these cities. Bosma 
and Schutjens (2009) explore the determinants of entrepreneurial activity at a larger level of regional 
aggregation in Europe. Belitski and Korosteleva (2010) explore how various demographic, socio-
economic and institutional characteristics of European cities and country-level settings affect 
entrepreneurship in 377 European cities during the period of 1989-2010. Despite a growing number 
of spatial-oriented studies of entrepreneurial activity worldwide, to our best knowledge Belitski and 
Korosteleva (2010) are the first who attempted to explain variations of entrepreneurship across 
European cities, distinguishing between Western and East European cities, by this providing some 
insights on whether cities of transition economies are any different from their Western counterparts 
in terms of factors driving their entrepreneurial activity.  
 Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011) show that transition economies generally exhibit lower rates of 
entrepreneurship than observed in most developed and developing market economies. They argue 
that this difference is even more pronounced for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
compared to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Despite the fact that small businesses have steadily 
become to play a more important role in urban economics of transition, there is still an obvious 
scarcity or virtually no existence of research in this field in the context of transition economies. The 
scarcity of cross-city research in the context of the region can be attributed to a number of reasons: 
lack of data; prevailing conventions of planning at larger geographic scales such as municipalities 
and beyond; and an incongruence of approaches for measuring entrepreneurial activity among 
transition countries.  
This paper investigates variation in entrepreneurial activity, proxied by the logarithm of 
number of small businesses, across 98 cities located in seven CIS countries, namely Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, during the period of 1995-2008. We employ an 
advanced econometric technique, the System Generalised Method of Moments (SYSGMM) 
technique, to estimate our model.  This allows us to address a number of econometric problems, 
including potential endogeneity of some of our repressors the presence of predetermined variables, 
and the presence of fixed effects which may be correlated with the regressors.  
In the recent years an increasing amount of entrepreneurship research has evolved around the 
effect of various institutional arrangements, such as cultural, social, and legal structures, which are 
thought to provide the context and legitimacy for operation of entrepreneurial organization (Busenitz 
et al. 2000; Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2002; Bruton et al. 2010; Manolova et al. 2008; Smallbone and 
Welter, 2006). With the collapse of communism, which was characterised by the suppression of 
private initiative, transition economies have undergone a colossal change involving comprehensive 
institutional reforms as they moved towards a market economy. For this reason, the institutional 
                                                          
11  This essay is the result of collaboration with Dr. Julia Korosteleva from SSEES, UCL (UK) and is the final draft of our joint paper 
Belitski, M. and Korosteleva, J. (2011) Entrepreneurship and cities: Evidence from post-communist world, WIFO Working Papers, 
2011. I attempted to introduce my own contribution. 
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environment is seen to have a more dominant influence in determining the pace and type of 
entrepreneurship in this region (Manolova et al. 2008; Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2010). This motivates 
us to more closely examine how the institutional environment shapes entrepreneurship in CIS cities.  
To investigate variation of entrepreneurship across CIS cities we utilize a four-pillar 
institutional framework building upon Scott‘s (1995) and Stenholm‘s et al (2010) research which 
emphasizes the role of four institutional dimensions, namely regulative, normative, cognitive and 
conducive, on entrepreneurial developments across CIS cities. We extend this framework by 
developing a theory on the crucial role of higher education institutions in accelerating 
entrepreneurship developments in the CIS region.  
Institutions operate at different levels of aggregation starting from the world system through 
supranational governance structures, country-level arrangements, regional frameworks to localised 
interpersonal relationships (Scott 1995). While studying cross-city and cross-country differences in 
entrepreneurship it is important to account for this multilevel dimension of institutions, as the effects 
of institutional arrangements may vary depending on the level of regional aggregation. Some 
institutions are more harmonized and more integrated at a country level than others. For example, 
property rights protection or business entry regulation as mandated by law, are expected to have a 
more differential effect at a country level, whereas differences in higher education as an institution 
and the way it shapes entrepreneurial activity may be more pronounced at a city level. In former 
Soviet Union countries, mega-cities are likely to host a diverse number of both classic and 
specialised institutions
12
, while smaller cities are more likely to host institutions specialising only in 
a specific field of science. The intensity and quality of research in higher education institutions and 
the degree of their collaboration with industry may also differ across cities, which, in turn, through 
knowledge spillovers, is likely to influence the level and types of entrepreneurial activity and city 
economic performance. Expecting a differential effect of institutions on entrepreneurship depending 
on the level of contextual aggregation at which they operate, we look at the effects of institutional 
arrangements on entrepreneurship in CIS cities at both city and country levels. 
While we find that some domains of the regulatory environment, namely a well-functioning 
banking sector and the size of state activities, matter in explaining heterogeneity in entrepreneurial 
activity across CIS cities, our key finding is related to the role of higher education establishments 
assumed to facilitate entrepreneurship in the region. Formally placed within the regulative 
environment and mandated by national laws on education, higher education as an institution has 
become increasingly sustained by other pillars that, taken jointly, accelerates entrepreneurial entry in 
the region.   
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses issues pertaining to 
entrepreneurship in the transition context, outlines the theoretical framework, and formulates 
hypotheses. The two subsequent sections discuss data and methodology and empirical results, 
whereas the last section highlights policy implications of our research. 
 
 
2.2. Theoretical concepts, hypothesis and controls  
 
2.2.1. Entrepreneurship in the context of transition 
 
Since the definitive work by Douglass North (1990) an increasing amount of entrepreneurial 
research literature has focused on examining how the institutional context shapes entrepreneurship 
and defines its success (Bruton et. al. 2010; Estrin et al., 2011).  The institutional environment 
provides a basis for legitimacy for business operation, making it acceptable and desirable by the 
society (Suchman, 1995). The institutional theory has proven particularly useful in examining the 
                                                          
12 By classic universities we mean higher education institutions offering degrees across different scientific fields –from mathematical 
sciences to history, whereas by specialised institutions we mean those which offer a degree in a specific scientific field such as 
economics, computer science, or architecture. 
 
24 
 
 
differences in the rate and type of entrepreneurial activity in transition countries (Aidis et al., 2008; 
Manolova, et al. 2008; Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2010).  
Numerous studies show that entrepreneurship levels in the transition economies are lower compared 
to other developed and developing economies, which is even more the case for the CIS compared to 
Central and Eastern Europe (McMillan and Woodruff, 2002; Estrin, Meyer and Bytchkova, 2006; 
Aidis et al., 2008). Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011) attribute this to the negative effect of the legacy of 
communist planning, which needs to be replaced with formal market-supporting institutions. Not 
earlier than a decade after transition began the policy-makers have started anticipating that the 
transition from communism goes beyond privatisation, liberalization, and decentralisation; it requires 
a creation of the institutional infrastructure, including legal and regulatory frameworks (Stiglitz, 
2002). Implementing institutional reforms aimed at establishing market-oriented institutions in these 
countries. With the longer prevalence of the communist rule in Former Soviet Union countries the 
erosion of institutional memory in this region has taken them longer than their counterparts in 
Central and Eastern Europe to build up a well-functioning institutional framework conducive to 
entrepreneurship development (Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011).  
As EBRD (2010) transition indicators show there is still little progress in reforming some particular 
institutional domains in CIS countries, in particular in part of establishing institution of private 
property with private sector contributing from as low as 25 (per cent) to GDP in Turkmenistan, 
followed by Belarus (30 per cent) and Uzbekistan (45 per cent). Generally speaking, after two 
decades of transition the business environment in some CIS economies still remains unfriendly for 
entrepreneurship development, creating a void typically filled by informal institutions (Puffer et al. 
2009).  
With a slow pace CIS economies have progressed in various aspects of institutional reforms. 
However, establishing a well-functioning set of new formal institutions takes longer given that 
informal institutions, comprised of values and norms, are more durable and slowest to change 
(North, 1990; Williamson, 2000; Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2011). As Estrin and Mickieiwcz (2011) 
argue, the legacy of communism was not conducive to entrepreneurship, ―as reflected not just in the 
remnants of the command economy‖ (typically seen in Belarus13), ―but more importantly by the 
social attitudes shaped during the communist period‖ (see also Estrin et al., 2006; Schwartz and 
Bardi, 1997). By viewing generalised trust as an important prerequisite to entrepreneurship
14
, Estrin 
and Mickiewicz (2011) argue that it was particularly negatively influenced by the prevalence of a 
system of norms and values associated with communism. The conditions of surveillance and detailed 
monitoring of citizens in soviet times triggered distrust that was often in contradiction to the official 
ideology promoting cooperation and trust (ibid.). The authors conclude that given slow pace of 
change in informal institutions rebuilding generalized trust may be delayed until after full 
generational change.  
 
2.2.2. Institutional theory 
 
The concept of institutions is multifaceted, and it embraces different topics across a wide 
range of social science fields ranging from economics and political science to sociology (Scott, 1995; 
Bruton et. al., 2010). Economists have studied organizations as institutional forms and economic 
processes, focusing on the incentives underlying the complexity of institutional environment, while 
employing theories based on assumptions of bounded or perfect rationality. More specifically, one 
branch of the institutional economic thought focuses on transaction cost theory and property rights 
(Scott, 1995).  Williamson (1975, 1985) looks at how establishing organizations as the complexity of 
‗governance structures‘ helps reduce transaction costs, extending this view further to account for the 
background conditions such as norms, property rights and rule of law underlying the choice of 
                                                          
13 See Korosteleva and Lawson (2010) for further discussion of this. 
14 Estrin and Mickiewicz (2011) argue that trust is an underlying element of cooperation which defines many aspects of 
entrepreneurship, including reliance on networks of contacts in start-up stage; in relation to entrepreneurial finance or establishment of 
relationship with suppliers in terms of, for example, securing trade credit from them. 
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alternative governance structures. Accordingly, Williamson (2000) proposes that institutions can be 
considered in terms of a hierarchy comprising four levels, each placing constraints on the levels 
below. He places society‘s embedded informal institutions (customs, traditions, norms and religion) 
at the top of the hierarchy regarding them the most permanent and the slowest to change. The next 
level comprises formal rules underlying property rights protection. The third level is governance of 
contractual relations which affects interactions of economic agents aligning governance structure 
with transactions, and ultimately affecting resource allocation comprising the forth level.    
Williamson‘s hierarchical approach echoes Douglass North‘s (1990) work on institutions 
examining how the complexity of cultural, political and legal frameworks influence economic 
development. According to North (1990) institutional arrangements define incentives which guide 
individual and organizational rational choices. He distinguishes between formal ―rules of the game‖ 
comprising laws and regulations, and informal or unwritten codes comprising social arrangements, 
and shows how via interaction these institutions either constrain or empower social behavior.  
Unlike economists who view institutions as resting primarily on formal rules, sociologists, 
largely building upon the cognitive and cultural theories, emphasize that variation in formal 
institutions is deeply rooted in social and cultural context, which influences the social desirability of 
organizational activity (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Granovetter, 1985; 
Zucker, 1991; Scott 1995; Busenitz, Gomez and Spencer, 2000). Zucker (1991) embraces institutions 
from the micro environmental perspective, stressing the importance of cognitive beliefs and 
institutionalized social knowledge in shaping organizations.  Meyer and Rowan (1977) see 
institutions not only as complexities of technical sophistication or relational patterns, but also of 
cultural rules supportive of organizations.  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) identify three important 
transmission mechanisms by which institutional effects are disseminated through a field of 
organizations. Along with a coercive channel associated with enforcement of formal rules, they 
distinguish mimetic and normative channels emphasizing the importance of social micro-level 
structures in determining economic agents‘ behavior in an economy.     
Following this line of argument, entrepreneurs, like any other individuals and organizations, 
will be influenced by the institutional context in which they operate and their strategies will 
respectively reflect the opportunities and limitations defined by this context (Baumol 1990, 1993; 
Baumol et al., 2007; Busenitz, Gomez and Spencer, 2000; Sobel, 2008; Boettke and Coyne, 2009; 
Aidis et al., 2008; Aidis et al., 2010; Bruton et al., 2010; Estrinet al., 2011). Baumol (1990, 1993) 
argues that institutional arrangements which define a prevailing system of payoffs will influence 
allocation of individual efforts between different types of entrepreneurial activity whether this is 
productive, unproductive or destructive. A set of framework conditions based on excessive 
regulation of business activities, high level of corruption and poor protection of property rights may 
produce undesired economic outcomes stimulating the development of shadow economy, or leading 
to misallocation of resources and capturing transfer of existing wealth that in Baumol‘s terminology 
is defined as unproductive entrepreneurship (Sobel 2008). To facilitate economic growth policy-
makers are urged to develop institutions which will increase relative reward for individuals to engage 
in the creation of wealth through realizing innovative growth-oriented projects seen as an important 
element of productive entrepreneurship (Baumol 1990, 1993; Sobel 2008).   
 Empirically, a well-developed business environment characterized by strong property rights 
protection, efficient system of contract enforcement and independent judicial system, and limited 
government‘s ability to transfer wealth through taxation and regulation, is shown to incentivize 
individuals to launch productive market businesses and more so high-growth innovative ventures 
with the potential to generate high economic returns (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Sobel 2008; Acs 
2010; Autio and Acs, 2010; Estrin et al., 2011; Stenholm et al.,  2010). 
Our investigation of how the institutional context influences entrepreneurship across cities in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States builds upon the theoretical framework proposed by Scott 
(1995) and extended by Stenholm, Acs and Wuebker (2010) which develops an integrated model of 
institutions drawing on the above perspectives.     
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2.2.3. The four-pillar institutional framework 
 
More specifically, Scott (1995) proposes the following three crucial elements of institutions: 
(1) ―regulative‖ framework comprising regulations, laws and sanctions which are legally binding; (2) 
―normative‖ context underpinning social values, norms and beliefs which are morally governed and 
culturally supported; and (3) ―cognitive‖ pillar constituting the ―shared logics of action‖ among 
individuals and organizations which they use in interpreting available information and formulating 
their expectations and response strategies. Stenholm, Acs and Wuebker (2010) extends Scott‘s three-
pillar model to include the ―conducive‖ dimension - a ―fourth institutional pillar‖ – which captures 
the conditions that primarily affect the quality of entrepreneurial activity and forms the grounds for 
generation and dissemination of innovative ideas and technologies, stimulating the rate of high-
impact entrepreneurship, regarded as an essential part of Baumol‘s productive entrepreneurship 
(Ireland, Hitt and Sirmon,  2003; Agarwal et al., 2007; Audrestch and Keilbach, 2007; Stenholm, 
Acs and Wuebker, 2010). Below we discuss the literature underpinning the theoretical arguments 
related to each of the four institutional pillars and formulate our hypotheses based on this discussion.  
 
Regulative pillar 
The regulative dimension largely originates from the institutional economics theory which 
emphasized the importance of formally codified and enforced rules of law. Formal regulative 
structures may simultaneously enhance entrepreneurial activity and constrain it. As discussed earlier, 
the former occurs via better functioning legal and regulatory institutions reducing transaction costs 
such as, for example, linked to contract enforcement, and via reducing risk associated, for example, 
with expropriation of private assets either by the state or economic agents. Better functioning formal 
institutions consequently enable the economy to move from a ‗relationship-based personalized 
transaction structure to a rule-based, impersonal exchange regime‘ (Peng, 2003).  In our study we 
examine the effect of the following formal institutional dimensions: (1) the development of financial 
institutions captured through the progress in banking reform
15
; (2) property rights protection; (3) size 
of the government associated with its ability to transfer wealth via taxation and corruptive practices; 
and (4) business regulation. 
Banking sector reform 
It is widely acknowledged that more developed financial markets are likely to alleviate 
borrowing constraints through the wider allocation of savings to potential investment projects and 
facilitation of the risk management in the presence of information asymmetries and transaction 
frictions (Levine, 1997). Better developed financial institutions, to the extent of mitigating external 
finance constraints, are found to disproportionally benefit more small and medium-sized firms (Beck 
et al., 2005). With wider supply of finance and competition, the financial institutions are pushed to 
choose more risky financial options including entrepreneurial finance (Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 
2011)
16
. This is particular topical for transition economies for which scarcity of financial resources is 
documented as one of the major obstacles for starting-up a new venture (Pissarides, 1998, 1999, 
2001; Pissarides et al., 2003; Klapper et al., 2002; Korosteleva et al, 2011).  Pissarides (2001) shows 
that lack of access to finance is more binding for SMEs than larger businesses. Financial constraints 
were found to have not only detrimental to entrepreneurial entry, but also for SMEs‘ growth and 
their potential to innovate and export (Klapper et al., 2002; Pissarides et al., 2003; Gorodnichenko 
and Schnitzer, 2010). Pissarides et al. (2003) also show that financial constraints affect SMEs more 
than barriers related to property rights issues.   
                                                          
15 As part of structural reforms viewed as institutional outcome measures (Glaeser 2004) along with progress in banking reform we 
also tested the significance of competition policy; enterprise restructuring and privatization, securities market establishment, utilizing 
EBRD transition indicators, but we failed to obtain any significant results. These results available from the authors upon request. 
16 Bank managers typically regard entrepreneurial ventures as highly risky given a higher asymmetry in information, lack of 
accounting records and credible reputation, associated with entrepreneurial projects (Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht 2007; 
Korosteleva and Mickieiwciz, 2011; Korosteleva et al. 2011). They also find it costly to monitor small businesses given their small 
scale, although with the advances in the risk scoring techniques the banking sector is capable to handle the entrepreneurial finance 
better than in the past (De la Torre et al. 2008). 
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The banking sector reform aimed to advance the financial development through the 
establishment of a two-tier banking system, liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation, full 
convergence of banking laws and regulations with Bank of International Settlements standards, and 
provision of full set of competitive banking services (EBRD, 2010).  The progress in reforming the 
banking sector was slow. Overall, after more than two decades of the financial sector reform the 
majority of CIS countries still have rather shallow domestic credit systems with domestic credit to 
private sector as a proportional of GDP ranging from as low as 18 per cent in Azerbaijan to as high 
as 45 per cent in Russia
17
.  
Using the EBRD 2002-2009 Business Enterprise Environment and Performance Survey data 
Korosteleva et al. 2011 show that given external finance constraints SMEs in transition economies 
tend to largely rely on their internal funds or retained profits in funding their fixed assets investment 
(80 per cent of SMEs). Only about 23 per cent of small and medium-sized firms rely on borrowing 
from private banks. Based on the above discussion we expect that a more developed banking sector 
will increase credit availability to SMEs, mitigating external finance constraints as an obstacle for 
starting-up new ventures.  Respectively, our first hypothesis postulates: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Progress in banking reform is positively associated with entrepreneurial entry. 
 
Property rights protection 
Strong property rights are important for any form of entrepreneurship to the extent that in the 
first place property rights guarantee the status quo via providing crucial security of private property 
against an arbitrary action of the executive branch of the government (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; 
Estrin et. al., 2011). It has been shown that strong property rights have a fundamental positive effect 
on economic activity and entrepreneurship. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) find that property rights 
institutions significantly influence investment, financial development and long-run economic growth. 
In the environment with weak enforcement of property rights, financial contracts are less likely to be 
concluded forcing banks to ration credit with small firms to be disproportionally affected the most 
preventing their entry (ibid.). Aidis‘s et al. study (2010) reveals that among various institutional 
measures strong property rights protection plays the most important role in explaining 
entrepreneurial entry. Estrin et al. (2011) show that a weak property rights also emerge as significant 
constrain for entrepreneurs‘ growth aspirations thus imposing some limitations on an economy‘s 
growth potential.  
Estrin et. al. (2011) also look at a narrower dimension of property rights, namely intellectual 
property protection which is expected to affect high-growth businesses, assuming that those are 
driven by a product or process innovation and hence particularly exposed to imitation of their ideas. 
However, they fail to find any significant effect of intellectual property protection on entrepreneurs‘ 
growth aspirations. Interestingly, studying 177 of the most significant shifts in patent policy in 60 
countries over 150 years Lerner (2009) finds that intellectual property protection is negatively 
associated with innovation output. This may be attributed to the increased rigidity of intellectual 
property rights restraining entrepreneurship instead of promoting it (Baumol and Strom, 2007). 
These more recent findings de-emphasize the effect of intellectual property rights on 
entrepreneurship (Estrin et al., 2011). In our study we explore the effect of the constitutional 
dimension of property rights given that our sample is comprised not only of innovative 
entrepreneurial activities, but of all its types. Based on this we postulate our next hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Strong property rights protection is likely to incentify entrepreneurial entry 
 
Size of the state 
                                                          
17 Source: World Bank (2011): World Development Indicators (edition: September 2011). ESDS International, University of 
Manchester. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5257/wb/wdi/2011-09. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are excluded from this comparison given data 
unavailability. 
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The size of the state has been argued to adversely influence entrepreneurial entry (Aidis et al., 
2010) and entrepreneurs‘ employment aspirations (Estrin et. al., 2011). Higher tax income associated 
with a larger size of the state and higher marginal tax rates for higher earners reduces the expected 
returns to entrepreneurs and discourages entrepreneurship (Parker, 2009). At the same time higher 
tax income can also be associated with a more generous welfare provision system, implying among 
other things higher unemployment benefits, that is expected to increase opportunity cost of going 
into entrepreneurship.  
Larger state may also reflect government‘s higher ability to transfer wealth through a 
differential tax policy applied by regional authorities, and other corruptive practices (Aidis et al., 
2010; Aidis et. al., 2009). For example, in Russia a large number of SMEs pay taxes in accordance to 
a single tax on businesses‘ imputed income, introduced in 1998. Prior to tax reform in 2003, regional 
authorities were given discretion to set a base yield for various types of business activities which are 
subject to a single tax that effectively gave them considerable power over the calculation of the 
single tax ―providing ample opportunities for corrupt behaviour to flourish‖ (Aidis et al., 2009: 266). 
While a new tax policy, introduced on 1 January 2003 and revised further in 2006 centralised the 
setting of a base yield, municipal authorities have gained some discretionary power to regulate a 
coefficient which is used to correct a base yield, taking into consideration some particularities of 
businesses such as the range of goods sold, seasonality of operations and location. A corrective 
coefficient is used for adjusting the value of base yield to account for the differences in business 
conditions. While the declared objective was good-natured aiming to reduce the tax burden for 
businesses facing the least favourable conditions, in reality, this approach has allowed municipal 
authorities to pursue a differential policy towards SMEs favouring well-connected business owners 
(ibid).  As demonstrated by OPORA‘s 2006 survey data18, half of the 61 per cent of the interviewed 
entrepreneurs who were subject to a single tax said that the overall tax burden had increased with the 
municipalities having obtained some discretionary power over a single tax (ibid.). Similarly, Zhuplev 
et al. (1998) discusses that one of the main obstacles Russian entrepreneurs face is government 
corruptive practices, ―the vagueness of the functions of state bureaucrats and the demands they 
impose on entrepreneurs and the lack of uniform interpretation of the laws‖ regulating 
entrepreneurship that sets provisions for rent-extracting by the state.  
Accordingly we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A greater size of the government will discourage entrepreneurial entry. 
 
Business regulations 
According to the public interest theory of regulation, a stricter businessregulation, requiring a 
proper screening of new firms will allow for the entry of only those firms which meet minimum 
standards for providing a quality product or service that should benefit the society.  On the other 
hand, the public choice theory views regulation as benign and socially inefficient. One strand of this 
theory (see Stigler, 1971) argues that regulation is acquired by the industry, and industry incumbents 
are likely to benefit the most. Once they are able to influence the regulation in their favour, 
incumbents increase their power to the extent that restraints entry of new firms and competition. 
Another strand of the public choice theory advocates that regulation is pursued for the benefit of 
politicians and bureaucrats who use it to create rents and to extract them via corruptive practices (De 
Soto, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).  
In their study of the regulation of entry of start-ups in 85 countries Djankov et al. (2002) find 
that countries with overly regulated business environment have higher level of corruption and larger 
unofficial economies, providing some supporting evidence for the public choice theory argument. In 
their majority, empirical studies on business regulation conform to the proposition that over-
regulated environment inhibits entrepreneurial entry (Grilo and Thurik, 2005; van Stel et al., 2007). 
                                                          
18 OPORA is Russia‘s NGO representing small and medium-sized enterprises. 
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Regulatory constraints are found to be of particular detriment to opportunity-driven entrepreneurship 
(Ardagna and Lusardi, 2008).  Vice versa, lower entry barriers are positively associated with the rate 
of firm entry (Klapper et al., 2006; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2006). Respectively, our next hypothesis is 
formulated as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 4: More flexible business regulations encourage entrepreneurship 
 
Finally, within the regulative institutional domain there is also need to discuss higher 
education institutions which are formally constructed within the regulative environment given that 
their establishment and operation are mandated by national laws on education. Higher education 
institutions help facilitate the rate of human capital formation seen as one of the factors influencing 
entrepreneurial activity across countries and regions (Davidson and Honig, 2003; see also Parker, 
2009 for overview of this literature). Barberis et al. (1996) provide some evidence for the important 
role of human capital for successful new entry by small firms in Russia. Given that higher education 
institutions constitute a central focus of our analysis and are sustained by other institutional pillars 
considered below we will elaborate more on their role in fostering entrepreneurship in the subsequent 
paragraphs. 
 
Normative pillar 
The normative institutions influence social behavior through a system of values, beliefs and norms. 
They are typically viewed as the standards of behavior established, for example, by close social 
networks (family and friends), professional associations and business groups, which underlie 
organizational goals and objectives (Scott, 1995; Manolova et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 2010). Values 
and beliefs of social groups influence entrepreneurial intentions to the extent of communicating a 
message to individual entrepreneurs of the relative desirability of their activity (Krueger et al., 2000). 
Such beliefs may be embedded in a wider setting of social references underpinned by national 
culture (Stenholm, Acs and Wuebker, 2010).  
In the former Soviet Union until 1988 any kind of private business activity was regarded as 
illegal, and the society had a hostile attitude to entrepreneurs regarding them as speculators and 
associating small business with theft from the community rather than the creation of wealth and 
prosperity (McCarthy et al., 1993; Smallbone and Welter, 2001). This soviet legacy, embedded in the 
socio-cultural setting of CIS countries, negatively affected entrepreneurial orientations at the start of 
transition.  It is argued that among other things a country can cultivate a positive image of 
entrepreneurship through the educational system (Verheul et al. 2002). The whole academic tradition 
of the Soviet-style higher education was rigidly teacher-controlled, exam-driven and hierarchical, 
allowing little personal contact and limited opportunities for active learning. Lecturers primarily 
relied on rote learning principle based on memorisation of concepts and they discouraged critical 
thinking. ‗Teaching students how to think‘ was lacking in the Soviet tradition of higher education. 
The past two decades have seen some profound changes in the higher education system across the 
region. Neoclassical economics advocating free markets and a system of values associated with them 
(e.g. individualistic orientation, earning on merit, different thinking, risk tolerance), marketing, 
management and entrepreneurship modules have become increasingly integrated in the higher 
education curriculums. Furthermore, the whole teaching-learning approach has undergone a 
significant change with rote learning principles being replaced with critical thinking stimulating 
innovative ideas and creativity, and individualistic approach.   
It has been argued that cultural values, including the degree to which people prefer to work as 
individuals rather than in groups, willing to accept inequality, tolerate risk and favor virtues of 
assertiveness, competition and success,  influence entrepreneurial orientation
19
 (Kreiser et al., 2010). 
                                                          
19 These values broadly reflect Hofstede‘s (1980) four cultural dimensions, namely individualism, power distance, uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity. 
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More individualistically-oriented cultures with positive perception of uncertainty and risk taking are 
shown to have a higher entrepreneurship orientation and higher appreciation of entrepreneurship 
(Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Kreiser et al., 2010). Incorporating these insights into our discussion 
of higher education institutions we conclude that a rapidly changing educational system in CIS 
countries assumes an important role of cultivating positive social attitudes towards entrepreneurial 
activities through teaching entrepreneurship-related modules and communicating the benefits of 
entrepreneurship as an alternative occupational choice to students, and in general through a new 
teaching-learning approach which underlies a change in a system of values more conducive to 
entrepreneurship. Altogether this makes entrepreneurial activity more socially desirable.  
 
Cognitive pillar 
The cognitive environment represents a common set of references, schemas and scripts 
specific to a socio-cultural context, and typically learned and adopted through social interactions 
(Scott, 1995; Bruton et al., 2010; Stenholm et al., 2011). Busenitz et al. (2000: 995) define the 
cognitive dimension as comprised of ―the knowledge and skills possessed by the people in a country 
pertaining to establishing and operating a new business‖. They continue to argue that within some 
countries this knowledge becomes institutionalized and being shared widely across individuals. 
Individuals‘ perceptions of knowledge and skills to start a new business are shown to direct abilities 
of entrepreneurs to identify new opportunities and exploit them (Shane, 2000; Baron, 2007).  
One of Busenitz‘s et al. (2000) findings suggests that perceived knowledge about starting new 
businesses may be particularly prevalent among individuals with higher education attainment. 
Education may affect individuals through providing them with a sense of autonomy and the skills 
which are necessary for discovering entrepreneurial opportunities (Verheul et al., 2002). Educational 
capital does not only explain entrepreneurial entry but also type of entrepreneurial activity, being 
found to positively affect high-growth expectations among entrepreneurs (Bowen and De Clercq, 
2008). They argue that it is also important to distinguish between ‗general education‘ and ‗specific 
education‘ promoting specific entrepreneurial skills, suggesting that it is the extent of education 
capital targeted specifically at entrepreneurship is what determines the allocation of entrepreneurial 
effort within a country. 
Smallbone and Welter (2006) argued that entrepreneurs in post-communist economies have 
higher educational attainment but they lack entrepreneurial knowledge and skills given the soviet 
legacy of suppressed private initiative (see also Zhuplev et al., 1998). A large number of highly-
educated entrepreneurs were struggling to match knowledge and skills acquired through higher 
education with market opportunities, often starting up low-skilled and low-value adding businesses 
such as retail trade or low-tech services
20
. With an educational institutional reform there is an 
increasing scope for integrating entrepreneurship-related modules in nationwide education 
curriculums that makes higher educated individuals acquire not only general knowledge and skills 
but also marketing and business management skills that is expected to enhance their entrepreneurial 
orientation.  Drawing on these insights we argue that the educational system influences 
entrepreneurial entry and different types of entrepreneurial activities by affecting individuals‘ 
perceived knowledge and skills they need to start-up a new venture. 
 
Conducive pillar 
The conducive environment, proposed by Stenholm et al. (2010) to solve the puzzle of how 
the three institutional pillars shape entrepreneurial behavior to direct their efforts to productive ends, 
is comprised of conditions which underlie the environment filled with new opportunities created by 
knowledge spillovers (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2007). To give some examples, such conditions 
                                                          
20 To illustrate this Welter and Smallbone (2010:111) discuss a case study the owner of a successful business involved in managing 
and letting advertising hoarding space in Minsk, Belarus, who was considering opening a coffee shop rather than expanding her key 
business. She explained this referring to business expansion strategy of ‗being too risky because her successful enterprise was 
beginning to attract too much attention of the wrong sort‖.    
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include availability of high-skilled labour, proximity to high-quality universities, development of 
entrepreneurial clusters, intensity of collaboration of higher education institutions and industry which 
all facilitate the formation of high-impact entrepreneurs, engaged in the pursuit of innovations and 
oriented towards growth and early internationalization of their operations (Stenholm et al., 2010). In 
other words, this pillar determines the institutional capability by a country, region or city to develop 
―strategic entrepreneurship‖ defined as activities based on the search of competitive advantage which 
through generation of new products, processes, markets, and organizational forms can lead to wealth 
creation sustainable in a long run (Hitt et al., 2001; Ireland et al., 2003; Agarwal et al., 2007; 
Agarwal et al., 2010). Knowledge spillovers are seen as a central element to strategic 
entrepreneurship (Agarwal et. al., 2010). The knowledge-based theory views knowledge as one of 
the most strategically important resources of a firm, determining its comparative advantage, (see 
Grant, 1996). Knowledge also emerges as a driving force behind regional and macroeconomic 
growth (Saxenian, 1994; Romer, 1990; Aginion and Howitt, 1992). However, possessing knowledge 
is not sufficient for generation of innovative output. Agarwal, Audretsch and Sarkar (2007) develop a 
model of ―creative construction‖ which shows how knowledge spillovers combined with an 
entrepreneurial action, enabling knowledge appropriation, leads to new firm creation and explains 
the success of industries and regions and the growth of economy as a whole. Focusing on localized 
knowledge spillovers Gambardella and Giarratana (2010: 323) show how their intensity increases the 
supply of knowledge to benefit more individuals who have better education and greater skill or in 
other words individuals with the highest ―absorptive capacity to use this knowledge‖. This increases 
the productivity gap across skills and increases regional heterogeneity in terms of skill endowments 
with regions characterized by intense knowledge spillovers being more populated by ―skilled-intense 
organizations that generally are smaller and oriented toward entrepreneurial ventures‖ (Gambardella 
and Giarratana, 2010: 324).   
Start-ups are inevitably about new ideas, and the ability of some agglomerated locations to 
foster new ideas is one potential reason why they become centers of entrepreneurship and self-
employment. Ideas are often outcomes of ‗knowledge intensive environments‘, i.e. groupings of 
large and small firms interacting with public research organisation and providers of knowledge 
intensive services. Spatial concentrations boost entrepreneurship by supporting the transfer of old 
ideas and the creation of new ones. Saxenian (1994) argues how the flow of ideas helped to create 
the entrepreneurial cluster of Silicon Valley. In her more recent work she extends her analysis by 
looking at how mobility of information and highly skilled workers with work experience and 
connections to Silicon Valley and related American technology centers, termed ‗Argonauts‘ 
contributed to the success of the economies of Taiwan and Israel turning them from peripheral 
regions specialized in low-skill labor-intensive manufacturing into centers of technology 
entrepreneurship (Saxenian, 2007).  
Higher education establishments are shown to enable human capital creation; accumulation 
of knowledge; the formation of regional innovation systems; entrepreneurialism; and regional 
economic and social development (Arora et. al, 2011; Etzkowitz, 2002; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff; 
1999; Chatterton and Goddard, 2000; Gunasekara, 2004; Holland, 2001). Respectively, cities with 
higher concentration of higher education establishments are more likely to be incubators of new 
ideas. As part of Europe‘s agenda to promote sustainable growth via innovation and 
entrepreneurship, many EU neighbourhood countries, including the majority of the CIS states studied 
here; embark on promotion of clusters, enhancing also collaboration between small businesses and 
research institutions. 
 
2.2.4. Understanding the role of higher education institutions: integrated approach 
 
Drawing on the above insights highlighting the role of higher education institutions on 
entrepreneurship within the four institutional dimensions, we further adopt an integrated approach in 
studying its effect on entrepreneurship across CIS cities. Scott (2008:54) argues that ―institutions 
supported by one pillar may as time passes and circumstances change, be sustained by different 
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pillars‖. Higher education institutions formally constructed within the regulatory pillar and bound by 
national laws on education, are embedded in the other three pillars discussed above. Through 
undergoing an institutional change they emerge to counterbalance the Soviet legacies to the benefit 
of entrepreneurship development in the region. They may influence entrepreneurial activity through 
various channels such as (1) human capital formation; (2) shaping a system of societal values and 
norms which cultivate a positive attitude towards entrepreneurship; (2) affecting individuals‘ 
perceptions about knowledge and skills necessary to start up a business; (3) knowledge spillovers. 
The embeddedness of higher education institutions within all four institutional pillars makes them 
well placed to accelerate the development of environment conducive to entrepreneurship. Based on 
this discussion, our last set of hypotheses can be formulated as follows. 
 
H5a: Cities with higher concentration of higher education establishments are likely to have higher 
entrepreneurial entry. 
H5b: The effect of higher education institutions is further reinforced through knowledge spillover 
effects occurring to the manufacturing industry. 
H5c: To the extent that higher education institutions are embedded into all four institutional pillars, 
the effect of education is expected to be one of the dominant institutional effects affecting 
entrepreneurship in CIS cities. 
 
2.2.5. Other controls 
 
At the macro level entrepreneurship literature suggests that entrepreneurial activity varies in 
countries at different stages of their economic development (Wennekers et al., 2005). We introduce 
city-level GDP pc to control for stage of the development.  According to a typology used by the 
World Economic Forum, countries worldwide can be broadly divided into ―factor-driven,‖ 
―efficiency-driven‖ or ―innovation-driven‖ economies by the stage of their economic development. 
The 2010 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor report (2009) shows that efficiency-driven economies, 
comprising Russia among others, typically exhibit a lower level of entrepreneurial activity reflecting 
the emergence of economies of scale with individuals preferring income stability, while being 
employed by larger firms, over risky business initiatives (Wennekers et al. 2005).  
Along with the level of income we also consider unemployment as part of socio-economic 
characteristics of cities as a likely determinant of entrepreneurial entry. The effect of the rate of 
unemployment is ambiguous. On the one hand side, it may have a push effect with entrepreneurship 
being seen as the only available occupational alternative. In this case entrepreneurship is most likely 
to be necessity-driven and associated with basic low-scale business activities (Mandelman and 
Montes-Rojas, 2009). It is important to note here that necessity-driven entrepreneurship is more 
likely to take a form of self-employment, implying that the unemployment effect may not necessarily 
show up or it may be inversely associated with entrepreneurship when proxied by small businesses. 
Furthermore, higher tax income can also be associated with a more generous welfare provision 
system, implying among other things higher unemployment benefits, which could reduce incentives 
to go into entrepreneurship. Furthermore, unemployment is a cyclical phenomenon and may simply 
mirror economic recession and demand deficiency, making entrepreneurial entry unlikely. 
The level of criminality in cities is also likely to affect entrepreneurial entry reflecting higher 
probability of asset expropriation by private parties. According to Rosenthal and Ross (2010) 
entrepreneurs will choose the safest location for doing their business. Central to their analysis is the 
idea that different sectors of the economy will sort into high- and low-crime areas depending on their 
relative sensitivity to crime. We expect a negative effect of city criminality on entrepreneurial entry.  
We also control for capital investment ratio in cities to capture the availability of financial resources 
in CIS cities. Although, generally expected to have a positive effect on entrepreneurial entry, the role 
of capital investment in the context of the FSU may be ambiguous, and the possibility of a crowding 
out effect as a result of public funds being channelled to support large-scale state-owned enterprises 
is not excluded.    
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We introduce the effects of urbanisation economies. Local interactions that give rise to 
agglomeration spillover for entrepreneurship are extensively discussed in Duranton and Puga (2004) 
and Rosenthal and Strange (2004). The proposition that agglomeration economies have a positive 
effect on productivity goes back to Marshall (1920). The scale of the urban environment may impact 
productivity through availability of a larger pool of workers and their skill diversity, co-location of 
firms across diverse industries, the proximity of customers and suppliers. In agglomeration 
economies a larger home market essentially increases the returns to business entry (Agrawal et al., 
2008; Gerlach et al., 2009; Simonen and McCann, 2008). So, the incidence of entrepreneurship is 
likely to be higher in urban agglomerations where entrepreneurs‘ payoffs are governed by higher 
technology, knowledge and consumer demand. Respectively urbanisation economies are expected to 
have a positive impact on entrepreneurial entry. Finally, we control for the size of the market, 
proxied by the natural logarithm of population density, industry composition, and country and time 
effects. 
 
2.3. Data and methodology 
 
2.3.1. Sample Description  
 
To investigate variation of entrepreneurship across FSU cities we utilise the 1995-2008 data 
collected from the Offices of National Statistics in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan as part of a larger project entitled "Cities: An Analysis of the Post-
Communist Experience". Our dataset contains urban audit indicators across various domains specific 
to our study, including some institutional measures at a city level (e.g. concentration of higher 
education establishments in a city; public expenditure as a proportion of GDP) and economic and 
social characteristics of cities and other indicators used controls in our study. We merge these 
statistical data with institutional country-level data, derived from the Polity IV data
21
 and Heritage 
Foundation
22
, EBRD transition indicators (EBRD Transition Reports, various issues),to shed some 
light on the effect of institutional settings at a country level on entrepreneurial entry. More 
specifically, the dataset is represented by 98 cities
23
 covering Russia (54 cities), Belarus (6 cities), 
Ukraine (26 cities), Moldova (1 city-capital), Georgia (5 cities), Armenia (5 cities), Azerbaijan (1 
city-capital)
24
 . 
 
2.3.2. Variable Definition 
 
We use a number of small businesses taken in logarithms to measure entrepreneurship. 
According to national statistical offices small businesses are defined as firms with 50 employees or 
less (100 employees respectively in manufacturing sector). A number of small businesses as a 
measure of entrepreneurial activity have been widely used in a number of empirical studies (for 
discussion see Parker, 2009). As Figures B1-B3 show there is a huge variation in the number of 
small businesses across our sample. The number of registered small businesses is extremely low in 
Naryan-Mar, Russia, varying from 60 to 165 over the period of 1995-2008, and Nazran, Russia, 
varying from 128 to 1857 respectively. In 6 out of 98 cities the number of registered small businesses 
                                                          
21 See M. Marshall and K. Jaggers, 2009. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2008, Dataset 
Users‘ Manual, available from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.  
22 For discussion see Beach, W.and Kane, T. 2008. Methodology: measuring the 10 economic freedoms. In K. Holmes, Feulner, E., & 
O‘Grady, M. (Eds.), 2008 Index of Economic Freedom: 39-55. The Heritage Foundation: Washington. 
23 In our sample city size varies from less than 50,000 such as Gori in Georgia, Naryan-Mar and Nazran in Russia to 10,500,000 
residents in Moscow, Russia. 
24 Djankov‘s et al. (2002) study that preceded launching the Doing Business project, contains data for 1999. If there were little time 
variation in the data, we could introduce start-up regulation variables as time-invariant. However, after comparing Djankov data for 
1999 and the Doing Business dataset for 2003, we discovered substantial variation in start-up regulatory measures over this relatively 
short time period. 
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over the 1995-2008 is below a thousand. These cities include Chernigov, Ternopil, Uzhgorod in 
Ukraine and Elista, Naryan-Mar and Nazran in Russia. At other extreme, Kiev, Moscow  - capital 
cities ,- and Saint-Petersburg show high rates of entrepreneurial activity with the number of small 
businesses reaching more than 40,000 on average over the period of our analysis.  
To test our institutional hypotheses we utilise measures at both city and country levels to 
account for the multilevel dimension of our data, and taking into consideration that the effects of 
institutional arrangements may vary depending on the level of regional aggregation. There is no 
universally accepted set of measures to test the effects of country-level formal institutional 
structures. Scholars have largely relied on what is commonly referred to as institutional outcome 
variables (Glaeser et al., 2004) which include survey indicators provided by the International 
Country Risk Guide, the World Bank measures of Governance Effectiveness; the World Bank‘s 
Doing Business indicators; Polity IV measures of political institutions, Fraser Institute, and the 
Heritage Foundation / Wall Street Journal indices. Among other our choice of country-level 
institutional variables has been driven by the need to avoid multicollinearity, which may both render 
some coefficient insignificant and lead others to appear significant because of over-specification. 
To test the effect of banking reform (Hypothesis 1) we employ EBRD transition indicators, 
scored from 1 denoting little progress from a socialist banking system apart from the separation of 
the central bank and commercial banks; a score of 2 showing that a country has established internal 
currency convertibility and has liberalised significantly both interest rates and credit allocation; a 
score of 3 implying that a country has achieved substantial progress in developing the capacity for 
effective prudential regulation and supervision, and in establishing hardened budget constraints on 
banks by eliminating preferential access to concessionary refinancing from the central bank; and a 
score of 4+ representing a fully-fledged market economy with the institutional standards and norms 
of an industrialised market economy. This measure has been utilized by other scholars, looking, for 
example, on banking reform and development in transition economies (see Fries and Taci, 2002).  
For the strength of property rights (Hypothesis 2), we use the Polity IV measure of efficient 
constraints on the arbitrary power of the executive branch of the government, named ―constrains on 
executive‖. Some scholars have largely relied on what is commonly called the Heritage Foundation–
Wall Street Journal indicator of property rights (e.g. Aidis et al, 2010; Estrin and Mickieiwcz, 2011).  
However, the Heritage Foundation variable integrates two dimensions of property rights, namely 
protection from arbitrary government and protection of private contracts. Following Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005), we consider the former to be more important (see also Estrin et al. 2011 for the 
validity of this measure). Furthermore, the Heritage Foundation measure of property rights is highly 
correlated with the Heritage Foundation indicator of business freedom which is crucial to test our 
hypothesis 4. Respectively, a two-fold problem with the Heritage Foundation measure of property 
rights leads us to adopt the Polity IV measure ―constraints on executive‖. 
To measure the size of the local government we use a city-level indicator, defined as local 
government expenditure to GDP ratio (Hypothesis 3). Government expenditure to GDP has been 
utilized at a country level as a proxy for size of the government by a number of scholars (Sobel, 
2008; Aidis et al., 2010; Estrin et. al., 2011).  
To test Hypothesis 4 we use the Heritage Foundation business freedom index (BFI) which 
measures the rigidity of business regulation. It reflects various barriers to start, operate and exit 
business, and it scores from 0 to 100 with 100 denoting the highest degree of business freedom 
(Beach and Kane, 2008). We anticipate that using the more narrow World Bank Doing Business 
start-up regulation data in our analysis could be seen as more adequate, but there are two problem 
with the latter dataset. First, it does not cover the time period of our study. The World Bank Doing 
Business data starts from 2003, whereas our sample covers 1998-2003. Second, while institutions 
should be seen as stable, there is remarkable time variation in World Bank entry barriers indicators, 
Djankov‘s et al. (2002) study that preceded launching the Doing Business project, contains data for 
1999. If there were little time variation in the data, we could introduce start-up regulation variables 
as time-invariant. However, after comparing Djankov data for 1999 and the Doing Business dataset 
for 2003, we discovered substantial variation in start-up regulatory measures (in particular, in those 
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related to time and cost to open a new venture) over this relatively short time period. Nevertheless, 
the number of entry procedures was the most stable indicator. 
Finally, we use the number of universities in the CIS countries obtained from the 
―Universities in CIS‖ and ―Universities worldwide information resources‖ databases25 to test our 
Hypotheses 5a and  5c. We further interact it with our industrial controls, each at a time, but find that 
this interaction is only statistically significant with manufacturing/energy and mining industry that 
captures the effect of university-industry collaboration (Hypothesis 5b) Table B1 reports variable 
definitions and descriptive statistics, including our control variables. Table B2 shows the correlation 
matrix between variables used in this study.  
 
2.3.3. Methodology 
 
We use the following model to examine the determinants of entrepreneurial activity in a 
panel of 98 cities during 1995-2008.   
 
Sit= 1Sit-1+ 2Xit +  3Zit + uit    (1),    i=1,..., N; t=1,...,T 
uit=vi + eit       (2) 
 
where Sit is our natural logarithm of the number of small businesses and Sit-1 is its lagged value 
(predetermined variable). Xit is a vector of our two potentially endogenous variables, namely GDP 
per resident, the rate of unemployment, and the ratio of capital expenditure to GDP . Zit is a vector of 
strictly exogenous control variables listed in Table B1. The error term uit consists of the unobserved 
city-specific effects, vi and the observation-specific errors, eit. 
The dynamic structure of equation (1) makes both the OLS and fixed effects estimators 
upwards and downwards biased respectively, and inconsistent, since the predetermined variable and 
endogenous variables are correlated with the error term. Therefore, to estimate equation (1) we use 
the System Generalised Method of Moments (SYS GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991; 
Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998).  The use of this estimator allows to address 
econometric problems which arise from estimating equation (1). These include (a) the problem of 
potential endogeneity of some of our regressors, notably GDP per resident, the rate of unemployment 
and the ratio of capital investment to GDP; (b) the presence of predetermined variables - the lagged 
dependent variable Sit-1 that gives rise to measurement error as it is correlated with past errors; (c) the 
presence of fixed effects which may be correlated with the repressors; (d) our finite sample. SYS 
GMM allows the predetermined and endogenous variables in levels to be instrumented with suitable 
lags of their own differences (Roodman, 2006).  
 
 
2.4. Empirical results and discussion  and discussion 
 
Our empirical results are summarized in Table B3 reporting the results based on the three 
estimation methods, notably pooled OLS (specification 1); (2) panel fixed effects (specification 2); 
and (3) System GMM estimation (specifications 3 and 4).Comparing the results of all three 
estimators used, one can see that the results obtained from the System GMM model are superior 
given that: (a) the autoregressive term is positive and significant, and its value lies between the 
respective terms obtained by fixed effects (which provides the lower bound) and OLS (which 
provides the upper bound); (b) there is gain in efficiency; (3) the instrument set is valid as evidenced 
by the Hansen test of over-identified restrictions; (4) all variables of interest have expected signs. 
Thus the discussion of our results proceeds based on specifications (3-4). 
                                                          
25
 For more detailed information please see http://univer.in and http://univ.cc. 
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We find support for Hypothesis 1, suggesting that entrepreneurial entry is positively associated with 
the progress in banking reform. To the extent that the banking reform promotes financial 
development via elimination of financial market frictions, reduction in transaction costs and risks 
associated with financing start-ups, it eases borrowing constraints which can be particularly severe 
for small businesses. Our results are consistent with Beck et al. (2005), showing that developed 
financial institutions are particularly beneficial for small firms as opposed to large ones; Korosteleva 
et al. (2011) who find that financial development in transition economies facilitates SMEs‘ access to 
external funds; and Korosteleva and Mickiewicz (2011) who provide some evidence on financial 
liberalization, which is captured though the progress in banking reform in our present work, 
increases the total financial size of the individual start-up entrepreneurial project via the increased 
use of external funds. 
We fail to find any support for the property rights hypothesis (Hypothesis 2).This can be 
explained by the fact that entrepreneurs choose to respond to institutional deficiencies, in our 
instance weak property rights protection, via employing various adaptive strategies such as, for 
example, a strategy of diversification: they choose to invest in unrelated businesses instead of 
growing their core businesses before ―beginning to attract too much attention of the wrong sort‖ 
(Welter and Smallbone, 2011). Such strategies impose growth constraints on existing businesses, 
preventing many of them to exploit economies of scale. These consequences are particularly 
hazardous in the industries where the economies of scale play a leading role given that a possible 
expropriation or raiding of a firm may prevent a firm from growth and engaging in different forms of 
business cooperation.  
Along with the executive constraints index we use a level of criminality at a city-level in an 
attempt to capture the effect of asset expropriation by rent-seeking private parties. Although the 
coefficient is negative, which is expected from the theory, it is not statistically significant. These 
results are followed by a discouraging effect of a larger size of the state on entrepreneurial activity 
(Hypothesis 3). Larger state is associated with authorities‘ higher ability to transfer wealth through a 
differential tax policy applied by regional authorities, and other corruptive practices (McCarthy et. 
al., 1993; Aidis et al., 2009; Aidis et al., 2010). Such policies of wealth transfer are short-sighted as 
increase in the taxation level could generate only short-term benefits for certain governmental 
officials, and can trigger many small and medium-sized businesses moving to the informal sector of 
the economy.  
Our empirical evidence does not support Hypothesis 4 postulating that more flexible business 
regulations encourage entrepreneurship (Djankov et al. 2002) and overregulated environment 
constraints entrepreneurial entry (Grilo and Thurik 2005). Although the value of the coefficient of 
business freedom is positive, it is not statistically significant. Perhaps, the effect of business 
regulation was expected to be stronger in the early or mid years of transition, but with many CIS 
countries making significant progress in liberalising business entry regulation by the end of 1990s (as 
evidenced by the Heritage Foundation data on business freedom), business regulatory environment 
has become less of an obstacle compared to the issues of external finance availability and cost; or 
rent-seeking practices employed by the state).  
We find that heterogeneity in entrepreneurial activity is largely explained by the presence of 
higher education institutions in a city (Hypothesis 5a). This effect is likely to work through various 
channels, including (1) human capital accumulation affecting the supply side of entrepreneurship 
with individuals with higher education being more likely to exploit new opportunities in the market 
and to set up a new venture (Barberis et al.,1996; Davidson and Honig, 2003); and availability of 
high-skilled labour which entrepreneurs with employment growth ambitions have access to; (2) 
positively affecting a change in a system of societal values and norms which are conducive to 
entrepreneurship; (3) through increasing individuals‘ perception of knowledge and skills needed to 
start a new venture (Busenitz et al. 2000), and finally (4) through knowledge spillovers that occur via 
collaboration between university and industry, which are captured via our interaction term between 
these two variables, providing support for Hypothesis 5b. We interpret this result as some evidence 
of the importance of agglomeration economies in terms of higher concentration of knowledge which 
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may lead to intensified exchange of ideas via collaboration between small businesses and research 
institutions. This as an important advancement given centralisation of research and development 
activities in the past. Even nowadays the research and development system in some CIS countries 
(e.g. Belarus) still largely reflects the Soviet legacy with extra-mural R&D organizations not 
business enterprises remaining the main and often only source of R&D (UNECE 2010). In summary, 
tighter links between university and industry may facilitate the development of strategic 
entrepreneurship in the region (Stenholm et al. 2010; Agarwal et. al., 2007;Agarwal et. al., 2010). 
We also confirm our hypothesis 5c finding that the effect of the presence of higher education 
establishments in a city is one of the most dominant institutional effects being statistically significant 
at one per cent level and with one standard deviation above the mean leading to 32 per cent increase 
in the rate of entrepreneurial activity in the region (calculations are based on specification 3). This is 
higher than the effect of a size of the state with a one standard deviation increase in this indicator 
causing a 21 per cent decrease in entrepreneurial entry; and comparable with the effect of a banking 
sector with the progress in the banking reform by one standard deviation above the mean leading to 
33 per cent increase in the rate of entrepreneurship, although the effect of the higher education is 
reinforced further through university-industry collaboration (specification 4). Furthermore, both the 
effect of the size of state and of progress in banking reform are statistically significant at 5 per cent 
level whereas the effect of higher education establishments is statistically significant at 1 per cent.      
As regards other control variables we fail to find some evidence of the significance of market 
size, proxied by the logarithm of population density, although it fails fairly narrowly to pass the 10 
per cent significance level and it is positively related to entrepreneurial entry. We find a significant 
and positive effect of air pollution, used as a proxy for agglomeration economies. We fail though to 
find any significant effect of capital investment and the rate of unemployment. Finally, our findings 
are robust to controlling for industry effects. The industrial effects on their own reveal that 
entrepreneurial entry is less likely to happen in the education industry given the public nature of 
these institutions and the importance of economies of scale in this industry.  
 
2.5. Conclusions 
 
In this study we have explored how heterogeneity in entrepreneurial activity across CIS cities 
is influenced by variation in key institutions operating at both city and country levels. We based our 
work on the institutional framework proposed by Scott (1995) and extended by Stenholm et al. 
(2010) advocating that the institutional environment is comprised of four key pillars including 
regulatory, normative, cognitive and conducive domains. We extend this theory to highlight the 
important role assumed by higher education institutions which while formally constructed within the 
regulative pillar, are embedded within the other three pillars to facilitate the creation of the 
environment conducive not only to entrepreneurial entry in general but also for the development of 
strategic entrepreneurship. More specifically,  we argue that higher education institutions might 
affect entrepreneurial activity via (1) human capital formation which in turn positively affects the 
supply of entrepreneurs in a city as well as the quality of labour resources available to entrepreneurs; 
(2) shaping a system of societal values and norms which cultivate a positive attitude towards 
entrepreneurship; (3) affecting individuals‘ perceptions about knowledge and skills necessary to start 
up a business; and finally (4) knowledge spillovers which occur through close collaboration between 
small businesses and research institutions, and which have been actively promoted now in the CIS 
region via establishment of clusters as part of Europe‘s agenda to encourage sustainable growth via 
innovation and entrepreneurship in the region, including EU neighbourhood countries. Some 
examples of such cluster initiatives include Skolkovo innovation hub in Moscow, and its equivalent 
in Minsk. Saxenian (1994) argues that small firms benefit the most from positive knowledge 
spillover effects, citing examples of Silicon Valley in California and the successful transformation of 
the Hsinchu-Taipei region of Taiwan. Overall, the embeddedness of higher education institutions 
within all four institutional pillars makes them well placed to accelerate the formation of the 
environment conducive to entrepreneurial entry in CIS cities. 
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Our other results also suggest the importance of some domains of regulatory environment. 
More specifically, we provide some evidence that larger size of local authorities, associated with a 
higher ability of governmental officials to transfer wealth through various corruptive practices, 
disincentivise entrepreneurial entry, and progress in banking reform enhances it.  
Our findings have important policy implications. On top of emphasizing the importance of 
further advancements in a banking reform crucial for promoting financial development and reduction 
in borrowing constraints for small businesses, the authorities should also adopt a complex approach 
in further reforming the taxation system (as part of addressing the larger state size problem) where 
reduction in the tax rates should be coupled with minimising the number/frequency of tax inspections 
and corruptive practices embedded in the ―grabbing hand‖ model of government intervention 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1999), which are found to be forcing entrepreneurs to adopt strategies 
constraining business growth of their core businesses. Finally and most importantly, to promote 
sustainable growth in the region local authorities should invest heavily in higher education, and as 
advocated by Bowen and De Clercq (2008) and Saxenian (2007) to generate higher returns, this 
investment should specifically target entrepreneurial and technical education. Furthermore, to 
promote strategic entrepreneurship the local authorities should concentrate on encouragement of 
cluster development between universities and local businesses.   
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Chapter 3: Returns to patenting and training – panel study of the UK innovators26 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The valid estimates of the returns to patenting and training have always attracted significant 
attention among academic researchers, patent officials, policy-makers and top managers of the 
companies taking strategic decisions on training and intellectual property rights protection. As the 
number of patent applications has increased in Europe, Japan and the US (Kortum and Lerner, 1998, 
1999; EPO Annual Report, 2003) and knowledge expenditure as an asset has become an integral part 
of the firm market value (Farooqui, Goodridge and Haskel, 2011), policy-makers have argued that 
the models estimating the value of patents, training and education using simple application or grant 
numbers as well as bi-variate choice models of whether to invest in training and education are not 
satisfactory any more. The models used by academics and scientists do not always comply with the 
availability of data or do not allow to extract at least approximate returns to patenting and training 
from the available data sources making it more difficult for the managers to decide about filing a 
patent and an amount of funds to be spent on knowledge. Moreover, most of the indicators used for 
the innovative outcomes are skewed to the left with a major part of firms exhibiting zero innovation 
outputs.  
Doing innovation and protecting it is important. It brings about higher bargaining and market 
power and enables the company covered by patents to charge higher prices for the innovation. At the 
same time this is not the only way to increase firm‘s innovative outcomes. Higher benefits from 
innovation and their protection come with a continuous investment in knowledge, such as training 
and education. Along with other investment in R&D, acquisition of machinery, equipment and 
software, different forms of design and others, knowledge expenditure (including training and 
education expenditure) is considered to be one of the most important factors that drive growth. The 
impact of knowledge investment (including training and education expenditure) as an intangible 
asset, contribute to the labour productivity growth of the firm, and overall in the UK market 
(Farooqui, Goodridge and Haskel, 2011).  
The purpose of this study is to estimate the private returns to patenting and training for the panel of 
the UK innovators over the period 2002-2009, and the incentives that patent protection offers for 
further investment in innovative training and education. Additionally we also aim to quantify the 
level of patent propensity for the UK innovators, which is a proportion of innovations for which 
patent protection was sought. Firms‘ patent propensities vary widely across industries. Moreover, 
within each industry, there are significant discrepancies between the number of pending patents and 
the number of innovative products launched to the market. Some products are protected by multiple 
patents, while certain patents are never embodied into tangible products (Branzei and Vertinsky, 
2006). Given the CIS data propensity to patent for the UK innovators has not been estimated, but 
assumed (Arora et. al. 2011), we use most recent panel and cross-sectional data, and correcting for 
the endogeneity of innovative training expenditure as a factor affecting innovative outcomes. The 
gains from quantifying firm‘s patent propensity is not limited to the UK, but the model offered could 
be applied to any firm or industry in any country in order to measure the indicator of interest given a 
limited firm level data availability. This paper also focuses on how the knowledge expenditure on 
innovative training and innovation outcomes, proxied by the new product revenue (NPR) are affected 
by the other factors. 
While there have been many studies on identifying the returns to patents and training 
(Kortum and Lerner, 1999; Schankerman 1998; Pakes and Simpson, 1989; Arora et. al., 2008; 
Leiponen and Byma 2009) and even those working with the UK micro-level data on innovative 
companies and R&D performers (Farooqui, Goodridge and Haskel, 2011; Hall et. al., 2011; Arora et 
al., 2011), the returns to innovative training and patenting have not yet been precisely identified. 
Neither the incentive that patent protection provides for further knowledge expenditure, although 
                                                          
26
 This essay is the result of collaboration with Dr. Yulia Rodionova from Leicester Business School (UK) I attempted to 
introduce my own contribution. 
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reverse link of the impact of knowledge spending on patents for the US has been explored by Artz et. 
al. (2010). Arora et al. (2011) estimate the interval of patent premia for the UK innovators using the 
Community Innovation survey data on the UK for 1997-2006. However, this interval is rather wide 
(0.4-2.87) and it has obtained using the assumptions on a patent propensity. The ability to use the 
real values of the patent propensity for the UK business would enable the researchers to calculate the 
patent returns more precisely and provide better understanding for the intellectual property rights 
policy in the UK.  
At the same time there is another gap in the research on the effect of patent protection in 
inducing more training and education expenditure relevant for managerial policy. It is not clear what 
would happen with training expenditure if a company chooses to protect its innovation by holding a 
patent. Comparing both returns on patenting and training, we could shed some light on a substitute or 
a complementary effect of patent and training expenditure returns in terms of revenues coming from 
new product sales to the market.  
There are two main contributions of this study: methodological and empirical.  
Modifying the model developed by Arora et al. (2011) for estimating the returns to patenting for the 
UK businesses, we employ a new approach to estimation of patent premia and returns to innovative 
training. Our approach extends Arora et al. (2008, 2011) using matched CIS and BSD data on new 
product revenues for a panel of 4049 firms over the period of 2002-2009. The model estimates patent 
premium using the data available on patent propensity for 4049 UK innovators, where we explicitly 
assume that it takes extreme values of 1 if the firms holds a patent, and of 0, if it does not. This 
assumption based on data, enables us to estimate the patent premium interval more precisely. When 
compared the results obtained by Arora et al. (2011) and from our study, the patent premia is 
identified more precisely.  
Our first empirical contribution consists of quantifying the patent propensity for the UK 
innovators which is 1/3 or less, and the value of the patent premium which varies between 191 and 
201%. Here the patent premium refers to the additional new product revenue from holding a patent. 
However, one of the main limitations of the study is that we cannot trace if a company holds a patent 
in CIS6 due to the change in the corresponding question between CIS5 and CIS6 surveys.  
The second empirical contribution is in estimating the implied increment to the new product 
revenue due to higher expenditure on training and education: we obtain the elasticity of NPR with 
respect to innovative training and education expenditure, which is within the range of 15 to 36 % for 
the different waves of CIS. Moreover, we find that innovative training expenditure has a higher 
effect during the crisis years and discuss why it could happen. We also establish that the returns on 
patents and innovative training are different between the young firms (start-ups) and mature firms 
(incumbents) within the panel.  
We make an original contribution to the literature by using such data on training as the 
amount of expenditure on innovative training, as opposed to using a dummy variable on the 
incidence of training. We then infer from it and use the data on innovative training only – hence, 
more exact estimates and lower training premia obtained than in the previous studies on returns to 
training (see Table C1).  
The results are robust in both across cross-sections and panel data estimations as well as 
using different estimation techniques: the sign and significance of the coefficients do not change, 
although the value of the parameters becomes more precise. Instrumenting innovative training gives 
an additional increase in the estimation efficiency and consistency: in the instrumented regressions, 
the relevant tests support the significance of the instruments and their fit to data. Test of goodness of 
the IVs is performed and is satisfied, which does not always happen in the works described in the 
study. The instrumentation is executed using the instruments within the current dataset, rather than 
using lags, which could have potentially decreased sample size. Results still hold while using 
different estimates for the panel data: OLS, fixed and random effects, iterative non-linear likelihood 
estimation. We also experimented with a new technique introduced by Baltagi (2008) of using the 
random effects with instruments in a panel.  
41 
 
 
The essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the literature overview on the returns 
to patenting and training, as well the incentive that holding a patent provides for further investment 
in training and education. The second part of Section 3.2 presents a theoretical model linking patents, 
training and innovative outcomes. Section 3.3 describes research methods, discusses identification 
strategy and offers data description. Section 3.4 discusses the results of the analysis and contributions 
to the existing research. Section 3.5 discusses future research and policy implications, and concludes. 
 
 
3.2. Theoretical Framework and Literature review 
 
3.2.1. Previous research  
 
In practice, the question of returns to knowledge investment is very complex. In addition, 
issues related to the legal and economic aspects of patents, developing special skills through training 
and education programmes are difficult to catalogue and to categorize in questionnaires and surveys. 
Nevertheless, an attempt to investigate systematically the possible reasons for the differences in 
returns to patenting and knowledge expenditure has been made. The search for valid estimates of 
economic returns to patenting and training has raised significant attention among economists, 
lawyers and policy makers. This is paralleled by an increase of the relevance of other intangibles for 
firm performance and profitability, leading to new questions in innovation and strategy as to how 
patents and knowledge expenditure increase firm‘s revenues and profits (e.g. Kortum and Lerner, 
1999; Arora et. al. 2008). In the two subsections presented below, we review the literature first, on 
the returns to patenting, and second, on the returns to training. 
 
3.2.1.1 Returns to patenting 
 
Firms do use various methods to protect their inventions, including patents, and different 
forms of the first mover advantage (e.g. Levin et al., 1987; Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2011). These 
instruments of protection and the nature of innovation vary across industries and firms of different 
size (Cohen and Klepper, 2006). Patents serve to protect the firm‘s technological knowledge and 
embody an exclusion right and provide an incentive for the firm to invest in innovation, knowledge 
and marketing activities (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2006). This is our link between the legal protection 
of innovation and further investment in training and education. As indicators, patents transmit 
information about the firm‘s technical knowledge and the intention to protect its inventions.  Patent 
is a signal of companies‘ engagement in new product / process development as new products / 
processes may require protection by patents (Mendonça, 2004). Similarly, patents can be used to 
detect companies‘ engagements to enter new product or new geographic markets. This will 
subsequently affect knowledge expenditure including innovative training.   
Literature search on ―Returns to patenting‖ leaves us with 27 academic papers published over 
the period of 1983-2011 with the majority of them including the last publication in a Research Policy 
Journal. The first paper dealing with returns to patenting is Scherer‘s (1983) ―Propensity to patent‖. 
It analyzed the relationship between knowledge expenditures viz. R&D and invention patenting by 
4,274 lines of business in 443 U.S. industrial corporations. It has shown that the number of patents 
tends most frequently to rise in proportion to R&D; this tendency has however exhibited diminishing 
returns. 
Above work was followed by Horstmann et al. (1985) who first started a discussion on the 
costs of disclosure which can more than offset the private gains from patenting with an effect of 
―stronger‖ patents on incentives to innovate. The private returns to patent protection were further 
explored by Pakes, Simpson and Schankerman in the 1980s in their examinations of European firms' 
patent renewal decisions (e.g. Pakes, 1986; Schankerman and Pakes, 1984; Pakes and Simpson, 
1989). These works utilized a patent-renewal data showing that they can be used to derive 
quantitative estimates of the private value of patent protection, such as annual renewal fees to 
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maintain patent protection on inventions. Under the assumption that patentee‘s decision on patent 
renewal results from profit-maximization, data on patent renewal rates and fees was used to infer the 
private value of patent protection (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984), which is different from the 
income derived received due patenting. 
In the early 1990s Harabi (1995) published the paper on the economic returns on technical 
innovations as an important factor for driving individual inventors and innovators. Since the 
economic returns on technical innovations were difficult to measure directly, many researchers have 
attempted to investigate them indirectly through qualitative techniques and by examining the 
effectiveness of various means of protection of invention, including patents and secrecy, and thus 
leaving aside the quantitative measure of returns, which had been under-researched.  
Patent protection per se yields monetary value and provides an incentive for more research 
expenditure including training and educational programmes that generate the underlying inventions. 
This idea has been suggested in Schankerman (1998), which is considered to be one of the earliest 
seminal works on returns to patenting and the resulting incentives for innovation. The value of a 
patent is represented by the incremental returns generated by holding a patent, above and beyond the 
returns that could also be earned by using the second-best means. He argues that a value of patent 
protection varies across inventions because of the differences in the underlying private value of the 
inventions and in the effectiveness of patents in protecting them.  The research was then extended on 
patent renewals by investigating the private value of patent rights in France during the period 1969-
1982 in pharmaceuticals, chemicals, mechanical, and electronics using the previously developed 
Pakes and Simpson (1989) techniques.  
Research on ‗Small firms, returns to cooperative innovation and patenting‘ was recently 
published by Leiponen and Byma (2009). Their study examines small firms‘ strategies for capturing 
the returns to investment in innovation and establishes the small firms‘ strategies, which turn out to 
be qualitatively different from those found in the earlier studies of both small and large firms. The 
authors conclude that most of the small firms use informal means of protection, such as speed to 
market or secrecy that proves to be more important than patenting for a small firm. Only firms with 
university cooperation and large firms —typically R&D intensive as well as knowledge-based small 
firms were likely to identify patents as the most important method of protecting their innovation and 
securing returns to patenting. This, however, does not mean that the returns to innovation for small 
firms are lower than those for large firms –an issue to be further investigated.  
During the years 2003-2007 several cutting-edge research papers turned up. Greenhalgh and 
Rogers (2006) estimated the value of innovation and its link with competition, R&D and intellectual 
property. This is the first study using a new data set on market valuations of UK companies and their 
knowledge expenditure including R&D during 1989 – 2002 based on the technological classification 
originating from Pavitt (1984).  The main result is that the valuation of R&D varies substantially 
across UK sectors while on average, firms that receive only UK patents tend to have no significant 
market premium. In direct contrast, patenting through the European Patent Office does raise market 
value. To explore further the reasons of low UK market premium on patenting the paper links 
competitive conditions with the market valuation of innovation and finds that the sectors that are the 
most competitive (‗science based‘ manufacturing) have the lowest market valuation of R&D. 
Furthermore, firms with larger market shares tend to have higher R&D valuations, as well as positive 
return to UK patents. This evidence supports Schumpeter‘s (1939) ideas by finding higher returns to 
innovation in less than perfect competitive markets and contradicts Arrow (1962) who argued that, 
with the existence of intellectual property rights, competitive market structure provides higher 
incentives to innovate.  
Most recent research on the value of a patent and returns to patenting is implemented by 
Bulut and Moschini (2009), Acosta et. al. (2009) and Artz et. al (2010). Bulut and Moschini (2009) 
study the US universities that have increased their involvement in patenting and licensing activities 
through their own technology transfer offices. They find that only a few US universities are gaining 
high returns, while others are continuing with negative or zero returns. Artz et. al. (2010) estimated 
the relationship between a firm's commitment to research and development including training and 
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education of workers and its innovative outcomes. They have analysed two innovative outcomes on a 
sample of 272 firms in 35 industries over 19 years: invention, which focuses on the development of 
new ideas; and innovation, the development of commercially viable products or services from 
creative ideas. Their main findings are that knowledge spending is positively related to patents, 
however the reverse relation have not been examined. The paper deals with increasing returns to 
scale to knowledge spending, and it is consistent with economic arguments for the advantages of 
scale in innovation, while it contradicts the latest research results. Consistent with their previous 
work, a negative relationship is found between patents and both returns on assets and sales growth. 
While these findings were unexpected, they are intriguing and call into question the value of patents 
as protection mechanisms if they generate negative returns. The authors argue that these results may 
result from the rise of strategic patenting, where an increasing number of firms are using patents as 
strategic weapons. This is to be further investigated with the micro-level data. On the contrary, a 
positive relationship is found between patents and new product announcements. This fact can prove 
why patents and knowledge expenditure can be associated positively with a fraction of income 
generated by new products, rather than with total sales of asset returns.   
The most recent work on returns to patenting is by Patel and Ward (2011) who estimated 
annual measures of Tobin's q and the data on citation patterns related to the area of science a firm 
patents. The main finding is that markets positively reward firms when patents are granted in terms 
of daily abnormal stock returns. Should a firm‘s patent portfolio be cited, a firm's market value 
increases instantly in terms of stock returns. Therefore, the case of having a patent could 
hypothetically determine higher incremental returns, leaving new space for further research. Finally, 
the study described below is complimentary to the research supported by the Intellectual property 
Office (IPO) UK completed in 2011 by Arora et. al (2011). Using the data on the CIS and BSD 
survey from the UK innovators they attempted to estimate the returns from IP protection and the way 
it enhances potential revenues that firms can earn from their innovative activities. The main 
assumption was that firms can earn larger revenues and profits (due to patenting), although the data 
was limited in terms of patent propensity for the UK business which did not allow them to estimate 
precisely the patent premia. Employing the data on patent effectiveness for the firm managers they 
estimated a certain intervals of a patent premium at each level of assumed patent propensity i. 
Please see the Table C4 in Appendix.  
 
3.2.1.2. Returns to training, drivers of training and innovative outcomes 
 
Maier (1965) defines abilities as being of two kinds: abilities arise without training 
(aptitudes) and modified abilities introduced by training (achievements). Achievements are realized 
abilities and the relationship between the achievements and aptitudes is expressed as achievements 
being an aptitudes reinforced by training. In the context of management literature Herron and 
Robinson (1998) Maier‘s formulation of achievements could be expressed as:  
 
Skills =Aptitudes x Training 
The Maier‘s word ―abilities‖ gives way to the world skills and training being an integral 
component of it. Skills needed for ―win-win‖ strategy are the result of both natural aptitudes and 
training. Herron and Robinson (1998) emphasize that ―training‖ may take place in multiple ways: it 
may mean either experience or a formal training whenever skill is exercised. Possession of skills will 
affect a motivation to use them, furthermore these entrepreneurial characteristics and skills will 
affect entrepreneurial behavior and eventually business performance (Herron and Robinson (1998, p. 
10). Training may also affect psychological characteristics of entrepreneurs providing more 
motivation through skills acquisitions (Begley and Boyd, 1987). From the practical point of view, a 
manager would like to know what will be additional revenue for a business if aptitudes are reinforced 
by training given a certain amount of dollars spent.  
Existing empirical studies surveyed analyzing the impact of training on business‘ performance 
concentrate on the general measures of training, rather than on the expenditure on training for 
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innovation, which complicates the direct comparison of the economic effects of innovative training 
expenditure on the new product revenue. For example, Marotta et al. (2007) present a study of 
Chilean firms with as a qualitative measure aggregated into several categorical groups and of how 
important training is perceived. This precludes the authors from computing the corresponding 
elasticity value with respect to the innovative training expenditure and therefore the contribution of 
training to skills, behavior and performance. Similar analysis carried out by Acemoglu (1997), 
although he analyzed innovation and training decisions, not directly the training premia (i.e. returns 
to training expenditure). This research could fit our analysis streamline, if the author would speak 
about returns on training expenditure, rather than identifying a certain incentives for employees to 
invest in general training  - worker‘s prospective approach. In our paper an employer, not employee 
bears the cost of training without fixing a market type and the division of cost between worker and a 
firm as opposed to Acemoglu (1997). A summary of an empirical previous research on the impact of 
training (broadly defined) on productivity is presented in the Table 3.1 below. 
As regards the drivers of training, our paper employs standard controls as found in much of the 
literature (see, e.g., Bishop, 1991, 1997; Galia and Legros, 2004; Baldwin and Johnson, 1995), 
subject to their availability in our data as well as industry dummies (Barrett and O‘Connell, 2001; 
Arora et. al. 2008). We next turn to the discussion of the theoretical model of the effect of patenting 
and innovative training on the new product revenue of a firm. 
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Table 3.1. Existing estimates of the impact of training on firm’s performance. 
Study Dataset Method Performance measure Data type/ Sample size Results 
Hansson 
(2007) 
The Cranet survey OLS, Probit 
(1)  the top 10 per cent; 
(2)  the upper half; or 
(3) the lower half of all firms 
in the sector: profitability. 
5,824 private-sector firms in 26 countries 
Positive relationship between the number of employees receiving training 
and being in top 10 per cent of profitability among other firms in the same 
sector. 
Bishop 
(1991) 
EOPP (1982) survey sponsored by 
the National Center for Research in 
Vocational Educational 
Cross-sectional 
analysis in levels and 
logs, OLS difference 
analysis 
Productivity growth 2594 firms ROI on 100 hours of new hire training ranged from 11% to 38%. 
Holzer et al. 
(1993) 
 
Survey sent to Michigan firms 
applying for state training grants 
Fixed effects Scrap rates 157 firms 
Doubling of worker training reduces scrap rates by 7%; this is worth 
$15,000. 
Ichniowski et 
al. (1987) 
Field interviews of 45 steel 
finishing lines in the US – monthly 
productivity data 
OLS, Fixed effects Productivity 
2190 observations from 36 lines owned by 
17 different steel companies 
Positive effect of high and low incidence of training on productivity in steel 
finishing lines 
Bartel (1994) Columbia HR Survey (1986) OLS, Probit Value added per worker 155 US enterprises in 1986 
Firms operating at less than their expected labour productivity in 1983 
implemented training programmes which resulted in them achieving higher 
productivity growth between 1983 and 1986, by 6% per year 
Black and 
Lynch (1996) 
National center for the Educational 
Quality of the Workforce (EQW) 
National Employers Survey (1994) 
Cross-sectional OLS 
Dollar value of sales, receipts 
or shipments in 1993 
US National Employers‘ Survey for 1994, 
617 firms, matched with the Census 
Bureau‘s Longitudinal Research Database 
for the panel study 
Per cent of formal off-the job training in manufacturing, as well as 
computer training in non-manufacturing sector is positively related to 
productivity in the cross-section. 
Black and 
Lynch (2001) 
EQW National Employers survey 
(1987-1993) 
Panel First differences 
estimation of 
productivity, then 
regressing residual on 
training variables 
Productivity Panel data for 1987 to 1993 
Number of workers trained in a firm is not statistically significantly 
linked to productivity (no effect on the establishment-specific residual in 
the panel estimation in the manufacturing sector). 
Barrett and 
O‘Connell 
(2001) 
Surveys of enterprises in Ireland in 
1993 and 1996-1997 
OLS and First 
differencing of panel 
data 
Productivity 
Surveys of enterprises in Ireland in 1993 
and 1996-7 
General and all training is positively related to productivity; specific 
training has no significant impact. 
Cassidy et al. 
(2005) 
Total Factor Productivity Survey 
(1999 – 2002) 
Panel data fixed 
effects estimation 
Total Factor Productivity 
Foreign-owned and indigenous Irish 
manufacturing with > 10 workers  
Plants engaged in training have a TFP advantage of 0.3 
percent, ceteris paribus 
Tan and Batra 
(1995) 
World Bank survey 
OLS; Probit  using 
predicted Training 
dummy to Instrument 
training dummy 
Log of Value added 300-56,000 firms by country 
Predicted training has positive effect on value added; effects range from 
2.8% to 71% per year 
Thornhill 
(2006) 
Survey of Canadian Manufacturing 
firms 
Weighted Heckman 
regression, Logit, OLS 
Innovation; Revenue growth 
for high technology and low 
technology firms separately 
845 firms 
Training is not statistically significant for either group; Training positive 
significant for innovation 
Huselid 
(1995) 
1992 survey of human resource 
practices 
Cross-section, as well 
as Fixed effects 
Tobin‘s Q and gross rate of 
return on capital 
968 firms 
High performance practices had significant effect in cross-sections but 
disappeared in the fixed effects study 
Bassi (1984) 
Continuous Longitudinal 
Manpower survey (1975-1978) 
Fixed effects/random 
effects/serially 
correlated error. 
Worker earnings 
Earnings of white and non-white males 
and females 
While women are found to benefit significantly from manpower training 
programs, no such effect was found for men 
Source: Bartel (2000) with the authors‘ additions and compilation. 
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3.2.2. Theoretical Model. 
 
As the starting point of our analysis we modify a theoretical model developed by Arora, 
Athreye and Belitski (2011) which is used to analyze the private returns to patenting and R&D 
incorporating the trade-offs of holding a patent postulated by Schankermann (1998). The model is 
extended to quantify returns to innovative training and the benefits coming from a patent protection of 
innovation for the investment in training. From the CIS we first create a measure of the total revenue 
from new products, NPR as follows 
 
NPR=TR x % of revenues from new products     (1.1) 
 
We consider as new products (N1) those products that are new to the industry – and not just to 
the firm. We can get TR and % of revenue from new products from CIS survey panel data for 2002-
2009, or from BSD survey and the percentage of revenues from new products from CIS.  
 
NPR  P1N1Q1          (1.2) 
 
Where P1 = average price of new products, N1 = number of new products, and Q1 = average 
quantity of new products.  
We assume that 
  
P1 Q1= PQ (1-) + PQ         (1.3) 
 
where P is the price of products and Q is the quantity of products sold.  
         This equation says that the average revenue per product is a weighted average of revenue created 
with and without patent protection, and that the revenue for items with a patent protection is greater 
following Schankerman (1998).  is the share of products for which patent protection was sought, 
called patent propensity, unknown from the ONS UK and IPO UK data as no special surveys have 
been undertaken so far, and  is the patent premium. 
Finally, we assume a production function linking the number of new product innovations to 
investments in innovative training, N1 = f(T).   For the moment, we do not specify the functional form 
of f ().  Note that T is the amount of money spent on training for product innovation, not the total 
training expenditure. We will measure T as (Total training expenditure), where  = share of training 
expenditure devoted to product innovation in the focal industry. Taking into account the nature of the 
question used in a survey: ―the amount of expenditure in each innovation activity, either from 
management accounting information or using informed estimates on training‖ and the fact that all 
companies in a sample are classified as innovators, we assume that =1. Thus, the firm‘s total training 
expenditure in our case is entirely related to an innovation activity. 
Combining with (1.3) and (1.2), we get  
 
NPR = PQ (1 -  + ) f(T)         (1.4) 
  
Taking logs, and transforming the model into econometric form we get 
 
npr = p + q + ln(1-  + ) + ln(f(T)) + εi      (1.5) 
 
where lowercases denote natural logs. 
 
Now, if we specify an appropriate form for f(T), we can estimate (1.5) as a non-linear least squares 
(where is not known and  is a parameter to be estimated). The econometric model of (1.5) becomes  
 
npri = A + b1 ln(Ti) + ln(1- i + i) + εi         (1.5‘)   
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Where A = p+q + intercept. 
 
There are two issues. First, (1.5‘) imposes a specific non-linear specification, albeit one that naturally 
follows.  Second, T is endogenous. In particular, it will depend upon unobserved firm specific 
differences in price and quantity.  Put differently, demand shocks (which affect p and q) will also 
affect innovative training expenditure.   
This can easily be seen by writing p = p+ , where p is the average (across firms) price and  
is a firm specific component of price.  All else equal, if  is high, T will be higher too. The obvious 
way out is to find an instrument for T. A natural instrument for T for (1.5) is any variable that affects 
cost of inputs, provided those are independent of demand shocks.  We have explored measures from 
the Community Innovation Surveys (CIS), such as the importance of increased capacity for production 
or service provision to product (good or service) and/or process innovations introduced scaled (0-3); 
and the importance of knowledge factors as constraints to innovation activities or influencing a 
decision not to innovate viz. lack of information on markets, as instruments. We also attempted to find 
the Arellano-Bond type instruments (see Arellano and Bover, 1995), i.e. the first lagged values of 
innovative training expenditure as an instrument for T, however the availability of data has 
considerably decreased the sample increasing the risk of selection bias. Moreover, the instruments 
used pass all the statistical tests and have economic justification and are also highly correlated with the 
instrumented variable.    
In our CIS data i is unobserved and therefore  could not be identified. We modify the 
original model (1.5‘), given our data constraints and the limited information available from the ONS 
micro-level data such as the BSD and CIS surveys to be able to estimate an equation that relates new 
product revenue (NPR) to patent protection and knowledge expenditure. The modified model can be 
written in the following form: 
 
npri = A+ b1ln(Ti) + ln(1- i *(1-))= A + b1ln(Ti) + i (-1)+ εi   (1.6) 
 
where the last equality holds since in the vicinity of x=0, y=ln(1+x) can be approximated by y=x. 
Since patent propensity i is observed (equals 1 for a firm holding a patent and zero when patent 
protection not used) we can quantify the returns to patenting in addition to speaking about the 
direction of a relationship between patent protection (holding a patent) and the new product revenue.  
Now we can rewrite (1.6) as the reduced form  
 
npri = A + B1ln(Ti) + B2xi + ei       (1.7) 
 
Therefore, xi= i and 0<i<1 and B2= (-1)   = B2+1    (1.8) 
 
Assuming firms choose their innovative training investments to maximize returns, so that actual NPR 
and T are jointly determined by underlying firm and industry characteristics (denoted by X) thus the 
estimating equation becomes  
 
Ti = C1 + Xi i + Bixi+ e2         (1.9) 
npri = C2 + Xi i + B1ln(Ti) + B2xi+ e2      (1.10) 
 
where C1 , C2 are vectors of intercept terms in equations (1.9) and (1.10) respectively, i  is a vector of 
unknown coefficients of the exogenous variables in equation (1.9), i is a vector of unknown 
coefficients of the exogenous variables in equation (1.10), Xi is a vector of exogenous variables 
(controls) in both equations; T is innovative training expenditure. 
 
Note that (1.10) is very similar to (1.7). However, by estimating (1.9) and (1.10) together, we 
accomplish two objectives. First, we improve the efficiency of the estimate, because parameters are 
48 
 
 
jointly determined in the two equations.  Second, we are able to estimate the incentives offered for 
innovative training due to patent protection and the other factors. The econometric model of equation 
(1.10) based on the panel data could be presented as follows: 
 
nprit = C + Xit  + B1ln(Tit) + B2xit+ eit      (1.11) 
eit =vi + uit          (1.12) 
 
where i denotes a reporting unit (i=1, …,n) and t  - the time period (t=1,..,T); C is a vector of intercept 
terms, it is a vector of unknown coefficients of the exogenous variables, Xit is a vector of exogenous 
variables (controls); Tit and xit are the variables of interest: training expenditure and patent protection 
of a firm i in period t. The error term eit consists of the unobserved individual-specific effects, vi and 
the observation-specific errors, uit. 
Our study is also subject to certain limitations. For instance, we do not analyze all the different 
ways in which patenting might affect innovation, however, we do analyze the new product income due 
to the existence / nonexistence of patent protection overall and for different enterprise age. Given our 
main focus is on studying the private returns to innovative training. Thus, while we control for training 
spillovers including patenting, we do not model the impact of training on those spillovers. Nor do we 
consider the impact of training on entry and associated innovation. 
 
 
3.3. Data and Methodology  
 
3.3.1. Identification Strategy and Research Hypotheses 
 
In general, many indexes are being used to measure innovation. Since R&D input index 
reflects only the input on innovative activities, it is hard to consider it as an actual process of 
innovation. Patent as an R&D output index also cannot be used to measure the actual amount of 
innovative activities in that not all the R&D efforts of a company turn into a patent; and not all 
innovations are eventually patented (Acs and Audretsch, 1987a, 1987b; Arora et. al, 2008).   
Commonly used indicators of innovation outcome based on Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS) data include percentage sales of products that are new to the market or to the firm or 
significantly improved compared to sales of other products. A review of the advantages and 
disadvantages of such indicators and some of the studies that employ them is provided by Vásquez-
Urriago et al. (2011). Their main advantages are that they provide a measure of the economic success 
of innovations (in terms of income which comes from sales of the innovative products), are applicable 
to all sectors, allow types of innovations to be distinguished, and allow the definition of continuous 
variables, which contribute to the development of econometric analyses (Negassi, 2004). Their 
limitations are that they are sensitive to product life cycles and markets, which may differ in the 
context of competing companies (Kleinknecht et al., 2002; Frenz and Ietto-Gillies, 2009). The number 
or a share of products in the market gauged the success of firms in developing and introducing new 
products is used as a substitute for a share of new products and therefore, new product revenue. This 
measure was among the most widely used indicators of the firm‘s innovative outputs (Deeds and Hill, 
1996; Harmon et al., 1997; George et al., 2002). In particular George et al. (2002) used various 
indicators for a firm innovation and performance outcomes among publicly traded biotechnology 
companies, such as the number of patents issued to the firm; the number of products in the market 
introducing new products; the number of products under development. New products were viewed as 
the forerunners of a company‘s future market offerings, and key stakeholders were likely to weigh this 
variable heavily in determining the company‘s viability. For the robustness check in this paper two 
indicators: sales of products that are new to the market per employed (in 000s £) as an indicator of an 
innovative outcome and new product revenue per employee as an indicator of an innovative 
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performance are explored
27
. 
New products development using patents as an instrument to protect its innovation by a firm 
may lead to increase in the market share and bargaining power which allows the firm to charge higher 
prices for the innovation and may result in increasing knowledge expenditure to boost future 
innovative outcomes including expenditure on innovative training. Consequently trained personal will 
ensure higher revenues and productivity. We define patent premium as the additional revenue from 
been able to protect its innovation on the assumption that firms earn more per unit on innovations that 
are protected by patents (Arora et. al, 2008). Training premium could be defined as the additional 
revenue from knowledge expenditure in a form of innovative training and education aimed to improve 
personnel skills, abilities and productivity. Our research hypotheses could be postulated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Innovative training provides higher new product revenue. 
 
Hypothesis 2: New product revenue is higher for business that holds a patent (positive patent premia). 
 
Moreover, higher revenues generated by patents will push firms to undertake more knowledge 
expenditure which includes innovative training and education. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Patent protection increases business’ knowledge expenditure on innovative training. 
  
This study highlights a number of important features. First, we use the latest matched panel data 
sample of 4049 UK innovators based on the UK Innovation survey available at ONS from October 
2011 for the period 2002-2009. The survey is built on the responses to the UK part of the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS). CIS performed on 3-4 year basis by all 27 European Union Members with 
the main objective to understand innovative business better.  In this study we the CIS and BSD 
matched databases are very powerful and provide data for a large sample of firms over the eight years. 
Since the survey is CIS-based, this measure can be replicated in other European countries, which will 
enable the development of stylized facts. Our study could also be useful for the Northern American 
innovation research enriching already existing surveys such as Carnegie Melon Survey, Science, 
Innovation, and Electronic Information Division of Statistics Canada Surveys (Branzei and Vertinsky, 
2006). Our data provide quantitative evidence of the benefits received from patent protection and 
training for the UK innovators across all sectors. 
Second, we employ the approach that relates CIS and BSD data on new product revenues, 
patent protection and knowledge expenditure on training for the UK innovators. Using parametric 
techniques including 2SLS and Tobit enables us to evaluate the training premium and returns to 
patenting as well as the inducement to invest in training for each round of CIS, discovering the 
changes in ex-ante and ex-post economically constrained times (2007-2009). These differences 
however could not be estimated for the patent premium and the inducement that patent protection 
provides for investment in training for the crises period 2007-2009. The reason for this is 
inconsistency between CIS4-5 and CIS6 question on the usage of patent protection. Using cross-
section estimation will allow us to estimate the relationship between patent protection and innovative 
outcomes as well as training premium for each of three periods for average firms and for different 
points on the dependent variable distribution (right-censored and uncensored observations in Tobit 
estimation).  
Third, we use panel data estimation with an extension for start-up firms and mature companies 
split to deal with unobserved heterogeneity across the firms of different age and increase the efficiency 
of the estimation. We also use industry controls generated in large six groups to control for 
                                                          
27
 The results obtained by using the new product revenue per employee as a dependent variable in the model (1.9) and 
(1.10) confirmed the results reported in the paper. The significance and the direction  of relationship between the 
innovative outcome, patent protection, training and other control variables  remained stable across various the estimation 
methods. This is also explained by the correlation coefficient between two innovative measures (sales of products that are 
new to the market per employed (in 000s £) and new product revenue per employee) which is 0.98. 
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unobserved heterogeneity across sectors. The definition of a new venture varies across studies. 
Depending on the industry setting, it can take between 8 and 12 years until companies mature (Zahra, 
1996; Rosenbusch et. al., 2011). Within the scope of this analysis, we use an average age of 10 years 
as a cut-off point between young and mature firms. 
Fourth, the instruments chosen are treated with cautious as the integrated effect moderate the 
relationship between training expenditure and firm innovative outcome (Zhuang et. al., 2009). Unlike 
the Arellano - Bond type instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995) viz. 
lagged values of training expenditure, instruments derived within CIS survey will not shrink the 
sample and robustness of the estimates could be controlled by performing F-test on instruments. 
Deriving the instruments within a sample does reduce the number of firms from the CIS survey 
however does not change the sample properties. We also experimented with lagged training 
expenditure, however due to a small sample bias we do not feature those results.  
Lastly, there are several estimation issues of the equations (1.9-1.10). A first estimation issue is 
that we have three cross section models, which do not allow us to control for unobservable individual 
heterogeneity, however allows controlling for the drivers and causes in each round of CIS driving 
more precise conclusions. We overcome the problem of unobservable individual heterogeneity using 
panel data estimation techniques (Baltagi, 2008). 
Second issue is related to the characteristics of our dependent variables, which is double censored, as 
firms can have none or all sales from new to the market products and hence none or all sales from new 
to the market products per employee. There are several different ways of estimating such a variable 
using parametric techniques (see Wooldridge, 2002; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; 2009). A double 
censored IV Tobit model will account for this fact. This is used in several of the empirical analysis 
(Negassi, 2004; Faems et al., 2005; Laursen and Salter, 2006).  
Third issue is that, by estimating a system of equations in the first stage of our analysis (1.9-
1.10) we accomplish two objectives. First, we improve the efficiency of the estimate, because T is 
endogenous.  Second, we are able to estimate the incentives offered for training expenditure due to 
patent protection
28
. The validity of our instruments is confirmed by a number of tests presented in 
Table C1. The first one is the Hansen's / Sargan‘s J statistic for overidentifying restrictions: the joint 
null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error term, and that 
the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. If the test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis, then all instruments used are considered exogenous. The second one is the 
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic, which tests whether the equation is identified, i.e., that the excluded 
instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors. A rejection of the null indicates that the 
matrix of reduced form coefficients is full column rank and the model is identified. 
 
3.3.2. Data and variable description 
 
In recent years, many studies on innovation have used CIS-type data. CIS data are popular for 
analysing innovation because (i) they allow comparable indicators to analyse inter-country and 
intertemporal differences and develop robust empirical evidence, and (iii) they are usually conducted 
by national statistics offices which are experienced at data gathering, and conduct extensive pre-testing 
and piloting to check interpretability, reliability and validity (Laursen and Salter, 2006, Frenz and 
Ietto-Gillies, 2009; Arora et. al., 2011). 
The dataset used in this paper is based on two independent, albeit mergeable, datasets, viz. the 
CIS
29
 surveys conducted bi-annually by the Office of National Statistics (ONS UK) and Business 
Survey Database (BSD) which we use to gain information on firm‘s ownership, status (MNE or not 
MNE), the year of establishment and SIC sector activity.  While the CIS provides detailed information 
on business characteristics, that include name, address, postcode, standard industrial classification, 
employment and employees, turnover, enterprise group links, and the turnover generated by new 
products, the survey only permits us to classify firms into innovators and non-innovators and asks 
                                                          
28 Please see Wooldridge, J. (2002) on derivation of the instrumented systems of equations and the instrumented techniques. 
29 For more information on CIS and what these datasets contain see: http://nswebcopy/StatBase/Source.asp?vlnk=926&More=Y 
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about types of aggregate innovative expenditures. It allows that firms produce the amount of 
expenditure in each innovation activity (Intramural and extramural R&D, Acquisition of external 
knowledge, Training, All forms of design, marketing expenditure, etc.) in a monetary value (£000s).  
ONS surveys tend to account for the majority of large sized businesses (for these have a 
greater economic impact), and then select a number of small and medium sized businesses sampled by 
industry and geographical region. To date there have been 4 CIS Surveys taken place with the latest in 
2009. Despite some survey questions were changed and more detailed we will be using CIS4-6 panel 
data component released recently by ONS (September 2011) for our analysis. This ensures 
consistency of econometric estimation and allows controlling for existing heterogeneity across UK 
firms within 2002-2009.  
Briefly we are describing three of the following survey included in the panel. CIS 4 covers the period 
2002-2004. It consists of 4049 successfully matched firms with CIS5-6 and BSD from 16240 firms 
originally available from ONS (24.93% matched). The CIS 5 survey was undertaken in 2004-2006 and 
consists of the same 4049 matched firms within CIS4 -6 and BSD from about 14000 originally 
available on CIS5 survey (28.92% matched). The version of CIS/BSD matched data used for the paper 
covers the year 1998-2006. CIS was originally conducted every four years, but since 2005 has been 
conducted every two. The UK Innovation Survey 2009, the sixth Europe-wide CIS was sent to 28,000 
UK enterprises with 10 or more employees and achieved a 50 per cent response rate.  
The Top 5 sectors presented in CIS4-6 panel data include: 74 – Other business activities 
including patents, financial management and consulting (1939 firms); Construction (959 firms); Retail 
trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles (895 firms); Wholesale trade and commission trade, 
except of motor vehicles and motorcycles (819 firms); Hotels and restaurants (659 firms).  
For a detailed Top 5 sector split by each CIS round please see Table 3.2 below. One may easily 
notice a shift towards service sector (Hotels and restaurants), real estate and manufacturing during the 
economically constrained times; from the traditional business activities, construction and trade. 
 
Table 3.2: Top 5 sectors included in the CIS4-6 panel dataset (CIS split) 
CIS4-6 Panel 
SIC 92 sector Number of reporting. Units 
Other business activities 1939 
Construction 959 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
895 
Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
819 
Hotels and restaurants 659 
 
Regarding the size of the reporting units split within CIS4-6, share of small businesses varies 
from 47.6 to 50.4%. The other half of the companies is shared almost equally between large and 
medium companies with a share of medium businesses from 24.6 to 26.4% and a share of large 
businesses within 24.9 and 26.0%. Table 3.3 shows the split between the sizes of the companies across 
each CIS round. 
Table 3.3: Firm size composition by CIS 
 
Size of Enterprise 
CIS4 CIS5 CIS6 
Number of 
reporting. 
Units 
% 
Number of 
reporting. 
Units 
% 
Number of 
reporting. 
Units 
% 
Small - 10-49 employees 2040 50.38 1989 49.12 1927 47.59 
Medium - 50-249 employees 999 24.67 1018 25.14 1068 26.38 
Large - 250+ employees 1010 24.94 1042 25.73 1054 26.03 
Total 4049 100 4049 100 4049 100 
Table 3.4 below shows the list of variables used in the analysis, sources and the way they were 
constructed. Table 3.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables and Table 3.6 reports the 
correlation matrix of the variables used in the analysis. 
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 Variable name Source of the data Measure description and construction 
Dependent 
variables 
 
 
New product revenue (NPR)  in £000 CIS 4-6 (q810, q2420) 
NPR is obtained by multiplying firm‘s share of products introduced that 
were new to firm‘s market by the firm‘s turnover. Measure included 
was ln(1+NPR) 
NPR per employee CIS 4-6 (q810, q2420, q2520) 
NPR divided by the number of listed employees in £000. Measure is 
reported as (1+NPR) / q2520 taken in logs 
 
Endogenous 
variable 
 
Training (T)  CIS 4-6 (q1450) 
Training expenditure is company-financed training unit expenditures in 
£000. We transform measure in ln(1+T) 
 
Rivals BSD (2002-2009) 
Number of rivals in the industry calculated by 2 digit SIC (92) sector 
taken in logs 
Global CIS 4-6 (q230, q240) 
Dummy variable=1 if the enterprise sells goods and/or services 
overseas (Other Europe and all other countries except the UK). 
Public BSD (2002-2009) Dummy variable=1 if the enterprise is a publicly traded company. 
Foreign BSD (2002-2009) Dummy variable=1 if the parent firm is located abroad (USA or other). 
Cooperation 
CIS 4-6 (q1861, q1862, q1871, 
q1872) 
Dummy variable=1 if the co-operation partner (e.g. Universities or 
other higher education institutions; Government or public research 
institutes) is located locally/ regionally within the UK or a partner is a 
UK national. Reporting unit level 
Patents  CIS 4-6 (q2130) 
Dummy variable=1 if the unit used patents to protect its innovation; 
zero – if patent protection has not been used. Data is unavailable for 
CIS6 due to changes in reporting the survey question. Reporting unit 
level 
 
Scientists (S) CIS 4-6 (q2610, q2520) 
Number of employees educated to degree level in science and 
engineering. Measure included was ln(1+S)  
Small firm 
 
CIS 4-6 (q2520) 
Dummy variable=1 if the unit‘s number of employees less or equal 50; 
zero – otherwise. Reporting unit level 
Large firm 
 
CIS 4-6 (q2520) 
Dummy variable=1 if the unit‘s number of employees more or equal 
250; zero – otherwise. Reporting unit level 
Table 3.4: Variables used in the study 
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 Biotech and pharmaceutical CIS 4- 6 (SIC92, SIC2003) 
Dummy variable=1 if the if 3 digit SIC(92) is sic244 or/ and  sic241 
or/and sic247; zero otherwise 
 Computers & electronic equipment CIS 4- 6 (SIC92, SIC2003) 
Dummy variable=1 if the if 3 digit SIC(92) is sic721 or/ and  sic723 or/ 
and sic724 or/and sic300 or/ and sic722; zero otherwise 
 Machinery CIS 4- 6 (SIC92, SIC2003) 
Dummy variable=1 if the if 3 digit SIC(92) is sic343 or/ and  sic292 or/ 
and sic295 or/and sic341 or/and sic353 or/and  sic296 or/and sic291; 
zero otherwise 
 Instruments CIS 4- 6 (SIC92, SIC2003) 
Dummy variable=1 if the if 3 digit SIC(92) is sic294 or/and sic332 
or/and sic333 or/and sic334; zero otherwise 
 Transportation CIS 4- 6 (SIC92, SIC2003) 
Dummy variable=1 if the if 3 digit SIC(92) is sic602 or/and sic601 
or/and sic603 or/and sic611 or/and sic621 or/and sic623; zero otherwise 
 
 Medical instruments CIS 4- 6 (SIC92, SIC2003) Dummy variable=1 if the if 3 digit SIC(92) sic331 
Instruments for 
Training 
expenditures 
Firm‘s capacity CIS4-6 (q1250) 
Reported the importance of increased capacity for production or service 
provision for the product (good or service) and/or process innovations. 
Four mutually exclusive responses (0 - Not used; 1-Low; 2 - Medium; 3 
- High). 
Market info CIS4-6 (q1907) 
Reported the importance to enterprise the lack of information on 
markets as a factor which constraints innovation activities. Four 
mutually exclusive responses (0 - Not used; 1-Low; 2 - Medium; 3 - 
High). 
Source: Office of National Statistics UK 
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Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics  
Variable 
CIS4 (2002-2004) CIS5 (2004-2006) CIS6 (2007-2009) Panel CIS4-6 (2002-2009) 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
NPR 4049 1.51 3.90 4049 1.20 3.53 4049 1.12 3.41 12147 1.28 3.61 
NPR per employee 3668 0.98 2.44 3763 0.76 2.17 3521 0.78 2.21 10805 0.77 2.20 
Rivals 4049 6.19 0.97 4049 6.19 0.96 4049 6.20 0.95 12147 6.19 0.95 
Global 4049 0.19 0.40 4049 0.20 0.40 4049 0.19 0.39 12147 0.19 0.39 
Public 4049 0.88 0.32 4049 0.88 0.32 4049 0.88 0.32 12147 0.88 0.32 
Foreign 4049 0.13 0.33 4049 0.13 0.33 4049 0.13 0.33 12147 0.12 0.33 
Cooperation 4049 0.06 0.23 4049 0.04 0.21 4049 0.07 0.26 12147 0.05 0.23 
Patents 3942 0.21 0.41 3662 0.24 0.43 4049 . . 11653 0.22 0.42 
Scientists 4049 2.38 3.28 4049 2.44 3.31 4049 2.27 3.24 12147 2.36 3.28 
Small firms 4049 0.50 0.50 4049 0.49 0.50 4049 0.48 0.50 12147 0.49 0.50 
Large firms 4049 0.25 0.43 4049 0.26 0.44 4049 0.26 0.44 12147 0.26 0.44 
Biotech and pharmaceutical 4049 0.00 0.07 4049 0.00 0.07 4049 0.01 0.08 12147 0.01 0.07 
Computers & electronic equipment 4049 0.02 0.14 4049 0.02 0.14 4049 0.02 0.14 12147 0.02 0.14 
Machinery 4049 0.04 0.19 4049 0.04 0.19 4049 0.04 0.20 12147 0.04 0.19 
Instruments 4049 0.01 0.10 4049 0.01 0.11 4049 0.01 0.11 12147 0.01 0.11 
Transportation 4049 0.06 0.23 4049 0.06 0.23 4049 0.06 0.23 12147 0.06 0.23 
Medical instruments 4049 0.00 0.06 4049 0.00 0.05 4049 0.00 0.06 12147 0.00 0.06 
Firm‘s capacity 3566 0.94 1.14 3881 0.42 0.92 3750 0.67 1.05 11197 0.68 1.04 
Market info 2102 1.34 0.66 1805 1.17 0.76 2283 1.18 0.73 6190 1.23 0.72 
Training 4049 0.90 1.50 4049 0.77 1.38 4049 0.41 1.07 12147 0.70 1.35 
Training (total)* 4049 23.09 171.80 4049 27.49 797.14 4049 23.27 799.73 12147 24.62 659.37 
*Training expenditure is taken in levels , 000s £ 
 
Source: Office of National Statistics UK. 
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Table 3.6: Correlation matrix 
 
NPR 
NPR per 
employee* 
Traini
ng 
Rivals Global Public Foreign Cooperation Patents Scientists Small firms Large firms 
Firm‘s 
capability 
NPR per  
Employee 
0.98* 
1 
           
Training 0.23* 0.20* 1           
Rivals -0.12* 
-0.13* 
-
0.03* 
1 
         
Global 0.22* 0.20* 0.15* -0.21* 1 
        
Public 0.08* 0.07* 0.07* -0.15* 0.11* 1 
       
Foreign 0.08* 0.07* 0.13* -0.15* 0.20* 0.13* 1 
      
Cooperation 0.25* 0.24* 0.20* -0.10* 0.19* 0.03* 0.08* 1 
     
Patents 0.24* 0.22* 0.22* -0.13* 0.23* 0.10* 0.16* 0.13* 1 
    
Scientists 0.25* 0.20* 0.31* -0.13* 0.31* 0.15* 0.25* 0.21* 0.24* 1 
   
Small firms -0.05* 
-0.01 
-
0.20* 
-0.08* -0.12* -0.17* -0.24* -0.06* -0.11* -0.29* 1 
  
Large firms 0.06* 0.02* 0.21* 0.09* 0.06* 0.14* 0.27* 0.06* 0.11* 0.26* -0.57* 1 
 
Firm‘s 
capability 
0.37* 
0.36* 
0.33* -0.11* 0.21* 0.10* 0.09* 0.27* 0.18* 0.26* -0.10* 0.09* 1 
Market info 0.13* 0.06* 0.14* -0.04* 0.15* 0.03* -0.02* 0.10* 0.12* 0.16* 0.03* -0.05* 0.22* 
Source: Office of National Statistics UK  
Note: The variable NPR per employee as a proxy for the productivity of a new products / processes will not be used interchangeably with the level of innovation in our 
analysis given the correlation coefficient between the NPR and NPR per employee is approaching the unity. Moreover the sign of the relationship with the other independent 
variables is same. Additionally the confidence intervals of both variables are overlapping. Wald test on the equality of the correlation coefficients between the NPR and NPR 
per employee with the independent variables was not rejected at 1% significance level. This could also be seen by a simple eyeball test comparing the pairwise correlation 
coefficients in column 1 and column 2 of the Table. The results of the tests and regressions using both NPR and NPR per employee are available from authors upon request.  
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3.4. Results 
 
The results of the analysis are shown in Tables C1-C3 in Appendix A. The equation 1.10 
explains the impact of holding a patent and of training expenditure on NPR, while the first stage 
equation 1.9 of 2SLS and IV Tobit estimates the incentives offered for training expenditure due to 
holding of a patent and other factors. Both H1 and H2 are supported by the estimation results. H3 is 
rejected. Table C1-C3 shows the estimation results (1.9-1.10) with NPR (in 000s £) taken in 
logarithms as a dependent variable, separately for the three cross-sections of CIS4, CIS5, CIS6.  
 
3.4.4. New product revenue and returns to patenting  
 
Our returns to patenting measure = B2+1 means that, as a firm gets a patent, NPR increases by 
1+1.64=2.64 for CIS4 and by 1+0.59=1.59 for CIS5 (Table C1). The results from the panel data 
estimation using instruments are even more precise and are restricted in the interval between 1.92 and 
2.01 (see Table C2). Although our finding is consistent with the estimates by Arora et al. (2011) for 
the UK firms assumed that the patent propensity is 1/3, the method of obtaining these results is 
different. Arora et al. (2011) calculate the patent premium on the UK innovators during the period 
1997-2006 which is overlapping with our data except for the use of cross-section estimation which 
does not allow them to control for existing unobserved heterogeneity across firms. Moreover, their 
study assumes certain level of patent propensity from 1/3 to 2/3 which means that from 1/3 to 2/3 of 
all innovations developed have been patented.  
The patent premium to NPR is derived from the marginal effect of patent effectiveness on NPR 
(viz. importance of patents as an instrument of IP protection by managers) given a certain assumed 
patent propensity of the firm. On the contrary, in our case the patent propensity for the firm is given: it 
is either one or zero, depending on the fact of holding of a patent. Our case falls in the extremes of 
Arora et al. (2008, 2011) assumptions about patent propensity (which is in the range from 0 to1) using 
a dummy variable for patent propensity viz. is exactly whether the reporting unit does (patent 
propensity equals zero) or does not (patent propensity equals one) use patent as an instrument of IP 
protection. Our results enable us to choose from the range of assumed patent premia offered by Arora 
et al (2001) calculated on the basis of different assumptions on patent propensity; those that overlap 
with the range 1.92-2.01 are the patent propensity of 1/3 or less. These estimates of patent propensity 
are also similar to those in the US manufacturing sector calculated by Arora et. al (2008). This means 
that the UK innovators patent a third or less of their innovations, which can also be seen from the 
descriptive statistics - the mean of ‗holding a patent‘ dummy. The UK innovators may choose to use 
other methods of protection for the rest of innovation like secrecy, speed and others being unaware 
that indeed patenting ensures up to 200% higher returns on their innovation.  
We split the sample into two in the Table C3. One sample to which the instruments are applied 
consists of 520 young firms called ―start-ups‖ (<11 years) and 4824 mature firms (>10 years). We 
estimate patent premium which is positive both for young (2.86) and mature firms (1.87) and 
significant for both types. These results suggest that holding a patent increases NPR of a young firms 
on average by 286% and mature firms by 187% (depending upon which CIS round we use for 
coefficient values). This finding is in line with Rosenbusch et. al. (2011) who emphasized that 
innovation has a stronger impact in younger firms than in more established SMEs. This finding 
suggests that the often cited liability of newness of younger firms can also be an asset for new firms. 
Their finding indicates that new firms possess unique capabilities to create and appropriate value 
through innovations.  
Higher returns to patenting may discourage young firms from investment in innovative training 
and education, if they are able to restrict the access of competitors and significantly increase their 
innovative outcomes by holding a patent. Holding a patent indeed could become a substitute for 
investment in innovative training and education, which eventually may affect the young company in a 
longer run. This is a message to policy makers and young (start-ups) company managers.  
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3.4.5. New product revenue and returns to training  
 
Estimating the implied increment to new product revenue due to higher expenditure on training 
an education we can speak about the marginal effect on NPR of innovative training and education 
expenditure. Existing estimates of training premium reported in the literature typically relate to 
increment to operating profits (also, value added, scrap rates, etc. – please refer to Table 3.1) rather 
than to the increments to new product revenues. Put differently, this estimate combines both the direct 
effect and indirect effects from training expenditure on NPR analogically to returns to patenting (see 
e.g. Holzer et al., 1993; Kammerer, 2009).  
We find that the elasticity of the new product revenue with respect to training expenditure is 
within the range of 0.3 – 0.5 % for the OLS estimates, in the range of 3-5 % for the 2SLS estimates, 
and varies from 15 to 36 % for the Tobit estimates for different waves of the CIS. 
When we estimate the same equations on the panel data, the corresponding elasticity of NPR to 
training expenditure is 0.25-0.32 % for the linear panel data non-instrumented regressions (Pooled 
OLS, random and fixed effects, maximum-likelihood estimation), and 3.2-5.0 % for the instrumented 
estimations. Thus, we note that our results (excluding Tobit results, where we do not perform the 
equivalent estimation on the panel data) are very robust and consistent both across cross-sections and 
the panel. 
The elasticity is the lowest for the CIS4, and is the highest during the economically constrained 
times 2007-2009 sample – the data from CIS6 survey. The potential explanation is linked with the 
impact of economic crisis, in a way the companies starting from the same level of training will intend 
to achieve higher returns to their input in various ways: improving the quality of services provided, 
putting additional pressure on workers, cutting other input costs, etc. Workers during the credit crunch 
years are often expected to put in more effort for the same or even lower compensation, and may be 
afraid of layoffs which may increase their productivity. Furthermore a consistently growing demand 
for new products given the lower level of inputs (including training expenditure) is going increase the 
returns to training in terms of NPR. So, given same level of inputs (innovative training and education 
in our case) a company would attempt to achieve higher results during the economically constrained 
times and more competitive external environment which will drive up returns to inputs. 
A good case study example of an increase in labor market pressure could be a chain of the 
supermarkets in the UK called Aldi. From the interview with the Aldi HR and skills team managers 
we came to know that Aldi paid their sales manager £8 per hour before the crisis hit them and now 
they get a 2 months waiting list for the same post given the salary is now down to £6 per hour. 
Speculating, Aldi could consider minimizing the cost of innovative training hiring already trained 
personnel and, expecting them to work harder or at least do the same job under the pressure of being 
on the job market again.  
At the same time, the demand for innovative products in the UK may keep growing along with 
the basic products (technological gadgets could be an example here). In fact we expect the demand for 
innovative products to increase overtime, which also explains higher revenue on new products 
generated by innovative firm overtime including the data from the economically constrained time 
(2007-2009). This explanation is consistent with the results obtained in Table C2 for the panel data 
estimates, when the Year dummy for CIS6 is positive and significant. 
When splitting a sample into two in the Table C3 we find that the difference in training 
premium between the start-ups and mature firms is respectively 2.8 and 3.3%. This result is obtained 
using EC2SLS RE (Baltagi's EC2SLS random-effects estimator) described in Baltagi (2008) which 
has proved to fit better the estimated model. A Likelihood-ratio test of Sigma u=0 rejected at 1% level 
in favour of random effects and the F-test of all u_i=0 both confirm the presence of random effects in 
the model. Although we are not using Tobit estimation in panel data analysis, the consistency between 
the 2SLS estimations in Tables C1 and C2 are obvious. We are not attempting to calculate the training 
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premium for start-ups and mature companies separately, although we can conclude that there are 
significant and positive returns, which are about 15-20% higher for the mature firms (>10 years).  
 
3.4.3. The implied elasticity of training to patent protection  
 
The most interesting finding linked to managerial policy is related to estimating the effect of 
patent protection in inducing more training and education expenditure. Equation (1.9) by incrementing 
training expenditures enables to compute the implied elasticity of training to patent protection (ET). 
Because this is a log-linear computation the direct effect can be read from the coefficient alone 
(multiplied by 100%).  
What would happen with training expenditure if a company chooses to protect its innovation 
by patenting and why? Table C1 (first stage results) show that holding a patent does not imply more 
investment in training. This effect does not change across the CIS4 and CIS5 for the same companies. 
The result goes contrary to the perception of patents and training being complements.  
Comparing both returns on patenting and training, one could understand that the returns to 
patenting overwhelmingly overweight the returns to training with 200% returns on patenting vs. at a 
maximum 36% returns on innovative training. Although we are not claiming that the investment in 
training and education is not important, it is definitely not a first priority for those companies who are 
able to extract higher benefits on innovative sales once they hold a patent. Patent premia earned on 
innovation protection disincentivise or have zero-effect on additional training expenditure for the 
firms that have higher patent propensity. On the contrary, those companies with a lower patent 
propensity are constrained to spend more on the other forms of formal protection such as registration 
of design, confidentiality agreements, copyright as well as informal protection such as secrecy, lead-
time advantage on competitors, complexity design, information on markets. In order to be able to 
introduce these methods of innovation protection, the firm will spend more on training and education 
of its personnel as well as will employ more staff with science and engineering degrees. Existence of 
other forms of innovation protection will drive knowledge investment in training out of those markets 
were the protection has already been granted. Therefore, we reject H3 and do not find any relationship 
of the impact of patenting on investment in innovative training. This effect has not been estimated on 
the split sample – young vs. mature firms, which should become a subject for the future research.  
 
3.4.4. New product revenue, training expenditure and their drivers  
 
The results for the instrumenting of innovative training expenditure (first stage estimates) 
presented in Table C1 on page 24, give us an idea of the importance of various drivers of training for 
innovative training expenditure. Mostly of the included controls are significant in at least two waves 
of the CIS data. Consistent with most of the literature (see, e.g., Baldwin and Johnson, 1995, for 
Canada; Korber and Muravyev, 2008, for Ukraine ) relating training and firm size, we find that small 
firms‘ training expenditure is 19-39% less than that of the medium-sized firms, while for the large 
firms it is 13-58% higher, for different waves of the data; (however, cf. Hansson (2007) who in a 
sample of 26 countries did not find any effect of firm size on either training as percent of wage bill, or 
on the share of employees trained). The number of competitors has a positive impact on training 
expenditure, which suggests that the firms may use their training policy as a strategy against their 
industry rivals. Interestingly, cooperation between the firm and the university/research institute has a 
strong positive impact on training, the presence of such increasing training expenditure by 46-61%. 
Global scope of operations (exporting activities) is found to be negatively related to training, however, 
this result is only significant for the CIS4. The share of degree-educated scientists among the firm‘s 
employees is positive and significant consistently across all three waves, with 1% increase in the 
number of scientists leading to a 1% in the innovative training expenditure. Ours is the first study that 
employs this variable as a driver of training (as opposed to the share of worker with higher education 
in general). Ownership type (public or foreign-owned) is not significantly related to innovative 
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training, which is in contrast to, e.g., Korber and Muravyev (2008) who find that state ownership has a 
positive effect on training. 
With regards to the variation of innovative training expenditure by industry, we find that 
training expenditure tends to be 45-53% higher in the computer & electronic equipment industry, 40-
61% higher in the production of instruments, and 30% in transportation industry, but the latter result is 
obtained for CIS4 data only. (Dumbrell (2002) analyses expenditure on training in Australia firms, 
however, our results are not directly comparable as he uses a different industry classification).  
Finally, our first instrument viz. firm ―Reported the importance of increased capacity for 
production or service provision for the product (good or service) and/or process innovations. Four 
mutually exclusive responses (0 - Not used; 1-Low; 2 - Medium; 3 - High)‖, increases training 
expenditure by 16-31% for a unit increase in the indicator and is significant for all three waves of data.  
The second instrument viz. firm ―Reported the importance to enterprise the lack of information 
on markets as a factor which constraints innovation activities. Four mutually exclusive responses (0 - 
Not used; 1-Low; 2 - Medium; 3 - High)‖, has a positive 5% effect on training expenditure for a unit 
increase in the indicator, although only in CIS6. As pointed out in Section 3.4.3, patent adoption is not 
found to have any significant effect on the innovative training expenditure. 
 
3.4.6. Discussion 
Our study develops the methodology (a model) and quantifies additional revenue coming from 
sales of the new products due to investment in innovative training by the firm and the fact that a firm 
holds a patent to protect its innovation. The result is estimated for the UK innovative companies and 
can the model could be easily applied for the other micro-level studies using various proxy for 
innovative outcomes and knowledge expenditure. This is our contribution to literature on returns to 
patenting and training. 
Our estimates show that the returns on investment in innovative training are generally lower 
than those found in the previous studies researching on the impact of training on the firm‘s 
performance (Bartel, 2000). The results obtained with instrumented panel data technique establish the 
returns to training are on average about 3.7-3.8% overall and 2.8% for start-ups and 3.3% for mature 
firms over the period 2002-2009. More sophisticated Tobit estimation quantifies the returns on 
training is between 15 and 36% over the period 2002-2009 using cross-section technique.  Moreover, 
since we measure the returns to innovative training using NPR, which includes only the increase in the 
company's innovative outcomes; we cannot expect them to be as high as the corresponding return to 
training using other more general measures (total sales, overall labour productivity, value added).  
Using both cross-section and panel data estimation we show that there are positive returns to 
training and patenting in terms of new product sales. In addition, this study enables to achieve more 
precise measures of ROI, as a follow up to the previous studies. Panel data estimation enables us to 
control both for fixed and random effects and justify the results obtained using cross section analyses 
for three periods (CIS4-6). The only exception of Cassidy et al. (2005) research on returns to training 
is cross-sectional with noise coming from previous periods and potentially effecting innovative 
outcomes. As noted before, we instrument training which has proven to be endogenous in our model. 
This ensures us an improvement in efficiency; thus, while a number of previous studies failed to find a 
significant link between training and performance, since they did not use instrumenting, this could 
explain such an outcome. On the contrary, our results are robust and significant across all three cross-
sections, and in the panel data with fixed and random effects.  
Our estimates on the patent premium are within 159-264% for CIS4 and CIS5 (Table C1), 
however more precise estimate using panel data narrow down this interval to 192-201% (see Table 
C2). Although this finding is consistent with the estimates by Arora et al. (2011) which assumed 1/3 
patent propensity, the other estimates are considerably lower. Consequently, the method of obtaining 
these results is different and the interval for patent propensity that we infer from our estimates is a lot 
narrower. According Arora et al. (2011) findings we could speak about the propensity to patent for the 
UK innovators which overall is a third of less. This result is also consistent with the descriptive 
statistics of a patent dummy mean, which indicates that only 22-24% of the reporting units protect 
60 
 
 
their innovation by patents. This result is based on the interval obtained using panel data estimation 
with instruments for our endogenous variable and it overlaps with Arora et al. (2011) patent premium 
given the patent propensity is 1/3 or less for the same interval (CIS4-CIS5). There is no special study 
by Intellectual Patent Office UK which analyses a patent propensity of the UK innovators as the study 
carried out by Arora et al. (2008) on the US manufacturing companies. A survey on the patent 
propensity is calling, and until that time 1/3 patent propensity for the UK innovation could be accepted 
as a threshold. This means that the UK innovators patent only a third of their innovations and use other 
methods of protection for the rest of innovation like secrecy, lead-time advantage on competitors, 
complexity design, market information, etc. Patent premia are positive for both young and mature firms 
although we always expect higher premia from the young companies that can benefit more from the patent 
protection.  
Dealing with endogeneity of training expenditure in a system of equations (1.9-1.10) allowed us to 
estimate the main determinants of training as well as to test H3 on the positive increments of patent 
protection to the investment in knowledge (training and education). Rejecting H3 in the Table C1 has an 
important interpretation first of all for policy makers and government agencies. Department of Business, 
Innovation and Skills of the UK government and Intellectual Patent Office UK may be interested in the 
result that there is not going to be any increase in knowledge expenditure for the firm, once the patent 
protection is in force. In fact government agencies interested in stimulating training and education 
expenditure by the UK innovators should encourage inventors to consider other instruments than patents 
and not to rely on high knowledge intensity of the UK business once the patent is issued. Legal protection 
by patents neither encourages nor discourages knowledge expenditure. We would like to advise the 
policy makers to initiate projects that encourage cooperation between the firms and Universities or 
other higher educational institutions as well as the Government or public research institutes located 
locally/ regionally within the UK. This recommendation could be developed from the results of the 
estimation in Table C1 (first stage). Additionally, helping companies to recruit and educate potential 
employees holding a degree level in science and engineering will not only push up the knowledge 
expenditure, but will also increase the innovative outcomes. Both of the policy instruments could be 
considered a main priority while developing skills and innovation policies for the UK active 
innovation performers. 
Finally, lower returns to training compared to returns on patenting overall and for a young 
companies and start-ups (<10 years) will call for policies looking to motivate managers and 
shareholders of the companies to change their approach to training and educational programmes. 
Higher returns on patenting and lower returns on training for a start-ups and young companies should 
draw attention of the government agencies. If there is no link between patent protection and 
knowledge expenditure, small businesses could be benefiting more by restricting market access to 
their competitors via patents and will automatically maximize their profits by cutting other inputs 
costs, including innovative training and education.  
In order to keep up with the modern challenges in innovation this paper calls to formulate efficient 
policy on intellectual property rights protection and knowledge investment on the basis of the results 
obtained in the study. As such, information on the patent propensity of the UK firms could be useful in 
developing the measures that increase this propensity. Not surprisingly patent protection makes a lot of 
sense to the firms as it increases the NPR by at least 191%, which seems a promising number both for 
IPO and for new patent applicants. Further research may focus on estimating returns to patenting and 
training by industry (2 or 3 digit SIC) and for non-for-profit units, like the UK based social and green 
entrepreneurs. Same estimations could also be done by the six aggregated industrial sectors used as 
controls in the model and for different levels of eco-innovation effectiveness. The relevant questions 
could be: ―Are the returns to patenting and innovative training different for firms of various sizes, 
location and industries? Are the returns to patenting higher for green innovators and social 
entrepreneurs? What is a patent propensity of the UK innovators by industry? firm size and firm age? 
How the patent propensity may impact final innovative outcomes and firm‘s innovative performance? 
Is there a link between patent protection and investment in knowledge expenditure by firm size, firm 
age, location and the type of industry? This will help formulate policies for providing incentives to 
invest in more training and education by the firm.  
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Appendix A: Output Sustainability to Exogenous and Endogenous Shocks: Evidence from 
Emerging Economies 
 
 
Data Sources and VAR Estimation and Analysis 
 
Data 
The data used in this study are at a monthly frequency and cover the period 2001:M1–2009:M9. The 
variables are measured as follows:  
BAA-AAA is the US corporate bond yield spread calculated as the difference between BAA and AAA 
Moody‘s corporate bond yields; LR is calculated as the nominal lending rate on national currency-
denominated loans at a monthly rate minus current monthly inflation, measured by the consumer price 
index; DS is calculated as the difference between the nominal lending rate on national currency 
denominated loans and the deposit rate on national currency denominated deposits. Same measures of 
one year nominal lending rate on national currency denominated loans and one  year deposit rates on 
national currency denominated deposits were taken within the countries analysed to ensure cross 
country consistency; GAP measures deviations of output, y, from trend, . is estimated with one 
sided moving average, using seven lags. Data were obtained from Datastream, International Monetary 
Fund (International Financial Statistics), National Bank of Ukraine for Ukraine wired 
http://www.bank.gov.ua/Statist/sfs.htm and Deutsche Bundesbank for Germany wired 
http://www.bundesbank.de/statistik/statistik_zeitreihen.en.php; Croatian Central Bureau of Statistics 
for Croatia available at: http://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm Federal Reserve bank of St. Louis 
(Economic Research). 
 
IVAR Estimation 
 
Number of Lags: To determine the number of lags we started by using standard lag-length tests, i.e. 
Akaike information criteria (AIC), Hannan–Quinn (HQ), and Schwarz. We controlled for residuals 
autocorrelation functions (cross-correlograms) across the lagged variables looking at the behaviour of 
residuals within the two standard error bans (taken for 24 lags). The choice of a lag length and the test 
results are likely to be robust, because of an assumption of covariance stationarity of the considered 
variables. The number of lags chosen is three.  
Panel Unit root test 
Table A1. Panel Unit root tests (Summary)* 
Method Statistic Prob.** 
Cross- 
sections*** 
Number of 
observations 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.214 0.0007 40 4480 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -16.516 0.0000 40 4480 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 588.655 0.0000 40 4480 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 262.596 0.0000 40 4640 
*Automatic lag length selection based on SIC: 0 to 12 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic 
normality 
*** Number of cross-sections explains 13 countries and 4 variables included in the model. One variable which is US corporate 
bond yields spread does not vary across the countries, therefore 3*13+1=40.  The output of four Panel Unit root tests in Table 
A1 allows us to reject the null of a unit root in a panel of 13 transition countries. The process is I(0).  
Source: Author‘s calculations. 
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Figure A.1 Generalised Impulse Responses, Output response to historical shock to BAA-AAA (left column) 
and LR (right column). 
 
Note: The impulse graphs include one-standard-error bands. 
Source: Author‘s calculations. 
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Appendix B: Entrepreneurship and cities: Evidence from Post-Communist World  
 
 
 
Figure B1: Number of Small Businesses Registered in a City in 1995 
 
Note: Year 2006 is included instead of 2008 for compatibility of cities with the base year 1995. Data 
on small businesses in 2008 is missing for twenty out of 96 cities.  
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Figure B2: Number of Small Businesses Registered in a City in 2006 
 
Note: Year 2006 is included instead of 2008 for compatibility of cities with the base year 1995. Data 
on small businesses in 2008 is missing for twenty out of 96 cities. 
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Figure B3: Growth in the number of Small Businesses Registered in a City, 1995-2006 
 
Note: Year 2006 is included instead of 2008 for compatibility of cities with the base year 1995. Data 
on small businesses in 2008 is missing for twenty out of 96 cities. 
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Table B1: Descriptive statistics and definitions of the variables 
 
Variable Definition Obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max 
SMEs 
Number of small and medium-
sized businesses registered, 
logarithm 
1160 8.46 1.05 4.09 12.35 
SMEs lagged 
Number of small and medium-
sized businesses registered taken in 
logs, first lag 
1116 8.45 1.05 4.09 12.35 
Public 
expenditure 
Public expenditure to GDP ratio 1077 0.59 0.47 0.06 5.73 
Capital 
investment 
Capital investment  to GDP ratio 987 0.24 0.17 0.01 1.51 
University 
Number of high educational  
establishments in a city 
1372 7.33 13.26 1.00 103.00 
University* 
Manufacturing/
energy/mining 
Interaction: Number of high 
educational  establishments and 
share 
Manufacturing/energy/mining 
sector GDP of a city 
1372 91.01 181.85 0.00 1406.5 
Population 
density 
Population density in the city per 
sq. km, 
Logarithm 
1307 7.75 0.58 5.82 9.18 
Air pollution 
Air pollution, 1000 tons per 
resident 
1148 0.29 0.55 0.00 5.46 
Unemployment 
rate 
Unemployment rate - % 1040 3.45 4.08 0.10 30.20 
GDP per capita 
GDP per capita in constant 2005 
USD, millions 
1157 7.59 0.77 5.50 11.45 
Banking reform 
EBRD. Banking reform and 
interest rate 
liberalization from 4- to 4+, where 
1 represented no progress in reform 
and 4 major advances 
1372 2.17 0.41 1.00 3.00 
Executive 
constraints 
Polity IV project. ‗Executive 
constraints‘ where 1 represented 
‗unlimited authority‘and 7 
‗executive parity‘ 
1372 4.37 1.11 2.00 7.00 
Criminality 
Number of crimes per 1000 
residents, logarithm 
1035 2.68 0.53 0.96 4.06 
Freedom of 
doing business 
The Heritage Foundation. The 
business freedom score between 0 
and 100, with 100 equalling the 
freest business environment 
1274 55.82 6.62 40.00 85.00 
Manufacturing/
energy/mining 
Industry contribution to GDP (%) -  
Manufacturing, energy & mining 
1372 12.81 11.06 0.00 82.74 
Agriculture/fis
hery 
Industry contribution to GDP (%) -  
Agriculture and fishery 
1372 22.28 13.92 0.00 81.16 
Trade 
Industry contribution to GDP (%) -  
Trade 
1372 7.36 4.76 0.00 31.18 
Constriction 
Industry contribution to GDP (%) -  
Constriction 
1372 12.96 8.82 0.24 62.40 
Transport 
Industry contribution to GDP (%) - 
Transport 
1372 10.53 3.43 1.23 21.20 
Finance 
Industry contribution to GDP (%) -  
Finance 
1372 1.11 2.22 0.00 19.70 
Education 
Industry contribution to GDP (%) - 
Education 
1372 4.16 1.31 0.90 9.80 
Source CIS Urban Audit 1995-2008. 
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Table B2: Correlation matrix for CIS urban audit variables 
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SMEs 1.00                   
SMEs lagged 0.97* 1.00                  
Public expenditure -0.30* -0.29* 1.00                 
Capital investment 0.03 0.03 0.21* 1.00                
University 0.64* 0.64* -0.19* 0.00 1.00               
Population density 0.19* 0.19* -0.35* -0.09* 0.28* 1.00              
Air pollution -0.09* -0.12* -0.07* -0.09* -0.11* -0.12* 1.00             
Unemployment rate -0.08* -0.08* -0.10* -0.06* -0.15* 0.10* -0.09* 1.00            
GDP per capita 0.18* 0.16* -0.26* 0.07* 0.24* 0.03 0.40* -0.25* 1.00           
Bankingreform 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.10* -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.13* 0.35* 1.00          
Executive constraints -0.04 -0.04 -0.11* -0.04 0.00 0.05* -0.02 0.04 -0.09* 0.45* 1.00         
Criminality 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.13* -0.04 -0.26* 0.25* -0.37* 0.27* -0.25* -0.19* 1.00        
Freedom of doing business 0.04 0.06* 0.02 -0.09* -0.04 -0.07* 0.02 0.30* 0.01 -0.04 -0.12* 0.09* 1.00       
Manufacturing/energy/mining 0.10* 0.08* 0.09* 0.27* -0.02 -0.03 -0.22* 0.04 -0.27* -0.09* -0.10* -0.13* -0.02 1.00      
Agriculture/fishery -0.03 -0.01 -0.17* -0.08* -0.18* -0.21* 0.37* 0.08* 0.28* -0.08* -0.11* 0.24* 0.18* -0.17* 1.00     
Trade 0.18* 0.14* -0.08* 0.24* 0.14* 0.15* -0.02 0.26* 0.17* 0.00 -0.12* -0.25* 0.03 0.28* -0.04 1.00    
Constriction 0.48* 0.48* -0.09* -0.04 0.56* 0.07* -0.20* -0.10* 0.03 -0.03 -0.04* 0.08* 0.16* 0.26* -0.03 0.04 1.00   
Transport 0.26* 0.26* -0.15* -0.22* 0.06* 0.01 0.08* -0.19* 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.30* 0.01 -0.06* -0.14* -0.14* 0.10* 1.00  
Finance 0.09* 0.09* 0.21* 0.15* 0.35* 0.11* -0.13* 0.08* -0.05* 0.03 0.03 -0.30* -0.03 0.11* -0.22* 0.23* 0.15* -0.23* 1.00 
Education -0.29* -0.30* 0.25* 0.08* -0.15* -0.12* -0.25* -0.12* -0.30* 0.00 0.07* 0.07* -0.17* 0.24* -0.56* -0.08* -0.05* 0.09* -0.13* 
Note: Level of statistical significance is 5%.  
Source:  CIS 1995-2006. All variables are taken in logarithms, excluding those in rations and percentage and binary values. 
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Table B3: Regression results philosophy – dependent variable – Number of SMEs 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimation method Pooled Fixed Effects System GMM System GMM 
SMEs lagged 
0.912*** 
(0.03) 
0.357*** 
(0.03) 
0.468*** 
(0.14) 
0.439*** 
(0.14) 
Public expenditure 
-0.052 
(0.05) 
-0.038 
(0.06) 
-0.450* 
(0.23) 
-0.419* 
(0.23) 
Capital investment 
-0.059 
(0.06) 
-0.128 
(0.08) 
0.487 
(0.36) 
0.597* 
(0.36) 
University 
0.004** 
(0.00) 
-0.006 
(0.01) 
0.024*** 
(0.01) 
0.023*** 
(0.01) 
University* manufacturing    
0.001* 
(0.00) 
Population density 
-0.0179 
(0.02) 
0.625*** 
(0.08) 
0.052 
(0.10) 
0.051 
(0.10) 
Air pollution 
-0.002 
(0.02) 
0.037 
(0.07) 
0.128 
(0.09) 
0.131 
(0.09) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.026 
(0.01) 
-0.024 
(0.02) 
GDP per capita 
-0.074 
(0.05) 
-0.027 
(0.05) 
-0.542** 
(0.23) 
-0.568** 
(0.24) 
Banking reform 
0.036 
(0.12) 
0.189* 
(0.11) 
0.807** 
(0.38) 
0.812** 
(0.38) 
Executive constraints 
-0.029* 
(0.02) 
-0.023 
(0.03) 
0.059 
(0.05) 
0.0584 
(0.06) 
Criminality 
-0.021 
(0.02) 
-0.016 
(0.03) 
-0.046 
(0.08) 
-0.049 
(0.08) 
Freedom of doing business 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.002 
(0.00) 
0.004 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
Industrial controls 
Manufacturing/energy/mining 
0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.008** 
(0.00) 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.008 
(0.01) 
Agriculture/fishery 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
Trade 
0.002 
(0.00) 
0.012* 
(0.01) 
0.006 
(0.01) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
Constriction 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.006 
(0.00) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
Transport 
0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
0.008 
(0.02) 
0.005 
(0.02) 
Finance 
0.005 
(0.01) 
-0.008 
(0.02) 
0.036 
(0.03) 
0.015 
(0.03) 
Education 
-0.038*** 
(0.01) 
0.008 
(0.02) 
-0.137** 
(0.06) 
-0.143** 
(0.06) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country controls No No Yes Yes 
Number obs. 732 732 732 732 
R-square 0.96 0.49   
Pr>z AR(1) / Pr>z AR(2)   0.00/ 0.35 0.00/ 0.60 
Hansen test, Pr.>chi2   0.24 0.24 
Dif. Hansen test, Pr.>chi2   0.23 0.25 
Source: Authors‘ calculations based on CIS Urban Audit dataset 1995-2008. 
Notes: Level of statistical significance is * 0.1%. ** 0.05% and ***, 0.01%. Excluded instruments two: employment and 
unemployment. Year type dummies are supressed to safe space, only those important in interpreting the research 
hypothesis such as sector controls are kept for demonstrative purposes.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. The figures reported for the Hansen test and Difference Hansen test are the p-values for the null 
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hypothesis: valid specification. Instruments for first differences equation GMM-type [L(2/.).(SMEs lagged Unemployment 
rate GDP per capita Capital investment)] collapsed. Instruments for levels equation: GMM-type [DL SMEs lagged 
Unemployment rate GDP per capita Capital investment) collapsed and all other regressors, including time controls, used as 
standard instruments here. Note: the autocorrelation test shows that the residuals are an AR(1) process which is what is 
expected. The test statistic for second-order serial correlation is based on residuals from the first-difference equation. F-test 
for excluded instruments shown in spec. 3-4  rejects null of instrument of the instruments applied in System GMM 
estimation to be not jointly significant: F test (35, 84) = 5978.83 for spec. 3 and Ftest(36, 84)= 5038.53 for spec. 4. 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C1: Training premium equation: cross-section estimation by CIS 
Dep. Var.: NPR in 
000s £, log 
CIS4 (2002-2004) CIS5 (2004-2006) CIS6 (2007-2009) 
Estimation method OLS 2SLS IV Tobit OLS 2SLS IV Tobit OLS 2SLS IV Tobit 
Training 
0.28*** 
(0.05) 
3.45*** 
(0.58) 
20.6*** 
(3.43) 
0.33*** 
(0.06) 
3.22*** 
(0.47) 
14.8*** 
(2.29) 
0.50*** 
(0.09) 
5.14*** 
(0.74) 
36.4*** 
(5.51) 
Rivals 
-0.14** 
(0.06) 
-0.50*** 
(0.18) 
-2.77*** 
(0.98) 
-0.18*** 
(0.07) 
-0.51*** 
(0.18) 
-2.52*** 
(0.88) 
-0.17*** 
(0.06) 
-0.15 
(0.15) 
-0.78 
(1.09) 
Global 
0.60*** 
(0.20) 
1.20*** 
(0.41) 
6.18*** 
(2.23) 
0.84*** 
(0.18) 
1.12*** 
(0.39) 
4.64** 
(1.84) 
1.02*** 
(0.18) 
0.34 
(0.37) 
1.49 
(2.57) 
Public 
0.29** 
(0.12) 
0.81 
(0.56) 
6.84** 
(3.47) 
0.31** 
(0.12) 
1.00 
(0.63) 
5.55* 
(3.33) 
0.23** 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.49) 
-0.69 
(3.63) 
Foreign 
-0.43 
(0.27) 
-0.91 
(0.57) 
-5.02 
(3.08) 
-0.40 
(0.27) 
-0.40 
(0.57) 
-2.37 
(2.79) 
0.033 
(0.24) 
0.81* 
(0.49) 
6.20* 
(3.45) 
Cooperation 
2.36*** 
(0.39) 
0.60 
(0.65) 
-3.45 
(3.45) 
2.85*** 
(0.46) 
0.63 
(0.69) 
-1.25 
(3.01) 
2.13*** 
(0.34) 
-1.33* 
(0.72) 
-15.9*** 
(4.98) 
Patents 
2.08*** 
(0.21) 
1.62*** 
(0.35) 
6.43*** 
(1.93) 
1.24*** 
(0.18) 
0.59* 
(0.35) 
2.94* 
(1.68)    
Scientists 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
-0.16** 
(0.08) 
-1.27*** 
(0.44) 
0.11*** 
(0.02) 
-0.080 
(0.06) 
-0.32 
(0.31) 
0.14*** 
(0.02) 
-0.25*** 
(0.08) 
-1.97*** 
(0.57) 
Small firm 
0.15 
(0.13) 
1.24*** 
(0.42) 
7.86*** 
(2.39) 
0.39*** 
(0.13) 
1.65*** 
(0.44) 
8.99*** 
(2.19) 
0.31*** 
(0.12) 
1.15*** 
(0.36) 
9.05*** 
(2.60) 
Large firm 
0.11 
(0.19) 
-1.99*** 
(0.57) 
-12.8*** 
(3.25) 
0.11 
(0.18) 
-1.31** 
(0.52) 
-7.02*** 
(2.50) 
-0.13 
(0.15) 
-0.57 
(0.38) 
-6.12** 
(2.78) 
Biotech and 
pharmaceutical 
-1.33 
(0.89) 
-3.40* 
(1.89) 
-15.3 
(10.52) 
-0.72 
(1.01) 
-0.11 
(1.77) 
-0.052 
(8.11) 
-0.30 
(0.83) 
-0.72 
(1.80) 
-3.02 
(12.36) 
Computers & 
electronic equipment 
0.32 
(0.51) 
-0.75 
(1.05) 
-5.98 
(5.57) 
0.94* 
(0.55) 
-0.69 
(1.08) 
-3.22 
(4.80) 
0.39 
(0.48) 
0.44 
(0.88) 
2.79 
(6.03) 
Machinery 
0.20 
(0.39) 
-0.69 
(0.74) 
-4.36 
(4.01) 
-0.096 
(0.38) 
-0.95 
(0.69) 
-5.08 
(3.25) 
0.30 
(0.34) 
-0.11 
(0.64) 
-2.43 
(4.41) 
Instruments 
0.91 
(0.81) 
0.50 
(1.24) 
-0.058 
(6.51) 
1.11 
(0.73) 
-0.21 
(1.34) 
-5.30 
(5.84) 
1.99*** 
(0.75) 
-0.71 
(1.13) 
-12.4 
(7.63) 
Transportation 
-0.53*** 
(0.15) 
-1.21* 
(0.73) 
-8.61* 
(4.47) 
-0.21 
(0.15) 
0.01 
(0.77) 
-7.40 
(5.34) 
-0.14 
(0.15) 
-0.17 
(0.60) 
-2.04 
(4.72) 
Medical instruments 
1.98 
(1.21) 
2.36 
(2.33) 
14.0 
(12.47) 
1.67 
(1.59) 
2.28 
(2.31) 
7.84 
(10.18) 
2.45** 
(1.07) 
0.64 
(2.08) 
-1.81 
(13.87) 
Constant 
0.89* 
(0.47) 
-0.13 
(1.31) 
-27.3*** 
(7.51) 
0.79 
(0.49) 
-0.33 
(1.42) 
-24.9*** 
(7.03) 
0.98** 
(0.44) 
-0.025 
(1.17) 
-29.5*** 
(8.57) 
Obs. 3942 1779 1779 3662 1413 1413 4049 2152 2152 
R-square 0.170 -0.976  0.164 -0.734  0.164 -1.406  
F statistics 26.24 10.45  20.69 9.36  20.33 10.85  
Sargan J-statistics  0.001   0.028   0.049  
Sargan  J stat. p-
value 
 0.96   0.86   0.82  
Anderson-Rubin chi-
sq 
 86.83   100.15   143.53  
Kleibergen-Paap 
LM statistic p-
value 
 0.00   0.00   0.00  
Uncensored obs.   307   268   360 
Likelihood   -4864.3   -3974.0   -5117.5 
Wald test chi2(1)   39.95   36.39   34.16 
First stage estimates: Dep. Variable: Training expenditure, log 
Rivals 
  
0.090** 
(0.04)   
0.081* 
(0.04)   
-0.013 
(0.03) 
Global 
  
-0.16* 
(0.09)   
-0.10 
(0.10)   
0.062 
(0.06) 
Public 
  
-0.11 
(0.13)   
-0.22 
(0.15)   
0.01 
(0.08) 
Foreign 
  
0.16 
(0.13)   
-0.20 
(0.14)   
-0.11 
(0.08) 
Cooperation 
  
0.46*** 
(0.13)   
0.49*** 
(0.15)   
0.61*** 
(0.08) 
Patents 
  
0.03 
(0.08)   
0.05 
(0.08)    
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Scientists 
  
0.01*** 
(0.01)   
0.01*** 
(0.01)   
0.01*** 
(0.01) 
Small firm 
  
-0.30*** 
(0.09)   
-0.39*** 
(0.10)   
-0.19*** 
(0.06) 
Large firm 
  
0.58*** 
(0.10)   
0.51*** 
(0.11)   
0.13** 
(0.06) 
Biotech and 
pharmaceuticals   
0.38 
(0.44)   
-0.36 
(0.43)   
0.14 
(0.31) 
Computers & 
electronic equipment   
0.45* 
(0.23)   
0.53** 
(0.26)   
-0.02 
(0.15) 
Machinery 
  
0.16 
(0.17)   
0.21 
(0.17)   
0.01 
(0.11) 
Instruments 
  
0.044 
(0.29)   
0.61* 
(0.32)   
0.40** 
(0.19) 
Transportation 
  
0.30* 
(0.17)   
-0.20 
(0.19)   
-0.02 
(0.10) 
Medical instruments 
  
-0.63 
(0.53)   
-0.51 
(0.56)   
0.31 
(0.36) 
Firm‘s capacity 
  
0.24*** 
(0.03)   
0.31*** 
(0.04)   
0.16*** 
(0.02) 
Market info 
  
-0.03 
(0.03)   
0.06 
(0.05)   
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
Constant 
  
0.18 
(0.30)   
0.39 
(0.34)   
0.18 
(0.20) 
F – stat for 
instruments 
 29.83   37.24   27.13  
Notes: *** - significant at 0.01; ** - significant at 0.05; * - significant at 0.1. 3-digit SIC (92) dummies for Top6 industries 
viz. Machinery, Biotech and pharmaceuticals, computers and electronic equipment, transportation, instruments and 
medical instruments are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses robust to heteroskedasticity. HF index as a measure of 
competition intensity was taken out due to Top 6 sectors (SIC) control. Those sectors are introduced as SIC(92) 
classification. 
Source: Office of National Statistics UK. 
 
 
Table C2: Training premium equation:  panel data estimation 
Dep. Var.: NPR in 000s £, log 
 
Estimation method 
panel-data models 
Instrumental variables for panel-data 
models 
OLS IMLE RE FE RE FE 
EC2SLS 
RE 
Training 
 
0.32*** 
(0.04) 
0.32*** 
(0.02) 
0.32*** 
(0.02) 
0.25*** 
(0.03) 
3.77*** 
(0.34) 
3.81*** 
(0.67) 
3.81*** 
(0.40) 
Rivals 
 
-0.18*** 
(0.05) 
-0.18*** 
(0.04) 
-0.18*** 
(0.04) 
-0.016 
(0.15) 
-0.40*** 
(0.10) 
0.22 
(0.48) 
-0.37*** 
(0.10) 
Global 
 
0.78*** 
(0.12) 
0.78*** 
(0.09) 
0.78*** 
(0.09) 
0.36** 
(0.15) 
0.95*** 
(0.23) 
0.66 
(0.47) 
0.90*** 
(0.22) 
Public 
 
0.30*** 
(0.08) 
0.30** 
(0.12) 
0.30** 
(0.12) 
- 
 
0.55* 
(0.33) 
- 
 
0.57* 
(0.30) 
Foreign 
 
-0.22 
(0.19) 
-0.22 
(0.14) 
-0.22 
(0.14) 
 
- 
-0.15 
(0.32) 
 
- 
-0.15 
(0.29) 
Cooperation 
 
2.32*** 
(0.23) 
2.31*** 
(0.14) 
2.32*** 
(0.14) 
1.89*** 
(0.17) 
0.072 
(0.38) 
0.18 
(0.56) 
0.15 
(0.40) 
Patents 
 
1.27*** 
(0.14) 
1.25*** 
(0.10) 
1.27*** 
(0.10) 
0.62*** 
(0.11) 
0.92*** 
(0.24) 
0.38 
(0.34) 
1.01*** 
(0.20) 
Scientists 
 
0.12*** 
(0.01) 
0.12*** 
(0.01) 
0.12*** 
(0.01) 
0.12*** 
(0.02) 
-0.15*** 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
Small firm 
 
0.24*** 
(0.08) 
0.23*** 
(0.09) 
0.24*** 
(0.09) 
-0.022 
(0.22) 
1.25*** 
(0.24) 
-0.52 
(0.78) 
1.02*** 
(0.20) 
Large firm 
0.030 
(0.12) 
0.030 
(0.10) 
0.030 
(0.10) 
-0.068 
(0.33) 
-1.28*** 
(0.28) 
-0.76 
(1.30) 
-1.05*** 
(0.21) 
Biotech and pharmaceuticals 
-0.58 
(0.70) 
-0.57 
(0.50) 
-0.58 
(0.50) 
-0.17 
(1.36) 
-1.26 
(1.10) 
2.62 
(4.06) 
-1.32 
(0.98) 
  
73 
 
 
Computers & electronic 
equipment 
0.50 
(0.36) 
0.50* 
(0.27) 
0.50* 
(0.26) 
-0.38 
(0.82) 
-0.46 
(0.60) 
-0.80 
(2.59) 
-0.39 
(0.50) 
Machinery 
0.20 
(0.26) 
0.21 
(0.19) 
0.20 
(0.19) 
0.061 
(0.63) 
-0.57 
(0.42) 
-0.77 
(2.04) 
-0.50 
(0.35) 
Instruments 
1.54*** 
(0.53) 
1.55*** 
(0.35) 
1.54*** 
(0.35) 
2.15** 
(0.97) 
0.13 
(0.74) 
-1.56 
(3.03) 
0.17 
(0.65) 
Transportation 
-0.32*** 
(0.10) 
-0.33** 
(0.16) 
-0.32** 
(0.16) 
-0.72 
(0.82) 
-0.52 
(0.41) 
-5.04 
(4.00) 
-0.49 
(0.37) 
Medical instruments 
2.20*** 
(0.83) 
2.21*** 
(0.65) 
2.20*** 
(0.64) 
2.39 
(2.10) 
2.26* 
(1.36) 
-0.42 
(5.57) 
2.00* 
(1.02) 
Year dummy CIS5 
 
-0.28*** 
(0.07) 
-0.28*** 
(0.07) 
-0.28*** 
(0.07) 
-0.27*** 
(0.07) 
-0.12 
(0.21) 
-0.33 
(0.25) 
-0.14 
(0.19) 
Year dummy CIS6 
 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.16** 
(0.07) 
2.38*** 
(0.31) 
2.00*** 
(0.50) 
2.20*** 
(0.24) 
Constant 
 
1.11*** 
(0.32) 
1.12*** 
(0.31) 
1.11*** 
(0.31) 
0.87 
(0.96) 
-0.92 
(0.81) 
-3.37 
(3.16) 
-0.60 
(0.74) 
Obs. 11653 11653 11653 11653 5344 5344 5013 
Sigma u 1.56 1.64 1.56 2.44 2.40 5.29 2.40 
Sigma e 2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93 5.72 5.72 5.72 
Rho 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.41 0.15 0.46 0.15 
chi2 745.414 1508.95 1740.58 
 
468.1 706.8 468.1 
F_f 
   
1.91 
 
0.55 
 
Chibar2 
 
589.49 
     
Notes: *** - significant at 0.01; ** - significant at 0.05; * - significant at 0.1 Standard errors are in parentheses 
robust to heteroskedasticity.  
Note: Panel data estimation models: OLS (Pooled OLS)- , FE (Fixed) -, RE random-effects, and 
IMLE (Iterative maximum likelihood estimation) models; EC2SLS RE (Baltagi's EC2SLS random-effects 
estimator).  F_f – F-test that all u_i=0 – rejected marginally at 10% revel for the panel data estimation and did not 
rejected for the instrumented panel-data models. Chibar2 is a Likelihood-ratio test of Sigma u=0 rejected at 1% 
level in favour of random effects. Hausman test (HT) chi2=171,0 signalling the endogeneity problem between the 
regressors and residuals in the model. This is also true for the instrumented regression (column (5-7) when two 
Hausman tests were performed: fixed effects vs. random effects estimator and fixed effects vs. Baltagi random 
effects estimators. Both HT reject the exogeneity of RE with the chi2=31.0 and EC2SLS RE with chi2=29.0. 
Although HT says that the error term is contaminated with endogeneity, Likelihood-ratio test of Sigma u=0 
confirm the presence of random effects in the model. Lack of market information as a constraint to innovation and 
the importance of increased capacity for production or service provision were used as instruments. 
Source: Office of National Statistics UK. 
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Table C3: Training -premium equation: firm age split 
Dep. Var.: NPR in 000s £, log Start-ups 
Mature 
firm 
Start-ups Mature firm 
Estimation method OLS OLS Baltagi RE Baltagi RE 
Training 
 
0.36*** 
(0.14) 
0.32*** 
(0.04) 
2.78*** 
(0.55) 
3.32*** 
(0.31) 
Rivals 
 
-0.097 
(0.12) 
-0.19*** 
(0.05) 
0.042 
(0.23) 
-0.44*** 
(0.10) 
Global 
 
1.27*** 
(0.43) 
0.74*** 
(0.13) 
1.22** 
(0.59) 
0.95*** 
(0.22) 
Public 
 
0.49** 
(0.23) 
0.26*** 
(0.08) 
0.25 
(0.81) 
0.53 
(0.33) 
Foreign 
 
0.52 
(0.75) 
-0.27 
(0.19) 
1.00 
(1.00) 
-0.27 
(0.32) 
Cooperation 
 
2.58*** 
(0.58) 
2.28*** 
(0.25) 
1.72** 
(0.75) 
0.25 
(0.36) 
Patents 
 
1.48*** 
(0.46) 
1.25*** 
(0.14) 
1.86*** 
(0.59) 
0.87*** 
(0.23) 
Scientists 
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
0.12*** 
(0.01) 
-0.038 
(0.09) 
-0.10*** 
(0.04) 
Small firm 
 
0.39 
(0.26) 
0.20** 
(0.09) 
2.06*** 
(0.55) 
1.01*** 
(0.24) 
Large firm 
 
-0.14 
(0.38) 
0.065 
(0.12) 
1.27* 
(0.77) 
-1.24*** 
(0.29) 
Biotech and pharmaceuticals 
-2.83*** 
(0.72) 
-0.23 
(0.79) 
-4.51* 
(2.40) 
-0.84 
(1.12) 
Computers & electronic equipment 
-0.97 
(0.68) 
0.78* 
(0.41) 
-1.50 
(0.98) 
-0.14 
(0.64) 
Machinery 
-0.28 
(0.91) 
0.25 
(0.27) 
-0.033 
(1.51) 
-0.52 
(0.42) 
Instruments 
0.85 
(1.73) 
1.62*** 
(0.55) 
-0.75 
(2.81) 
0.26 
(0.73) 
Transportation 
-0.19 
(0.37) 
-0.33*** 
(0.10) 
0.63 
(1.17) 
-0.55 
(0.41) 
Medical instruments 
4.04*** 
(1.23) 
2.01** 
(0.89) 
4.08 
(4.91) 
1.82 
(1.35) 
Year dummy CIS5 
 
-0.47** 
(0.22) 
-0.25*** 
(0.07) 
-0.88 
(0.57) 
-0.10 
(0.20) 
Year dummy CIS6 
 
-0.12 
(0.19) 
0.027 
(0.07) 
0.81 
(0.58) 
2.17*** 
(0.29) 
Constant 
 
0.47 
(0.90) 
1.22*** 
(0.35) 
-2.85 
(1.81) 
-0.21 
(0.81) 
Obs. 1209 10444 520 4824 
Sigma u 1.41 1.57 0 2.90 
Sigma e 2.90 2.93 6.67 5.58 
Rho 0.19 0.22 0 0.21 
chi2 180.10 635.15 115.33 454.49 
Notes: *** - significant at 0.01; ** - significant at 0.05; * - significant at 0.1 Standard errors are in parentheses 
robust to heteroskedasticity. Lack of market information as a constraint to innovation and the importance of 
increased capacity for production or service provision were used as instruments. 
Source: Office of National Statistics UK. 
 
 
Table C4: The patent (revenue) premium at different levels of patent propensity 
CIS wave CIS3 CIS4 CIS5 
Coefficient estimated from the 
model 
0.91 0.49 0.57 
Patent propensity (i) 
1/3 2.75 1.48 1.72 
½ 1.82 0.98 1.14 
2/3 1.37 0.74 0.86 
Note: Each cell represents the value of the patent premium for a given level of patent propensity and based on 
coefficient estimates of patent effectiveness reported in Arora et. al. (2011). 
Source: Arora et. al. (2011). 
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